PIG IRON BALLAST.

Inquiry:

'In regard to pig-iron ballast being placed in the vessel whilst in the West Australian trade, and subsequently removed when the ship was transferred to the Queensland trade, it was explained by the general manager that this ballast, amounting to 164 tons, became unnecessary, owing to cargo being obtainable both up and down the Queensland coast. A letter from Captain Knight to the company at the time confirmed this view; and stated that the ship rolled less, and was more comfortable in a seaway.'

Cairns Post, Wednesday 14 June, 1911.

The Yongala Inquiry.

Marine Board inquiry resumed.

Further Evidence.

(By Telegraph.) :

BRISBANE,- Monday.The Queensland 

Marine-Board this morning continued 

its inquiry into the loss of the Yongala, 

which was commenced last week.

Captain Mackay said he thought the Board 

were perfectly satisfied as to the stability of 

the ship. Edward Northcote, general 

manager of the Adelaide Co. and master

mariner, said when the pig-iron was placed 

in No. 2 hold of the Yongala for the West 

Australian run he was not concerned about 

her stability which has been established by 

experience in several voyages, it was put in 

to make the vessel more comfortable, and
to increase her draught when returning 

from the west without cargo, it was found 

it increased her draught six inches forward

and one inch aft, and she was less lively in

a sea way. The iron was removed when the 

ship was placed on the East coast, because

sufficient cargo was obtainable. Masters of 

the Company's boats, had instructions on

no account to race.

It is interesting to note that the 164 tons of pig iron increased draught by 6 inches forward and yet, discharging 50 tons at Mackay, reduced draught by 3 inches. Something was seriously off with these figures.

The impression one is left with is that Yongala required additional ballasting, forward, illustrated by the final voyage figures of 17 ft. 9 in. forward, 22 ft. 6 in aft (as dodgy as they indeed are), a differential of 4.75 ft.. But comfort won of safety and one wonders what roll this played in the disaster. Certainly handling would have been compromised to some extent in a gale.

Interesting that the masters were instructed not to race - implying a cautious code of conduct within the company. What does this say about:

http://yongalarevisited.blogspot.co.za/2016/08/exciting-ocean-race.html

Captain Knight was one of the most experienced 

men in the service, and enjoyed the Company's 

perfect confidence. He was a particularly 

cautious man. The Yongala had less superstructure 

than most modern ships. In the absence or facts 

he hesitated to express  an opinion which would 

be academic as to what happened to the Yongala.

Again I think Captain Mackay protested too much in his description of Captain Knight and the significant top hamper carried by Yongala:

http://yongalarevisited.blogspot.co.za/2016/09/reprehensible-amount-of-over-confidence.html

Yes, there were other steamers with similar and higher superstructures, but in most cases these were stabilised by appropriate ballasting.

I guess the key factor was cargo carried. These steamers were designed to operate with large components of cargo in holds. Without this component stability was compromised even if all ballast tanks were full. 

Running such steamers with 34% of max. cargo in the case of Yongala and 14% in the case of Koombana a year later, plus storm conditions, was never going to end well.

A postcard circa 1910 showing ships tied up to the wharves along the Pioneer River and showing the old Sydney Street Bridge.
(Mackay Historical Society Archive No. 86-71a)

STABILITY - MARINE INQUIRY.

The " Yongala " was a steel screw steamer of 3,664 tons gross and 1,825 net; length, 350 feet; breadth, 45·2 feet; depth (of hold), 27·2 feet; built under special survey in 1903 by Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworth, and Co., Newcastle-on-Tyne, from specifications supplied by the Adelaide Steamship Company. Mr. Adamson, the company's superintendent engineer, supervised her building, and gave in evidence that the that the specifications provided that:

"After the vessel is completed, her centre of gravity is to be ascertained experimentally by inclining her, and curves of stability are to be calculated up to 90 degrees inclination at intervals of not more than 10 degrees and for five different conditions of loading, to be specified by the company". "Complete diagrams of results are to be prepared and supplied to the company". "The inclining experiments are to be performed at the expense of the builders", "and in the presence and to the satisfaction of inspectors appointed by the company to watch the experiments."

