ENQUIRY OPENED - YONGALA'S FATE.

The Advertiser (Adelaide) Friday 9 June, 1911.

THE YONGALA'S FATE.

ENQUIRY OPENED.

Brisbane. June 8.

The Marine Board enquiry into the loss

of the Adelaide Steamship Company's

steamer Yongala, which disappeared with

all souls in a cyclone on March 24, between

Dent Island and TownsviIle, was opened

this morning. Mr. T. O'shea appeared

on behalf of the Adelaide Steamship 

Company.

E. B. Wareham, Queensland inspector 

and attorney of the Adelaide Steamship

Company, tendered a plan and model of the

steamer, her displacement, and particulars

of the cargo. Mr. Wareham said he had

been in the company's employ for 16 1/2 

years. He was familiar with the Yongala, 

having travelled in her several times. She 

was a fast ship.

Captain Mackay - Was she a stiff ship or

a lively ship?

The Witness - I should call her a stiff

ship. The master, Captain Knight, had a

reputation of being a good seaman and 

a particularly steady man. The ship was

fully equipped. She was built by Armstrong, 

Whitworth, & Co.

It is interesting that this employee and representative of the Adelaide Steamship Company claimed that Yongala was a stiff steamer - implying that there were no issues relating to 'top heavy' instability. The stiffness of the steamer would have been an all-important factor when steaming into the heart of a cyclone. Tenderness would not have been and Mr. Wareham was not about to open Pandora's Box on the witness stand. He was clearly anxious to establish a clean slate by including, though he was not asked, that Captain Knight was beyond reproach and Yongala, a fine steamer (reputation of Armstrong, Whitworth and Co), fully equipped - by implication in the event of an emergency at sea.

Captain Mackay asked the witness about

the rumor that 400 tons of ballast had 

been taken out of the vessel, and the 

witness said he had replied to that. He 

pointed out that when the vessel was 

on the Western Australian trade she 

generally travelled from Fremantle to 

Adelaide with very little cargo, and often 

none at all. Her mean draught from 

Fremantle to Adelaide would be from 

16 ft. 8 in. to 17 ft. 6 in..

If the reporter documented the figure accurately 400 tons of pig iron were significantly more than the 164 tons of pig iron quoted in the Inquiry transcript. Yongala's max. draft figure was 24 ft., which suggests that an average of 17 ft. was notably light condition. 

The Inquiry transcript quoted an average draft of 19.75 ft., final voyage from Flat Top. On the surface of things, this differential would justify the taking out of the pig iron. But was this the whole truth?

It seems extraordinary that Yongala drew 22 ft. 6 in. aft, final voyage, carrying 617 tons (34% of capacity - 1,800 tons) was a mere 1 ft. 6 in. off maximum lading. Does not make sense! The forward draft figure of 17 ft. 9 in. was 6.25 ft. off max. which makes more sense but raises a question about trim and handling with bow being significantly lighter than stern, by 4.75 ft..

'it was explained by the general manager that this ballast, amounting to 164 tons, became unnecessary, owing to cargo being obtainable both up and down the Queensland coast.'

It must be said at this juncture that the mere fact Yongala required between 164 and 400 tons of permanent pig iron ballast, over and above the water ballast component, indicates an inherently tender (top heavy) vessel. The point is well made that there might have been significantly less cargo between Fremantle and Adelaide, but the witness failed to mention that Yongala, as late as December 1910, periodically serviced the route between Adelaide and Fremantle, and not exclusively the east coast! If Yongala was an inherently stiff steamer there would not have been the need for additional permanent ballast.

The water ballast she then carried would

be 400 tons. In May, 1904 it was decided

to put some stiffening in her for the run

across the Bight, and on May 17, at Sydney, 

184 tons of pig iron were stowed in the

after end of the No. 2 hold. In May, 1907,

when the vessel was put on the trade from

Melbourne to Cairns, this was discharged,

as the vessel could rely on having cargo

both ways.

