ENQUIRY OPENED - YONGALA'S FATE.

The Advertiser (Adelaide) Friday 9 June, 1911.

THE YONGALA'S FATE.

ENQUIRY OPENED.

Brisbane. June 8.

The Marine Board enquiry into the loss

of the Adelaide Steamship Company's

steamer Yongala, which disappeared with

all souls in a cyclone on March 24, between

Dent Island and TownsviIle, was opened

this morning. Mr. T. O'shea appeared

on behalf of the Adelaide Steamship 

Company.

E. B. Wareham, Queensland inspector 

and attorney of the Adelaide Steamship

Company, tendered a plan and model of the

steamer, her displacement, and particulars

of the cargo. Mr. Wareham said he had

been in the company's employ for 16 1/2 

years. He was familiar with the Yongala, 

having travelled in her several times. She 

was a fast ship.

Captain Mackay - Was she a stiff ship or

a lively ship?

The Witness - I should call her a stiff

ship. The master, Captain Knight, had a

reputation of being a good seaman and 

a particularly steady man. The ship was

fully equipped. She was built by Armstrong, 

Whitworth, & Co.

It is interesting that this employee and representative of the Adelaide Steamship Company claimed that Yongala was a stiff steamer - implying that there were no issues relating to 'top heavy' instability. The stiffness of the steamer would have been an all-important factor when steaming into the heart of a cyclone. Tenderness would not have been and Mr. Wareham was not about to open Pandora's Box on the witness stand. He was clearly anxious to establish a clean slate by including, though he was not asked, that Captain Knight was beyond reproach and Yongala, a fine steamer (reputation of Armstrong, Whitworth and Co), fully equipped - by implication in the event of an emergency at sea.

Captain Mackay asked the witness about

the rumor that 400 tons of ballast had 

been taken out of the vessel, and the 

witness said he had replied to that. He 

pointed out that when the vessel was 

on the Western Australian trade she 

generally travelled from Fremantle to 

Adelaide with very little cargo, and often 

none at all. Her mean draught from 

Fremantle to Adelaide would be from 

16 ft. 8 in. to 17 ft. 6 in..

If the reporter documented the figure accurately 400 tons of pig iron were significantly more than the 164 tons of pig iron quoted in the Inquiry transcript. Yongala's max. draft figure was 24 ft., which suggests that an average of 17 ft. was notably light condition. 

The Inquiry transcript quoted an average draft of 19.75 ft., final voyage from Flat Top. On the surface of things, this differential would justify the taking out of the pig iron. But was this the whole truth?

It seems extraordinary that Yongala drew 22 ft. 6 in. aft, final voyage, carrying 617 tons (34% of capacity - 1,800 tons) was a mere 1 ft. 6 in. off maximum lading. Does not make sense! The forward draft figure of 17 ft. 9 in. was 6.25 ft. off max. which makes more sense but raises a question about trim and handling with bow being significantly lighter than stern, by 4.75 ft..

'it was explained by the general manager that this ballast, amounting to 164 tons, became unnecessary, owing to cargo being obtainable both up and down the Queensland coast.'

It must be said at this juncture that the mere fact Yongala required between 164 and 400 tons of permanent pig iron ballast, over and above the water ballast component, indicates an inherently tender (top heavy) vessel. The point is well made that there might have been significantly less cargo between Fremantle and Adelaide, but the witness failed to mention that Yongala, as late as December 1910, periodically serviced the route between Adelaide and Fremantle, and not exclusively the east coast! If Yongala was an inherently stiff steamer there would not have been the need for additional permanent ballast.

The water ballast she then carried would

be 400 tons. In May, 1904 it was decided

to put some stiffening in her for the run

across the Bight, and on May 17, at Sydney, 

184 tons of pig iron were stowed in the

after end of the No. 2 hold. In May, 1907,

when the vessel was put on the trade from

Melbourne to Cairns, this was discharged,

as the vessel could rely on having cargo

both ways.

It appears that the reporter confused the figure of 400 tons with ballast water, as he or she might have done referring to 184 tons rather than 164 tons. I am going to take 164 tons of pig iron ballast as given. If Yongala had retained the 164 tons of pig iron, taking into consideration that she was 34% full in terms of cargo, 23 March, she might have survived the storm. After all, the pig iron was added with reference to storm conditions off the Australian Bight and reduced cargo component.