These tests were strictly carried out in his presence. Mr. Adamson also stated that the machinery, especially crank shaft and shafting, were 20 to 25 per cent. stronger than Lloyd's requirements.

If further confirmation of the ship's stability and seaworthiness be required, it is to be found in the satisfactory career of the vessel of over seven years' continuous running on the coast of Australia, four of which were in the West Australian trade, where the return journey was always made without cargo in all weathers, without accident.

It is important to note that Yongala's specifications were, as in the case of the Waratah, supplied by the owners. Armstrong Whitworth and Company had a fine reputation which was only as good as the specifications supplied. The Adelaide Steamship Company ordered steamers with prominent top hampers and relatively low draughts, a good example of which was the SS Koombana, built 1908 (see image below). I believe the reason for this was multi-fold. There was increasing competition-driven pressure to provide luxurious, elevated (access to sea breezes in warm weather) accommodation for first class passengers, combined with 2nd and 3rd class accommodation lower down in the ship. Add to this a financially viable capacity for cargo and mails, and it starts to become clear that this was the way of the future. An ambitious all in one package. To further complicate matters many of the lesser coastal ports at that time had limited draught access - some with prominent sand bars at their mouths. In fact the larger steamers had to time their arrivals at ports to coincide with spring tides, which in itself probably presented a further pressure to make good passages without delays.  

The Inquiry transcript is glaring in not what was included but what was not. In the case of the Waratah the Court examined the stability curve figures in various conditions of lading. It was not simply enough to state that there were five and the presence of Mr. Adamson ensured all was well. Yongala departed Mackay with only 34% of her usual cargo component and at least a ton of kerosene on deck. This condition demanded analysis of the respective stability factors both GM and righting angles. It's absence reduces the gravitas of the Inquiry. Note that the Inquiry did not even include the maximum draught figures for the Yongala. Again the words white wash come to mind.

Yes, a relevant point was made that Yongala had a good track record in various conditions of lading and all forms of weather at sea. But it took a cyclonic event to reveal this type of steamer's weakness. We must not forget that Grantala, identical to Yongala, was safely anchored in Bowling Green Bay during the same cyclonic storm, at the same time Yongala was 11 n miles out at sea in the worst of the conditions. It was a sensible decision on the part of Captain Sim who understood the limitations of his steamer and did not wish to put her to the final, fatal test.

It is disturbing that the wording and content of this Inquiry mirrored the same a year later at the Inquiry into the loss of the Koombana. Plagiarism masking bias and whitewash.

SS Yongala (I still believe that the size of her funnel could have been reduced to improve stability)

SS Koombana

ENQUIRY OPENED - YONGALA'S FATE.

The Advertiser (Adelaide) Friday 9 June, 1911.

THE YONGALA'S FATE.

ENQUIRY OPENED.

Brisbane. June 8.

The Marine Board enquiry into the loss

of the Adelaide Steamship Company's

steamer Yongala, which disappeared with

all souls in a cyclone on March 24, between

Dent Island and TownsviIle, was opened

this morning. Mr. T. O'shea appeared

on behalf of the Adelaide Steamship 

Company.

E. B. Wareham, Queensland inspector 

and attorney of the Adelaide Steamship

Company, tendered a plan and model of the

steamer, her displacement, and particulars

of the cargo. Mr. Wareham said he had

been in the company's employ for 16 1/2 

years. He was familiar with the Yongala, 

having travelled in her several times. She 

was a fast ship.

Captain Mackay - Was she a stiff ship or

a lively ship?

The Witness - I should call her a stiff

ship. The master, Captain Knight, had a

reputation of being a good seaman and 

a particularly steady man. The ship was

fully equipped. She was built by Armstrong, 

Whitworth, & Co.

