THE "LIST".

Truth, Brisbane, 14 May, 1911.

Scarcely a steamer goes North from Brisbane 

without the decks being covered with cargo, 

and at times passengers are compelled to climb 

over perishables to get on board. 

By what can only be considered good fortune, Yongala departed Flat Top with minimal deck cargo - or at least that is what was reported....

Strange stories have been circulated concerning the Yongala 

since she disappeared, and the opinion has

got abroad that she was not classed by

seafaring men as what is commonly styled by 

them "safe." We have heard about a "list" she 

is said to have had when she left Flat Top, and 

about pig-iron ballast that is supposed to have

been in her at one time, and also about

men having left her because they got the notion 

that she was "a coffin ship."

This is a highly revealing comment and it makes complete sense that Yongala probably had a list. However, no mention, officially, was ever made.

Last Sunday the writer was returning

by train from Pinkenba, and he heard

a couple of seafaring men discussing the

Yongala. One of them said he lost a

brother in her, and he stated openly that 

his brother assured him before her last 

trip that the steamer was not safe, and that 

he would leave her but for being ashamed 

to do so. Another of the party exclaimed, 

'What about the other ship? I am on her. I 

know she is no safer, and yet I don't like 

to leave her."

The other ship, namely Grantala, identical to Yongala.

Of course, this may be nothing more

than superstition, but when men, who

appear to know what they are talking

about, give public expression to such

serious statements, the need for earliest

and fullest investigation and inquiry is

evident.

Those who will feel inclined to defend

the Government authorities will, no 

doubt, make the excuse that the shipping 

company did search the scene or the dis-

aster, and contend that there was no need 

for the Government to do so earlier than 

weeks afterwards; but that

excuse will not satisfy citizens. The

company would not have been likely to

convict itself if the discovery had been

made that the loss of the Yongala was 

due to the condition of the vessel 

when she left port, or to something that

would take the company liable for

heavy damages. Though a company is

said to have neither a body to be kicked,

nor a soul to be damned, the persons

who are in control are human and practice 

self preservation. 

For this reason, if 

for no other, it was the duty of the

Government to have a thorough search

made as soon as there was reasonable

grounds for believing the vessel had met

with mishap. In fact, there should be

in every important port steamers retained 

by the Government, or owned by

the State, to go to the relief of vessels

reasonably supposed to be in distress.

In Brisbane, there are some suitable

craft which would serve the purpose,

but the Cabinet Ministers put them into

another service, and they are mostly 

engaged for pleasure trips. 

The Otter and the Lucinda might have been used to

search for the Yongala weeks ago with

out the cost of much to the taxpayers,

but those vessels are too cosy to be sent

on such a mission, and the authorities,

for shame's sake, seek to make amends

by sending one of the oldest tenders

on the coast, to investigate when there

is not one ray of hope, for the 200 (122) souls

who were on board when the Yongala

was last seen.

Why has there been so much delay in

culling an inquiry into the circumstance

surrounding the disaster? Can anything

be gained by delaying the publication of

authentic information relating to the

Yongala, and to her condition when she

sailed on her last voyage. We are told

that she was heavily laden when she left

Brisbane, and it would be interesting to

know whether more cargo was put into

her at Flat Top. 

No on both accounts.

We have also been

told about that "list," and particularly

of how she was loaded or relieved of

some of her cargo might clear up all

of the doubts lingering in the mind of

auspicious citizens. We have had the

story of the pig-iron ballast explained

by the representatives of the shipping

company, but not until it is confirmed 

by men who were working on the vessel 

at the time it is said to have been removed

will the public be satisfied. 

Over matters that would tend to relieve the

public mind might also be explained at

a proper inquiry. For instance, the

height above deck and weight of the

funnel, the build of the Yongala, the

actual amount of cargo she carried on

her decks, the state of her machinery

and propeller, the condition of her steer-

ing gear and boats, 

There is no denying the significance of Yongala's huge funnel. I have commented on the wind catchment factor, particularly in cyclone conditions, but the weight of the structure also contributed hugely to the top heaviness factor. This was such a significant factor that Grantala had her funnel reduced in later service.

