Daily Commercial News, 27 June, 1911.
MARINE COURT INQUIRY.
The Loss of the Yongala.
The inquiry into the circumstances
connected with the loss of the Adelaide
S.S. Company's s.s. Yongala which
occurred on March 23, was held at
Brisbane last week. Captain Mackay
presided, and the other members of
the Board present were Captain Collin,
Messrs. P. Henderson, Munro, and T.
J. Johnston.
Mr. E. B. Wareham, Queensland inspector
and attorney for the company, produced a
plan of the ship, the allocation of the cargo,
and the capacity of the holds.
Mr. Wareham said he had been in the
employ of the company for 16 years, and
knew their ships well, with the exception of the
Koombana. He knew the Yongala well; she
was a 'fast ship, her steaming capacity being
from 16 to 17 knots'.
He would call her a stiff ship under
normal conditions. He knew the
master well; he was a good seaman
and particularly steady.
Captain Knight's track record with the Adelaide Steamship Company spoke for itself. 'Steady' was a better choice of word than 'cautious'.
The Yongala arrived in Australia at the
beginning of December, 1903. She was
built by Armstrong, Whitworth and Co.,
and was of 3664 tons gross. Her length
was 350ft, beam 45ft 2in, and depth
27ft 2in. She went at once into the
trade between Sydney and Fremantle.
On her trip the steamer would
have a full general cargo, and a supply
of bunker coal and fresh water.
The bunkers would be replenished at
Fremantle for the run to Adelaide. She
would have very little cargo, and
would be practically empty on the trip
east. Her mean draft on that trip
would be from 16ft 8in to 17ft 6in.
Her full draught would be about 24ft.
Mr. Warehams' figures give us an average draft of about 17 ft. empty and 24 ft. full. This is a range of 7 ft..
Her water ballast amounted to 406
tons. In May, 1904, after she had run
five complete trips, it was decided to
put some stiffening into her to steady
her for the run back across the Bight.
In May, 1904, while the vessel was in
Sydney, 164 tons of pig iron was placed
in the after end of No. 2 hold (forward).
In May,1907, when she was taken off
that run to go on the Melbourne-Cairns
run, the vessel having no longer had to
contend with the heavy seas in light
trim, the ballast was taken out.
This was not entirely the truth of the matter. Yongala periodically serviced the route to and from Fremantle, crossing the Bight, up to as late as December, 1910.
The words 'ballast taken out' smacks of negligence.
Captain Knight had written to him,
stating that the vessel was very much
better since the pig iron was taken out.
The rolling was less pronounced, and
she recovered more gently, having
entirely lost the jerky recovery which
characterised her when the pig iron
was on board. She was more comfortable
in a seaway, and the removal of
the pig iron, he thought, would in no
way affect the stability of the vessel.
Luxury passenger steamers of the era were designed to be slightly top heavy for comfort; a longer, slower roll. However, this was a balancing act and too tender (top heavy) created stability problems, which could be dangerous in severe gale-force conditions.
A steamer was required to return to the upright from a heeling (listing) position quickly enough and with enough force before being struck by a following cross (beam) sea.
The pig iron was an acknowledgement of this inherent limitation in Yongala's stability. Fully loaded it was not necessary but with minimal cargo it was recognised as a safety measure.
A jerky recovery, however, could result in passengers falling on the promenade deck, which was a phenomenon shared with the Waratah when she was stabilised in a similar way utilizing a high specific gravity load of lead concentrates combined with deep loading.
Arguably the pig iron was required in ballast and 23 March there were 607 tons on board, but given the enormous funnel and reduced draught, Yongala was vulnerable in the middle of a cyclone.
Captain Mackay: You know, of course,
Mr. Wareham, the keen competition
between companies and their desire to
get as much speed as possible out of
their vessels. Did you give Captain
Knight any emphatic orders to
push the Yongala?
Mr. Wareham;. No, I have never
given such orders. I always leave it to
the discretion of the master. Of course
they sometimes push the boat some
what to catch a tide.
https://yongalarevisited.blogspot.com/2016/08/exciting-ocean-race.html
The draught of the Yongala when she
left Brisbane was 17ft 9in forward and
22ft 6in aft. She left on Tuesday, March 21,
and at the draught mentioned, there
would be 667 tons of cargo, coal in
bunkers 613 tons, fresh water 120
tons, stores and spare gear 120 tons.
There was no record of the amount
of water in her ballast tanks, of which
the capacity was 406 tons. She would
carry 3350 tons within her holds, bunkers,
and ballast tanks full.
Mr. Wareham's calculation gives a figure of 2,091 tons cargo, full.
607 tons is actually 29% of capacity (not 34% as previously assumed based on total cargo figure of 1,800 tons).
The vessel would lift 3 in between Brisbane
and Flat-top owing to consumption of coal
and Flat-top owing to consumption of coal
and fresh water. She discharged 60 tons of
cargo there, and would be about 8 in lighter
when she left there. Her draught would then be
19 ft 8 in. At 10 o'clock on the night of the
accident she would 'have been drawing
19 ft 71/2 in.
This paragraph is revealing.
Mr. Wareham made the assumption that Yongala's draught would be 19 ft. 7 1/2 in. by 10 p.m., 23 March. He was a mere 1 hour 45 minutes off the correct time of the disaster; 10 p.m. vs. 11.45 p.m..
He informed the Court that when Yongala was in ballast she drew about 17 ft..When full she drew 24 ft.. This is a differential of 7 ft..
Carrying 29% of cargo carrying capacity, 23 March, 607 tons, she drew 19 ft. 7 1/2 in.. a differential of just over 4 ft.. 29% of 7 ft. is 2 ft.. added to 17 ft. = 19 ft..