It appears that the reporter confused the figure of 400 tons with ballast water, as he or she might have done referring to 184 tons rather than 164 tons. I am going to take 164 tons of pig iron ballast as given. If Yongala had retained the 164 tons of pig iron, taking into consideration that she was 34% full in terms of cargo, 23 March, she might have survived the storm. After all, the pig iron was added with reference to storm conditions off the Australian Bight and reduced cargo component.

Interesting to note that the pig iron was loaded forward in the ship, hold, 2, which makes sense given the large differential between the aft and forward draft figures, final voyage. The pig iron would have made an important, positive difference to these figures and ostensibly the handling of the steamer.

The witness read a letter from Captain

Knight, dated June 11. 1907, stating that

the vessel seemed much better since the

iron was removed. It had done away, he

said, with the jerking recovery which had

been so noticeable when the iron was on

board and the vessel was in ballast trim.

This is a significant passage. Improved GM stability did not equate with passenger comfort. Further to this I cannot help but draw a comparison with the Waratah. Captain Ilbery of that vessel significantly improved GM stability (reducing the top heaviness factor --> stiffening) for Waratah's final voyage by loading 1,500 tons of lead concentrates at 11 cubic feet to the ton and 8 ft. high in a lower hold midships, creating a significant shift of Waratah's centre of gravity downwards - reducing top heaviness factor. However, during the voyage over from Australia to Durban (South Africa) there were reports of just such a 'jerking recovery' described above which caused passengers to fall on deck. It seems to me that in both cases, making corrections for relatively top heavy vessels, created its own set of problems. 

Referring to the vessel's last trip from

Brisbane, the witness said the vessel took

on at Brisbane 25,500 gallons of water.

Captain Knight had no instructions. The

vessel's draught on leaving Brisbane was

17 ft, 9 in. fore and 22 ft. 6 in. aft. The

draught on leaving Mackay was about 

3 in. less. The actual dead weight on the

vessel was 1,885 tons. The cargo was 

667 tons, coal in the bunkers 615 tons, 

fresh water 120 tons, and stores and 

spare gear 120 tons. The amount of 

water in the ballast tanks was unknown, 

but their total capacity was 4,000 tons. 

With her bunkers full and loaded right 

up with cargo her dead weight would be 

3,500 tons. According to calculations 

based on the coal and water consumed 

the vessel's mean draught at 1 p.m. on 

March 23 was 19 ft. 7 1/2 in.

When Yongala departed Brisbane she had a mean draught of 20.1 ft., and on leaving Mackay after discharging about 50 tons of cargo her draught was allegedly reduced by 3 in.. 

This is an interesting insight. 3 in. = 50 tons. 1,800 tons = 36 in. = 3 ft.. i.e. fully loaded, 24 ft. and completely empty, 21 ft.. I THINK NOT!

Something is not right with these quoted figures. Truth obscured. 

I suspect Yongala was drawing far less than claimed, probably approximating the mean figure in the region of 17 ft. (see crossing the Bight reference above). 

The total capacity of ballast tanks was 400 tons, not 4000 tons as quoted above. The entire gross tonnage of Yongala was 3664 tons.

Questioned by Captain Mackay the witness 

said he had never heard of passengers

having expressed their dissatisfaction with

the vessel when she was in the Western

Australian trade. The vessel on the fatal

trip had no cargo on the upper deck. In

his opinion the Yongala was blown out of

her course and struck a rock and sank.

'Blown out of her course and struck a rock' would have exonerated both Captain Knight and the Adelaide Steamship Company. Stating that Yongala had no cargo on the upper deck was misleading, because the real issue was how much cargo was on deck - according to the Inquiry transcript, at least 1 ton. This was a clever diversion from the truth with obvious implications regarding both GM and the shifting of cargo on deck - see previous post:

http://yongalarevisited.blogspot.co.za/2016/08/yongalas-deck-cargo-adrift.html

The only cargo stowed in the No. 3 lower

hold seemed to have been found. She had

airtight compartments all round except

under the engine-room, and he thought she

struck under the bilges.

Fair enough unless the relatively top heavy unstable Yongala began listing too far and took seas and cross seas over her decks, breaching her after hatch, admitting tons of water into the lower holds, causing her to founder and by which process the release of cargo stowed in number 3 hold, midships.