Grantala later known as SS Figuig.

Yongala's funnel, which was built into the vessel = not likely to break off during a gale and therefore contribute to dragging the steamer over.

courtesy SS Yongala, Mystery of a Generation. 

the truth concerning 

men who are said to have left the

ship at different times because of the

belief that she was "a coffin" and many

other things that are talked about by

people in all places. There certainly is

some mystery surrounding the disaster,

and the authorities will be wanting in

their duty to the community if the inquiry 

is not opened at an early date,

especially as seafaring men are constantly 

on the move, and material witnesses may 

not be given an opportunity to throw

light on the mystery.

WIND CATCHMENT.

The West Australian, Perth, 20 August, 1909.

The wind was so strong that two small

tugs were unable to get the steamer 

Yongala from Melbourne, away from the

wharf. It was only when a third and

larger tug arrived that she was shifted

after much delay.

It was this very wind catchment factor, enhanced by an enormous funnel, which probably contributed to dragging the steamer over in the cyclone of 23 March.

courtesy SS Yongala, Mystery of a Generation

courtesy Trove.

BOTTLE MESSAGE.

The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 14 December, 1911.

THE MESSAGE FROM THE YONGALA.

IS IT A HOAX ?

The finding of the bottle-paper supposed to be

from the missing steamer Yongala, which foun-

dered with all hands off the Queensland coast

in March last, occasioned considerable interest

in shipping circles yesterday, and speculation

was rife as to whether the paper was really

genuine.

Mr. Wareham, the Queensland inspector for the 

Adelaide S.S. Co., who is at present in Sydney, 

had a telegram from the Mackay office of the 

company, giving the information of the finding 

of the bottle-paper, and he is taking the necessary 

steps to have the message sent south to him to 

Brisbane for the purpose of comparing the writing 

with that of "J. West, chief cook," on the ship's 

articles at Brisbane. At present considerable

doubt seems to exist as to the paper message

coming from the missing ship. Cross currents

and the numerous islands in the locality would,

it is pointed out, lessen the chances of the bottle-

paper drifting to the position where it was picked

up is about 100 miles south of of the place where

the Yongala is supposed to have been lost. The

Yongala which was in command of Captain Knight

left the Mackay anchorage at 1.40 p.m. on March

23, and was reported as having passed Dent Island

at 6 p.m., the same day, but was not subsequently

heard of. A small portion of her cargo was picked

up on the coast and reefs to the north-west of the

Whitsunday Passage. No fewer than 120 lives were 

lost in the ill-fated steamer. The message found at

Westhill, and sent to Mackay, was written on an

envelope and read: "S.S. Yongala: Terrible storm,

8.30 p.m.. It's a case of good-bye - J. West, cook."

courtesy Google Earth
If this was true and Yongala making an average of 16 knots, the message would have been thrown overboard in the vicinity of Holbourne Island and Nares Rock. If there had been another more than 3 hours to go, surely some attempt would have been made to seek anchorage or get people off in lifeboats??

courtesy Trove.

'IT IS WORSE THAN HELL'.

The Evening Telegraph, 7 April, 1911.

Captain MacKenzie brought out the 

chart, sketched the passage Captain 

Knight is bound to have taken and if 

this is correct, then it is impossible 

that the ill-fated vessel was ever within 

miles of Nares Rock.

Captain Knight and Captain Mc-Kenzie 

have often discussed the navigation of 

this difficult Northern run; have compared 

charts; and both Captains run on the same 

course.

It seems that there

ARE TWO COURSES

once north of the passage. One leads

away, outskirting the coastal reefs

and islands, and runs within a few

miles of Nares Rock. The second

comes in and bears towards Gloucester 

Island.