Interesting to note that the pig iron was loaded forward in the ship, hold, 2, which makes sense given the large differential between the aft and forward draft figures, final voyage. The pig iron would have made an important, positive difference to these figures and ostensibly the handling of the steamer.

The witness read a letter from Captain

Knight, dated June 11. 1907, stating that

the vessel seemed much better since the

iron was removed. It had done away, he

said, with the jerking recovery which had

been so noticeable when the iron was on

board and the vessel was in ballast trim.

This is a significant passage. Improved GM stability did not equate with passenger comfort. Further to this I cannot help but draw a comparison with the Waratah. Captain Ilbery of that vessel significantly improved GM stability (reducing the top heaviness factor --> stiffening) for Waratah's final voyage by loading 1,500 tons of lead concentrates at 11 cubic feet to the ton and 8 ft. high in a lower hold midships, creating a significant shift of Waratah's centre of gravity downwards - reducing top heaviness factor. However, during the voyage over from Australia to Durban (South Africa) there were reports of just such a 'jerking recovery' described above which caused passengers to fall on deck. It seems to me that in both cases, making corrections for relatively top heavy vessels, created its own set of problems. 

Referring to the vessel's last trip from

Brisbane, the witness said the vessel took

on at Brisbane 25,500 gallons of water.

Captain Knight had no instructions. The

vessel's draught on leaving Brisbane was

17 ft, 9 in. fore and 22 ft. 6 in. aft. The

draught on leaving Mackay was about 

3 in. less. The actual dead weight on the

vessel was 1,885 tons. The cargo was 

667 tons, coal in the bunkers 615 tons, 

fresh water 120 tons, and stores and 

spare gear 120 tons. The amount of 

water in the ballast tanks was unknown, 

but their total capacity was 4,000 tons. 

With her bunkers full and loaded right 

up with cargo her dead weight would be 

3,500 tons. According to calculations 

based on the coal and water consumed 

the vessel's mean draught at 1 p.m. on 

March 23 was 19 ft. 7 1/2 in.

When Yongala departed Brisbane she had a mean draught of 20.1 ft., and on leaving Mackay after discharging about 50 tons of cargo her draught was allegedly reduced by 3 in.. 

This is an interesting insight. 3 in. = 50 tons. 1,800 tons = 36 in. = 3 ft.. i.e. fully loaded, 24 ft. and completely empty, 21 ft.. I THINK NOT!

Something is not right with these quoted figures. Truth obscured. 

I suspect Yongala was drawing far less than claimed, probably approximating the mean figure in the region of 17 ft. (see crossing the Bight reference above). 

The total capacity of ballast tanks was 400 tons, not 4000 tons as quoted above. The entire gross tonnage of Yongala was 3664 tons.

Questioned by Captain Mackay the witness 

said he had never heard of passengers

having expressed their dissatisfaction with

the vessel when she was in the Western

Australian trade. The vessel on the fatal

trip had no cargo on the upper deck. In

his opinion the Yongala was blown out of

her course and struck a rock and sank.

'Blown out of her course and struck a rock' would have exonerated both Captain Knight and the Adelaide Steamship Company. Stating that Yongala had no cargo on the upper deck was misleading, because the real issue was how much cargo was on deck - according to the Inquiry transcript, at least 1 ton. This was a clever diversion from the truth with obvious implications regarding both GM and the shifting of cargo on deck - see previous post:

http://yongalarevisited.blogspot.co.za/2016/08/yongalas-deck-cargo-adrift.html

The only cargo stowed in the No. 3 lower

hold seemed to have been found. She had

airtight compartments all round except

under the engine-room, and he thought she

struck under the bilges.

Fair enough unless the relatively top heavy unstable Yongala began listing too far and took seas and cross seas over her decks, breaching her after hatch, admitting tons of water into the lower holds, causing her to founder and by which process the release of cargo stowed in number 3 hold, midships.

Captain Mackay said the opinion was

held that when the Grantala sheltered at

Cape Bowling Green she was on the right

hand semicircle of a cyclone, which was

taken to be 30 miles across. Calculations

would show that if the Yongala pursued

her regular course she would strike the

very centre of the disturbance.

The very centre of a cyclone is calm but the seas immensely dangerous for a tender vessel.