It is interesting that this employee and representative of the Adelaide Steamship Company claimed that Yongala was a stiff steamer - implying that there were no issues relating to 'top heavy' instability. The stiffness of the steamer would have been an all-important factor when steaming into the heart of a cyclone. Tenderness would not have been and Mr. Wareham was not about to open Pandora's Box on the witness stand. He was clearly anxious to establish a clean slate by including, though he was not asked, that Captain Knight was beyond reproach and Yongala, a fine steamer (reputation of Armstrong, Whitworth and Co), fully equipped - by implication in the event of an emergency at sea.

Captain Mackay asked the witness about

the rumor that 400 tons of ballast had 

been taken out of the vessel, and the 

witness said he had replied to that. He 

pointed out that when the vessel was 

on the Western Australian trade she 

generally travelled from Fremantle to 

Adelaide with very little cargo, and often 

none at all. Her mean draught from 

Fremantle to Adelaide would be from 

16 ft. 8 in. to 17 ft. 6 in..

If the reporter documented the figure accurately 400 tons of pig iron were significantly more than the 164 tons of pig iron quoted in the Inquiry transcript. Yongala's max. draft figure was 24 ft., which suggests that an average of 17 ft. was notably light condition. 

The Inquiry transcript quoted an average draft of 19.75 ft., final voyage from Flat Top. On the surface of things, this differential would justify the taking out of the pig iron. But was this the whole truth?

It seems extraordinary that Yongala drew 22 ft. 6 in. aft, final voyage, carrying 617 tons (34% of capacity - 1,800 tons) was a mere 1 ft. 6 in. off maximum lading. Does not make sense! The forward draft figure of 17 ft. 9 in. was 6.25 ft. off max. which makes more sense but raises a question about trim and handling with bow being significantly lighter than stern, by 4.75 ft..

'it was explained by the general manager that this ballast, amounting to 164 tons, became unnecessary, owing to cargo being obtainable both up and down the Queensland coast.'

It must be said at this juncture that the mere fact Yongala required between 164 and 400 tons of permanent pig iron ballast, over and above the water ballast component, indicates an inherently tender (top heavy) vessel. The point is well made that there might have been significantly less cargo between Fremantle and Adelaide, but the witness failed to mention that Yongala, as late as December 1910, periodically serviced the route between Adelaide and Fremantle, and not exclusively the east coast! If Yongala was an inherently stiff steamer there would not have been the need for additional permanent ballast.

The water ballast she then carried would

be 400 tons. In May, 1904 it was decided

to put some stiffening in her for the run

across the Bight, and on May 17, at Sydney, 

184 tons of pig iron were stowed in the

after end of the No. 2 hold. In May, 1907,

when the vessel was put on the trade from

Melbourne to Cairns, this was discharged,

as the vessel could rely on having cargo

both ways.

It appears that the reporter confused the figure of 400 tons with ballast water, as he or she might have done referring to 184 tons rather than 164 tons. I am going to take 164 tons of pig iron ballast as given. If Yongala had retained the 164 tons of pig iron, taking into consideration that she was 34% full in terms of cargo, 23 March, she might have survived the storm. After all, the pig iron was added with reference to storm conditions off the Australian Bight and reduced cargo component.

Interesting to note that the pig iron was loaded forward in the ship, hold, 2, which makes sense given the large differential between the aft and forward draft figures, final voyage. The pig iron would have made an important, positive difference to these figures and ostensibly the handling of the steamer.

The witness read a letter from Captain

Knight, dated June 11. 1907, stating that

the vessel seemed much better since the

iron was removed. It had done away, he

said, with the jerking recovery which had

been so noticeable when the iron was on

board and the vessel was in ballast trim.

This is a significant passage. Improved GM stability did not equate with passenger comfort. Further to this I cannot help but draw a comparison with the Waratah. Captain Ilbery of that vessel significantly improved GM stability (reducing the top heaviness factor --> stiffening) for Waratah's final voyage by loading 1,500 tons of lead concentrates at 11 cubic feet to the ton and 8 ft. high in a lower hold midships, creating a significant shift of Waratah's centre of gravity downwards - reducing top heaviness factor. However, during the voyage over from Australia to Durban (South Africa) there were reports of just such a 'jerking recovery' described above which caused passengers to fall on deck. It seems to me that in both cases, making corrections for relatively top heavy vessels, created its own set of problems. 