"We were both decided that the

Nares Rock course is unsafe unless

we pass the rock in daytime," said

Captain McKenzie.

courtesy Google Earth

"It is easy to trace the whole catastrophe," 

he added. "I know Captain Knight and 

his methods so well." 

Captain McKenzie thinks that the

vessel would have caught 

THE FULL FORCE

of the storm after passing north of

Upstart, at that time the vessel

would be on its ordinary inside 

course.

courtesy Google Earth
Interestingly, the inside course would have brought Yongala to about 7 miles out from Cape Bowling Green, which was where the original oil patch was observed - wrecks are known to move over decades, but 4 miles is ridiculous. It makes more sense that Captain Knight gave himself more sea room given the extreme conditions and ended up at a position 11 miles out from Cape Bowling Green irrespective of whether he initially used the inside or outside courses.

"It is sad to think",said Captain

McKenzie, "that at that precise moment

the Grantala was anchored in safety not 

25 miles away from its sister ship, which 

was being driven to its doom.

Grantala was anchored 17.7 miles away.

Captain McKenzie considers that

the storm would "put the vessel

broadside on to its full force, and

with a dreadful list it would be driven 

before its fury. There would be few 

on deck at the time. The captain, 

of course, would be on the bridge, 

and probably , two of the mates, the 

wheel hand, and the lookout. The 

weather would render the fo'c'sle head 

untenable.

When the full terrific blast struck

the ship she would list immediately.

Acknowledging the top heavy steamer's limitations.

Captain Knight might have given orders

but it would have been impossible to have 

heard them two feet away, and even if heard, 

it would have been impossible to have carried

them out. All that the hands on deck could have 

done would be to have clung to a stanchion 

and wait for the frightful blow to moderate.

The rain would come down almost horizontally 

with such awful force that if one turned one's face 

to it, it would have been cut. The spray would be 

whipped from the crests of the seas , and would 

hit the vessel like shrapnel.

And indeed impossible to launch lifeboats in such conditions.

"They say," said Captain' McKenzie

"that a cyclone at sea is like hell. I say, if it is 

possible, it is worse than hell. It is simply 

indescribable."

The captain considered that under

these awesome and dreadful conditions 

the vessel was driven out broadside on.

And eventually the end came.

As it was, with that tremendous list,

and the terrible storm, it was impossible 

to do anything. Those on deck could only 

cling breathlessly to stanchions or whatever 

hold was available, while down below it 

would be sheer impossibility to put a 

shovelful of coal into the fires.

The Australasian, Melbourne, 8 April, 1911.

"To be in a cyclone," Captain Thompson 

continued, "is like being in the inside

of a drum. There is a terrific surging noise

round you, as if all the fields in Hades were

yelling. It is like hell let loose. The sea

breaks in every direction at once, a heavy

sea and wind are coming over on one side,

and the next minute the sea and wind are

coming from the other. If there is sea

room you might get out of it, but if there

is no room you can only anchor and trust

to Providence. Where the Yongala was

there was no sea-room - only about 15 or

20 miles between the coast and the reefs.


The Register, Adelaide, 9 June, 1911.

 'But Capt, Knight, never varied his track. 

Night or day, thick or clear, she steered 

13 miles off Cape Upstart, and

6 1/2 miles off Cape Bowling Green.

Contradicting Captain Mackenzie, Alexander McGregor Leslie, Superintendent of Wharfs and master mariner, who had been Yongala's second officer for 2 years and 3 months, made the convincing statement that Captain Knight never varied his course no matter the weather, day or night. 

13 miles off Cape Upstart was the outside track, not inside. This was close to Nares Rock and considered dangerous at night. 

6 1/2 miles off Cape Bowling Green was 5 miles closer to shore than where the wreck lies. This also makes sense in the context of allowing enough sea room to prevent running aground on the reefs off the Cape during a fierce storm.

Captain Knight was a risk-taker, by all account. 



courtesy Trove.

siz surveying the reefs