Mr. Wareham produced a letter from a

stevedore stating that on leaving Brisbane 

the coal bunkers were full and well trimmed.

Captain Mackay said these cyclonic

storms, travelled (winds) at a hundred miles an

hour. They had been known to travel at

170 miles, and the course of this one was

from north-east at right angles almost to

the course which they supposed Captain

Knight was steering. Therefore the vessel 

could not have been blown onto a reef.

One simple, rational deduction which ruled out striking a reef, and suggesting that Yongala must have been overwhelmed by the cyclone.

Christian Hansen gave evidence confirming

the letter Mr. Wareham had read concerning 

the Yongala's coal bunkers. The witness said 

there was some light cargo at the bottom of 

the vessel, but the heavy cargo was placed 

on top of it. He did not think she rolled more 

than any other ship. He had always heard 

people speak well of the vessel. It would have 

been absolutely impossible for the cargo to

shift. Re-examined, Mr. Wareham said

the Yongala did not carry a raft, only boats. 

The vessel cost £102,000, and the company

got £65,000 insurance, carrying the balance 

of the risk themselves.

As if matters could not get any worse for an allegedly top heavy vessel. Heaviest cargo, lowest down, was the signature for lowered centre of gravity and improved GM stability. If Mr. Hansen is to be believed, this was one further nail in the coffin of a steamer which should never have tackled a cyclonic storm.

Not having a raft is important. In a rapidly deteriorating situation with Yongala listing further and further, regular lifeboats would have been impossible to launch safely. However, a few survivors might have managed to get away from the sinking steamer in a raft and lived to tell the tale.

Edwin Rothwell. master mariner, and

the Government pilot, described the search

made for the Yongala in the steamer Porpoise. 

They found no sign of the vessel.

He was of opinion that the Yongala did

not strike a reef. The hurricane came from

the north-east, and if she had been driven

anywhere it would be on the main shore.

He thought the Yongala met the full force

of the storm about midnight, and simply 

went down. The force of the gale would

give her a list, and some cargo might

move and prevent her recovering. He did

not think there was much chance of a 

further search proving successful. It 

would be possible for the cargo to move 

even if well stowed, and unless something 

like that happened be thought a ship like 

the Yongala would have weathered the storm. 

He calculated that at midnight the Yongala

would be ten or twelve miles north of Cape

Upstart. He did not suggest neglect, as

there was nothing lacking in the ship's

officers or crew. The portions of the ship

picked up did not indicate that she had

gone on a rock.

Again confirmation that Yongala could not have struck a reef and 'simply went down' in the storm. Being a tender (top heavy) steamer the storm 'would give her a list, and some cargo might move and prevent her from recovering'. 'It would be possible for the cargo to move even if well stowed' - and there you have it!! Well said Captain Rothwell.

The wreck site is 25 miles north of Cape Upstart, which means that Captain Rothwell was a mere 13 miles off in his calculations. Remarkable! 

A. M. Leslie, Superintendent of Wharfs

and Stores for Dalgety & Co., said for two

years and three months he was second

officer on the Yongala. She was a tender,

but a safe ship.

Very interesting!! Mr. Leslie, no longer an employee of the Adelaide Steamship Company called a spade a spade - YONGALA WAS A TENDER SHIP.

Captain F. G. Shaw, assistant shipping

inspector, said he inspected the Yongala

when she was in Brisbane on her last 

voyage. She was well equipped and 

complied with the regulations in every 

respect. She had little deck cargo.

Little deck cargo is not the same as NO deck cargo - and 'little' is not a value.

Captain Forrester, shipping inspector,

said the stability of the vessel had never

been questioned by the passengers or 

anyone else.

He would say that wouldn't he, or else his head was for the chopping block.

The enquiry was adjourned till Monday.

ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE.

..the Board fully realise the difficulty inseparable from the task assigned to them, inasmuch as, while partaking to some extent of the nature of the ordinary inquiry into a marine disaster, the cause of which, by personal evidence and attendant circumstances, is usually ascertainable, its identity with such is impaired in this case by the fact that to enable them to arrive at a definite finding no such testimony is available, and it would therefore appear to the Board that, in order to account for the total disappearance of the ill-fated vessel with all on board, the inquiry will chiefly be in the direction of the ship's stability, equipment, and seaworthiness, together with the question of Captain Knight's carefulness and general efficiency as a shipmaster.