Referring to the vessel's last trip from

Brisbane, the witness said the vessel took

on at Brisbane 25,500 gallons of water.

Captain Knight had no instructions. The

vessel's draught on leaving Brisbane was

17 ft, 9 in. fore and 22 ft. 6 in. aft. The

draught on leaving Mackay was about 

3 in. less. The actual dead weight on the

vessel was 1,885 tons. The cargo was 

667 tons, coal in the bunkers 615 tons, 

fresh water 120 tons, and stores and 

spare gear 120 tons. The amount of 

water in the ballast tanks was unknown, 

but their total capacity was 4,000 tons. 

With her bunkers full and loaded right 

up with cargo her dead weight would be 

3,500 tons. According to calculations 

based on the coal and water consumed 

the vessel's mean draught at 1 p.m. on 

March 23 was 19 ft. 7 1/2 in.

When Yongala departed Brisbane she had a mean draught of 20.1 ft., and on leaving Mackay after discharging about 50 tons of cargo her draught was allegedly reduced by 3 in.. 

This is an interesting insight. 3 in. = 50 tons. 1,800 tons = 36 in. = 3 ft.. i.e. fully loaded, 24 ft. and completely empty, 21 ft.. I THINK NOT!

Something is not right with these quoted figures. Truth obscured. 

I suspect Yongala was drawing far less than claimed, probably approximating the mean figure in the region of 17 ft. (see crossing the Bight reference above). 

The total capacity of ballast tanks was 400 tons, not 4000 tons as quoted above. The entire gross tonnage of Yongala was 3664 tons.

Questioned by Captain Mackay the witness 

said he had never heard of passengers

having expressed their dissatisfaction with

the vessel when she was in the Western

Australian trade. The vessel on the fatal

trip had no cargo on the upper deck. In

his opinion the Yongala was blown out of

her course and struck a rock and sank.

'Blown out of her course and struck a rock' would have exonerated both Captain Knight and the Adelaide Steamship Company. Stating that Yongala had no cargo on the upper deck was misleading, because the real issue was how much cargo was on deck - according to the Inquiry transcript, at least 1 ton. This was a clever diversion from the truth with obvious implications regarding both GM and the shifting of cargo on deck - see previous post:

http://yongalarevisited.blogspot.co.za/2016/08/yongalas-deck-cargo-adrift.html

The only cargo stowed in the No. 3 lower

hold seemed to have been found. She had

airtight compartments all round except

under the engine-room, and he thought she

struck under the bilges.

Fair enough unless the relatively top heavy unstable Yongala began listing too far and took seas and cross seas over her decks, breaching her after hatch, admitting tons of water into the lower holds, causing her to founder and by which process the release of cargo stowed in number 3 hold, midships.

Captain Mackay said the opinion was

held that when the Grantala sheltered at

Cape Bowling Green she was on the right

hand semicircle of a cyclone, which was

taken to be 30 miles across. Calculations

would show that if the Yongala pursued

her regular course she would strike the

very centre of the disturbance.

The very centre of a cyclone is calm but the seas immensely dangerous for a tender vessel.

Mr. Wareham produced a letter from a

stevedore stating that on leaving Brisbane 

the coal bunkers were full and well trimmed.

Captain Mackay said these cyclonic

storms, travelled (winds) at a hundred miles an

hour. They had been known to travel at

170 miles, and the course of this one was

from north-east at right angles almost to

the course which they supposed Captain

Knight was steering. Therefore the vessel 

could not have been blown onto a reef.

One simple, rational deduction which ruled out striking a reef, and suggesting that Yongala must have been overwhelmed by the cyclone.