Captain Mackay said the opinion was

held that when the Grantala sheltered at

Cape Bowling Green she was on the right

hand semicircle of a cyclone, which was

taken to be 30 miles across. Calculations

would show that if the Yongala pursued

her regular course she would strike the

very centre of the disturbance.

The very centre of a cyclone is calm but the seas immensely dangerous for a tender vessel.

Mr. Wareham produced a letter from a

stevedore stating that on leaving Brisbane 

the coal bunkers were full and well trimmed.

Captain Mackay said these cyclonic

storms, travelled (winds) at a hundred miles an

hour. They had been known to travel at

170 miles, and the course of this one was

from north-east at right angles almost to

the course which they supposed Captain

Knight was steering. Therefore the vessel 

could not have been blown onto a reef.

One simple, rational deduction which ruled out striking a reef, and suggesting that Yongala must have been overwhelmed by the cyclone.

Christian Hansen gave evidence confirming

the letter Mr. Wareham had read concerning 

the Yongala's coal bunkers. The witness said 

there was some light cargo at the bottom of 

the vessel, but the heavy cargo was placed 

on top of it. He did not think she rolled more 

than any other ship. He had always heard 

people speak well of the vessel. It would have 

been absolutely impossible for the cargo to

shift. Re-examined, Mr. Wareham said

the Yongala did not carry a raft, only boats. 

The vessel cost £102,000, and the company

got £65,000 insurance, carrying the balance 

of the risk themselves.

As if matters could not get any worse for an allegedly top heavy vessel. Heaviest cargo, lowest down, was the signature for lowered centre of gravity and improved GM stability. If Mr. Hansen is to be believed, this was one further nail in the coffin of a steamer which should never have tackled a cyclonic storm.

Not having a raft is important. In a rapidly deteriorating situation with Yongala listing further and further, regular lifeboats would have been impossible to launch safely. However, a few survivors might have managed to get away from the sinking steamer in a raft and lived to tell the tale.

Edwin Rothwell. master mariner, and

the Government pilot, described the search

made for the Yongala in the steamer Porpoise. 

They found no sign of the vessel.

He was of opinion that the Yongala did

not strike a reef. The hurricane came from

the north-east, and if she had been driven

anywhere it would be on the main shore.

He thought the Yongala met the full force

of the storm about midnight, and simply 

went down. The force of the gale would

give her a list, and some cargo might

move and prevent her recovering. He did

not think there was much chance of a 

further search proving successful. It 

would be possible for the cargo to move 

even if well stowed, and unless something 

like that happened be thought a ship like 

the Yongala would have weathered the storm. 

He calculated that at midnight the Yongala

would be ten or twelve miles north of Cape

Upstart. He did not suggest neglect, as

there was nothing lacking in the ship's

officers or crew. The portions of the ship

picked up did not indicate that she had

gone on a rock.

Again confirmation that Yongala could not have struck a reef and 'simply went down' in the storm. Being a tender (top heavy) steamer the storm 'would give her a list, and some cargo might move and prevent her from recovering'. 'It would be possible for the cargo to move even if well stowed' - and there you have it!! Well said Captain Rothwell.

The wreck site is 25 miles north of Cape Upstart, which means that Captain Rothwell was a mere 13 miles off in his calculations. Remarkable! 

A. M. Leslie, Superintendent of Wharfs

and Stores for Dalgety & Co., said for two

years and three months he was second

officer on the Yongala. She was a tender,

but a safe ship.

Very interesting!! Mr. Leslie, no longer an employee of the Adelaide Steamship Company called a spade a spade - YONGALA WAS A TENDER SHIP.

Captain F. G. Shaw, assistant shipping

inspector, said he inspected the Yongala

when she was in Brisbane on her last 

voyage. She was well equipped and 

complied with the regulations in every 

respect. She had little deck cargo.

Little deck cargo is not the same as NO deck cargo - and 'little' is not a value.

Captain Forrester, shipping inspector,

said the stability of the vessel had never

been questioned by the passengers or 

anyone else.

He would say that wouldn't he, or else his head was for the chopping block.

The enquiry was adjourned till Monday.