As in the case of the Waratah, there was no physical evidence or verifiable eye witness accounts to support the position and cause of the Yongala casualty. In one sense this placed undue pressure on the Court to establish cause and effect. However, in my opinion, there was enough evidence to support the fact that Captain Knight was not as careful and efficient as he might have been.

...to be continued...

The position of the Yongala wreck was discovered many years after the Inquiry.

THE MARINE INQUIRY.

Unique ID:	21077
Description:	BOT Wreck Report for 'Yongala', 1911
Creator:	Board of Trade
Date:	1911
Copyright:	Out of copyright
Partner:	SCC Libraries
Partner ID:	Unknown

Transcription (No. 7477.)

" YONGALA " (S.S.).

REPORT of an Inquiry held by the Marine Board of Queensland into the circumstances attending the loss of the s.s. " YONGALA," of Adelaide, on or about the 23rd day of March, 1911, between Mackay and Townsville.

In complying with the request of the Hon. the Treasurer for immediate steps to be taken to hold a full inquiry, under the provisions of " The Navigation Act of 1876," into the circumstances connected with the loss of the s.s. "Yongala," on or about the night of the 23rd March, 1911, between Mackay and Townsville, the Board fully realise the difficulty inseparable from the task assigned to them, inasmuch as, while partaking to some extent of the nature of the ordinary inquiry into a marine disaster, the cause of which, by personal evidence and attendant circumstances, is usually ascertainable, its identity with such is impaired in this case by the fact that to enable them to arrive at a definite finding no such testimony is available, and it would therefore appear to the Board that, in order to account for the total disappearance of the ill-fated vessel with all on board, the inquiry will chiefly be in the direction of the ship's stability, equipment, and seaworthiness, together with the question of Captain Knight's carefulness and general efficiency as a shipmaster.

Mr. J. T. O'Shea, of Messrs. O'Shea and O'Shea, solicitors, appeared on behalf of the Adelaide Steamship Company. Having heard the evidence of Mr. E. Northcote (the general manager), Mr. E. B. Wareham (the Queensland inspector and attorney), Mr. H. Adamson (the superintending engineer), and C. Hansen (the superintendent stevedore), of the Adelaide Steamship Company; Captain J. Sim (master), W. K. Saunders (mate), and F. K. Blown (chief engineer), of the s.s. "Grantala "; Captain C. MacKenzie (master) of the s.s. " Wollowra," and Mr. A. McG. Leslie, who have for various periods served in the " Yongala "; Captains Hurford of the " Bombala," Smith of the " Cooma," Sharland of the "Warrego," Dibble, late of the Howard Smith Company; Binstead, Torres Strait Pilot; Rothwell, who searched for the wreck in the " Porpoise "; Mr. Bond, the Divisional Officer of the Meteorological Bureau of Queensland; the Shipping Inspector and Assistant Shipping Inspector of Brisbane; the Board find that the s.s. " Yongala," Official Number 118332, registered in Adelaide, Captain William Knight, master, and owned by the Adelaide Steamship Company, Limited, was on a voyage from Melbourne to Cairns, via ports.

In view of certain rumours being in circulation reflecting on the ship's stability, the Board invited, through the Press, persons desirous of giving evidence to attend the inquiry, which notice, however, met with no response.

Stability. 

The " Yongala " was a steel screw steamer of 3,664 tons gross and 1,825 net; length, 350 feet; breadth, 45·2 feet; depth, 27·2 feet; built under special survey in 1903 by Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworth, and Co., Newcastle-on-Tyne, from specifications supplied by the Adelaide Steamship Company. Mr. Adamson, the company's superintendent engineer, supervised her building, and gave in evidence that the that the specifications provided that:

"After the vessel is completed, her centre of gravity is to be ascertained experimentally by inclining her, and curves of stability are to be calculated up to 90 degrees inclination at intervals of not more than 10 degrees and for five different conditions of loading, to be specified by the company". "Complete diagrams of results are to be prepared and supplied to the company". "The inclining experiments are to be performed at the expense of the builders", "and in the presence and to the satisfaction of inspectors appointed by the company to watch the experiments."

These tests were strictly carried out in his presence. Mr. Adamson also stated that the machinery, especially crank shaft and shafting, were 20 to 25 per cent. stronger than Lloyd's requirements.