Christian Hansen gave evidence confirming

the letter Mr. Wareham had read concerning 

the Yongala's coal bunkers. The witness said 

there was some light cargo at the bottom of 

the vessel, but the heavy cargo was placed 

on top of it. He did not think she rolled more 

than any other ship. He had always heard 

people speak well of the vessel. It would have 

been absolutely impossible for the cargo to

shift. Re-examined, Mr. Wareham said

the Yongala did not carry a raft, only boats. 

The vessel cost £102,000, and the company

got £65,000 insurance, carrying the balance 

of the risk themselves.

As if matters could not get any worse for an allegedly top heavy vessel. Heaviest cargo, lowest down, was the signature for lowered centre of gravity and improved GM stability. If Mr. Hansen is to be believed, this was one further nail in the coffin of a steamer which should never have tackled a cyclonic storm.

Not having a raft is important. In a rapidly deteriorating situation with Yongala listing further and further, regular lifeboats would have been impossible to launch safely. However, a few survivors might have managed to get away from the sinking steamer in a raft and lived to tell the tale.

Edwin Rothwell. master mariner, and

the Government pilot, described the search

made for the Yongala in the steamer Porpoise. 

They found no sign of the vessel.

He was of opinion that the Yongala did

not strike a reef. The hurricane came from

the north-east, and if she had been driven

anywhere it would be on the main shore.

He thought the Yongala met the full force

of the storm about midnight, and simply 

went down. The force of the gale would

give her a list, and some cargo might

move and prevent her recovering. He did

not think there was much chance of a 

further search proving successful. It 

would be possible for the cargo to move 

even if well stowed, and unless something 

like that happened be thought a ship like 

the Yongala would have weathered the storm. 

He calculated that at midnight the Yongala

would be ten or twelve miles north of Cape

Upstart. He did not suggest neglect, as

there was nothing lacking in the ship's

officers or crew. The portions of the ship

picked up did not indicate that she had

gone on a rock.

Again confirmation that Yongala could not have struck a reef and 'simply went down' in the storm. Being a tender (top heavy) steamer the storm 'would give her a list, and some cargo might move and prevent her from recovering'. 'It would be possible for the cargo to move even if well stowed' - and there you have it!! Well said Captain Rothwell.

The wreck site is 25 miles north of Cape Upstart, which means that Captain Rothwell was a mere 13 miles off in his calculations. Remarkable! 

A. M. Leslie, Superintendent of Wharfs

and Stores for Dalgety & Co., said for two

years and three months he was second

officer on the Yongala. She was a tender,

but a safe ship.

Very interesting!! Mr. Leslie, no longer an employee of the Adelaide Steamship Company called a spade a spade - YONGALA WAS A TENDER SHIP.

Captain F. G. Shaw, assistant shipping

inspector, said he inspected the Yongala

when she was in Brisbane on her last 

voyage. She was well equipped and 

complied with the regulations in every 

respect. She had little deck cargo.

Little deck cargo is not the same as NO deck cargo - and 'little' is not a value.

Captain Forrester, shipping inspector,

said the stability of the vessel had never

been questioned by the passengers or 

anyone else.

He would say that wouldn't he, or else his head was for the chopping block.

The enquiry was adjourned till Monday.

ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE.

..the Board fully realise the difficulty inseparable from the task assigned to them, inasmuch as, while partaking to some extent of the nature of the ordinary inquiry into a marine disaster, the cause of which, by personal evidence and attendant circumstances, is usually ascertainable, its identity with such is impaired in this case by the fact that to enable them to arrive at a definite finding no such testimony is available, and it would therefore appear to the Board that, in order to account for the total disappearance of the ill-fated vessel with all on board, the inquiry will chiefly be in the direction of the ship's stability, equipment, and seaworthiness, together with the question of Captain Knight's carefulness and general efficiency as a shipmaster.

As in the case of the Waratah, there was no physical evidence or verifiable eye witness accounts to support the position and cause of the Yongala casualty. In one sense this placed undue pressure on the Court to establish cause and effect. However, in my opinion, there was enough evidence to support the fact that Captain Knight was not as careful and efficient as he might have been.

...to be continued...

The position of the Yongala wreck was discovered many years after the Inquiry.