If further confirmation of the ship's stability and seaworthiness be required, it is to be found in the satisfactory career of the vessel of over seven years' continuous running on the coast of Australia, four of which were in the West Australian trade, where the return journey was always made without cargo in all weathers, without accident.

In regard to pig-iron ballast being placed in the vessel whilst in the West Australian trade, and subsequently removed when the ship was transferred to the Queensland trade, it was explained by the general manager that this ballast, amounting to 164 tons, became unnecessary, owing to cargo being obtainable both up and down the Queensland coast. A letter from Captain Knight to the company at the time confirmed this view; and stated that the ship rolled less, and was more comfortable in a seaway.

From the foregoing the Board are satisfied that the vessel in construction, stability, and seaworthiness was equal to any of her class on the Australian coast.

The cost of the vessel was £102,000. The underwriters' proportion of the insurance was £65,000, and the balance was carried by the owners.

The vessel left Brisbane on the 21st March with a total dead weight of 1,885 tons, fully manned, equipped, in excellent trim, draft aft 22 feet 6 inches, forward 17 feet 9 inches, leaving a clear side of 10 feet 6 inches, with a general cargo and passengers for Northern ports, and reached Mackay on the 23rd March. The weight of cargo in the vessel was 667 tons, almost entirely in the lower hold, and was properly stowed. There were 43 tons in the between decks, 40 of which were for Mackay; and 11 tons on deck, 10 of which were also for Mackay.

The number of persons on board on leaving Mackay were:

First saloon passengers 29.  

Second saloon passengers 19.  

Crew 72. 

Total 120. 

The "Yongala " left the anchorage at Mackay at 1.40 p.m. on the 23rd March, and was reported as having passed Dent Island at 6.30 p.m. on the same day. She was not subsequently heard of. A small portion of her cargo, &c., was picked up on the coast and reefs to the north-west of the Whitsunday Passage.

The Meteorological Bureau telegraphed Flat-top on the 23rd that cyclonic conditions prevailed between Mackay and Townsville. This was signalled to the s.s. " Cooma " from Flat-top; but, unfortunately, the "Yongala" had left some hours previously.

The s.s. " Taiyuan " anchored at Repulse Island on the morning of the 23rd, and had the wind from S.E. (strong gale with occasional terrific squalls). At Dent Island it also blew from S.E., force 7 to 9, with no indication of a cyclone, when the " Yongala" passed at 6.30 p.m.

At Cape Bowling Green, however, the wind commenced at S.S.E., veering to S., S.W., W., and thence to N.W. The "Grantala," bound South, anchored about 7 miles W.N.W. from the Cape, experienced the same weather conditions; barometer 29.50, which would place her on the northern margin of the right-hand semicircle of the storm proving unerringly that in conformity with the laws relating to hurricanes in the Southern Hemisphere it came from the N.E., and in its progressive motion to the S.W. (inland) large trees were uprooted, clearing a well-defined space through the forest at the back of Cape Upstart. 

From the scant data available, it may be assumed that the diameter of the storm did not exceed 30 miles; and as the course of the " Yongala " would be nearly at right angles with the path of the storm, it is just possible that she reached its southern margin, about midnight, between Cape Upstart and Cape Bowling Green.

It has been given in evidence that several masters, including Captain Knight, when proceeding from Whitsunday Passage north, were in the habit of using the inshore route, passing between Armit and Gumbrell Islands. The Board, however, are of opinion, taking into consideration the prevailing weather conditions at the time, that Captain Knight as a careful and experienced master would not use the passage on that occasion.

Several theories were suggested by witnesses (well known shipmasters) as to the cause of the disaster, notably the vessel striking a reef or, owing to some mishap, rendered helpless in the vortex of the storm; but as they were merely conjectures, it is not possible to allow them any consideration; and while it is both gratifying and reassuring that the vessel's stability and seaworthiness remain unassailable, and the competency and carefulness of Captain Knight unimpeachable, the Board, with no desire to indulge in idle speculation, simply find that, after becoming lost to view by the lightkeeper at Dent Island, the fate of the "Yongala" passes beyond human ken into the realms of conjecture, to add one more to the long roll of mysteries of the sea.

The Board have to thank Mr. Northcote, general manager of the Adelaide Steamship Company; Mr. Wareham, the local inspector, and officers for their efforts in supplying every information regarding the vessel. Plans, models, and details of every description were readily furnished, and witnesses brought forward at some inconvenience to the company's working arrangements. The Board also commend the company for their prompt action in endeavouring by every means at their disposal to obtain information regarding the whereabouts of the missing vessel.

From the evidence given by some experienced shipmasters, the Board are confirmed in the opinion that the risk of navigating the Queensland coast is considerably enhanced during the hurricane months, or from December to April; and, although with plenty of sea room and a well-found ship (steam or sail), the observant master can, by heaving to on the right tack, or keeping out of the path of the storm, invariably avert disaster, indeed, at times make it a fair wind to his destined port; but when caught inside the Barrier Reef, with the number of islands and reefs intervening, the Board think it will be generally conceded that the only element of safety is to be found in securing the best anchorage available and several harbours of refuge exist along this part of the coast.

By direction of the Marine Board of Brisbane, this 20th June, 1911.

  

AROHD. MORGAN,  

Secretary.

(Issued in London by the Board of Trade on the 25th day of August, 1911.)

There is a lot to digest and I am going to tackle the transcript section by section in coming posts. Suffice to say that in some respects the report was scant if I compare with the wreck report for the Waratah. Very little attempt was made to outline Yongala's stability in various forms of lading and to what degree 617 tons of cargo, some of which was on deck, affected her GM and righting angle figures. It's as though it was a subject left well alone.

to be continued.....

http://www.plimsoll.org/resources/SCCLibraries/WreckReports2002/21077.asp

WRECKSITE - FITTING TOGETHER THE PIECES OF THE PUZZLE.

The Advertiser (Adelaide) Tuesday 28 March, 1911.

THE WORST FEARED.

VIEWS OF CAPTAINS.

Brisbane, March 27.

No word of the missing Yongala was 

received up to a late hour to-night. The

steamer Grantala, from Cairns via ports,

arrived this evening, and Captain Sim 

when seen on arrival said he met the full 

force of a cyclone within a few hours steam

from Dent Island, where the Yongala was

last sighted. He was therefore in a position 

to give an account of the conditions which 

were probably experienced by the Yongala. 

The Grantala, which is a sister ship to the 

Yongala, left Townsville at 4 pm. on Thursday, 

and arrived off Cape Bowling Green about 

7.30 p.m. the same day. As it was then blowing 

very strongly the captain decided to anchor. 

38 miles = 10.89 knots average. 'Easy steam'. No urgency.

Captain Sim decided to depart Townsville suggesting that there was no cyclone warning at that port and conditions were fairly calm at 4 p.m.. Within 3.5 hours a strong gale came up forcing the decision to anchor in the bay and confirming the sudden energy of the system making landfall at speed.

The wind increased in force from the south 

through west to north. About 100 fathoms 

of cable was paid out, and as the shelter 

was good the ship rode out the gale, which

blew with the force of a cyclone. It was

strongest between 1 and 2 a.m., and was

then blowing from the west south-west.

Upper left hand section of the cyclone, otherwise known as the 'right-hand' of the cyclone.

The wind eventually came round towards

north and the barometer rose.

Cyclone moving over in a more or less southwesterly direction.

Heavy rain fell all night. The anchor was 
raised at 8 a.m. on Friday and the vessel 

proceeded south. Rain and heavy weather

were experienced all the way to Cape 

Moreton. Captain Sim describes the night 

off Bowling Green as one of the worst he 

ever experienced.

Captain McKenzie, of the Innamincka, 

which arrived from Sydney to-night, gave

little hope of the safety of the Yongala.

With the aid of a chart Captain McKenzie

explained that once the Yongala had passed

Dent Island she was in a locality beset by

reefs and islands. With a fearful gale behind 

her and a strong set of the current from the 

land off Burdekin River she would be moving 

through the water at a good pace. He spoke 

in the highest terms of the seagoing qualities 

of the Yongala, but, under the circumstances 

which were experienced by the Grantala in 

the same locality, he had to take a very serious 

view of the matter.

This expert comment supports my contention that Yongala averaged almost 17 knots to the disaster site, 11 miles off Cape Bowling Green Light. From the description given by Captain Sim of the cyclone's sudden development (and dissipation) in the vicinity of Cape Bowling Green, it is strongly suggested that Yongala steamed into the eye and where seas 'come from all directions' overwhelming the tender steamer.