19 ft. is 7 1/2 in. short of his own estimation, and significantly more tender.
The ship, when she left Flat Top, had
only 3cwt (0.168 tons) of cargo on the
winch deck.
In answer to Mr. Munro,he said the
ship had no cargo on her upper deck
when she left Brisbane.
To Mr. Johnston he said he did not
know whether the ship when she was
built was tried for stability.
This was a peculiar comment given that all steamers of the era were subjected to a heeling test to establish stability curves during different conditions of lading. Perhaps he did not want those curves presented in Court and certainly not any recommendations made by the builders as regards dead weight....
The ship would be more buoyant if her
ballast tanks were empty, but they could
never be emptied unless she had some
cargo in her holds.
Common sense and one assumes that 406 tons minus water consumed were in the tanks on departure from Flat Top.
Captain Mackay: What is your
opinion of the fate of the ship
Mr. Wareham: My opinion is that on
account of bad weather the ship was
blown out of her course and struck a
rock, ripping her bilge open. What
makes me more certain of that is the
cargo that was stowed in the lower holds
was the first, to come out. It was light
cargo. I have received a letter from
the Meteorological Bureau, giving
information regarding the state of the
weather on day and night of the disaster.
The letter stated that a strong south-east
gale was blowing when the Yongala
passed Dent Island. I think she struck
north of Flinders Passage.
Captain Collin:: Has there ever been
any record of the ship having shifted
her cargo or coal in her bunkers?
Mr. Wareham: No, she has never
been known to shift a cargo, nor has
she ever broken down. Captain
Knight had her all the time, with the
exception of six months, during which
time Captains Mackenzie and Irvine
had her.
Captain Knight knew his ship!
Mr. Johnston : Did either Captain
Mackenzie or Captain Irvine ever
make any complaint about the ship?
Mr. Wareham: No.
Mr. Johnston: I suppose she had
met big seas on the run from
Fremantle to Adelaide?
Mr. Wareham: Yes; she has been in
some heavy seas.
Captain Mackay: But you can't compare
the long regular roll off the Western
Australian coast with a hurricane
sea?
Mr. Wareham: I am perfectly confident
that she struck a rock.
Mr. Wareham failed to rise to the occasion. He implied by his assumption that the cause of the loss was striking an obstacle and not the cyclone conditions itself. By implication he was not presenting a case for Yongala's unassailable stability, 29% laden.
Captain Mackay, on the other hand, was probing the extraordinary nature of cyclone conditions.
Captain Mackay: I am positive that
no other ship would survive. You
think, Mr. Wareham, that the ship
would have survived anything, other
than a rock ?
Captain Mackay tried to help but to no avail. Mr. Wareham was supposed to say that no ship could have survived such an onslaught (apart from Grantala safely anchored a few miles away). Grantala did not sustain any signficant top hamper damage or lose lifeboats during the gale. Granted she lay on the outer edge of the cyclone.
Mr. Wareham: Yes.
Captain Mackay: Do you say you
thought the Yongala would bear up
under a hurricane which tore up big
trees by the roots and hung them
about as if they were saplings?
Captain Mackay was supposed to be interrogating Mr. Wareham not assisting him! The point made is clear: conditions which could cause such damage to large trees would have overwhelmed any vessel.
Mr. Wareham: A tree would be stationary,
and would offer a good deal of resistance,
but the Yongala would be running before
the storm.
Again this notion of outrunning a severe southeast gale. Mr. Wareham did not pick up on the assistance offered and in a sense made matters worse by implying that a ship would be more flexible before a gale.
Captain Mackay: If she was, that
would dispel the idea that she struck
a reef, as the storm was travelling
toward the land.
Captain Mackay gently trying to steer the man back to a cyclone approaching land and the unlikelihood of striking the outer Barrier Reef.
No response documented.
Christian Hansen, stevedore in the
employ of the Adelaide S.S. Company,
said the cargo was well stowed in the
Yongala when she left Brisbane. They
always tried to get the heavy cargo
at the bottom of the holds. The light
cargo which was found after the
disaster was Melbourne cargo, and in
Brisbane similar cargo was put on top
of it.
A sound principle if true. It also suggests that stevedores were prepared to and had the time to reorganise cargo stowage i.e. the lighter Melbourne cargo stowed above heavier Brisbane cargo. It also suggests that such reshuffling might have made cargo prone to shifting if not adequately secured once reorganised.
The ballast tanks were always
filled before leaving port. He had been
to sea and had travelled on the Yongala.
In her normal trim she did not roll any
more than any other ship.
It makes sense that all the ballast tanks would have been full minus fresh water consumed (not replenished at Flat Top). Any free surface effect (loose water) in incompletely filled tanks might have contributed to heeling instability.
Yongala would not have rolled any more than any other ship under normal circumstances and condition of lading (sizeable cargo component). This was irrelevant to the case at hand.
It doesn't manage to sweep the issue of the 164 tons of pig iron under the carpet, though.
She was a fine ship, and he had always
heard passengers speak well of her,
and particularly of the man who was
the master. The vessel was exceptionally
well stowed, and she carried less deck
cargo than on any of her previous
Queensland trips. It was absolutely
impossible for the cargo to shift. He had
never heard of the coal shifting. There
was about 60 tons of light Melbourne
cargo in the bottom of the holds.
There must have been general relief that the deck cargo only amounted to about 1 ton. To say that cargo or coal never shifted was overdone and defensive.
Captain Mackay to Mr. Wareham:
Has the cargo found at Cape Bowling
Green been absolutely identified as the
cargo that was placed in the after
hold?
Mr. Wareham: Yes, absolutely.
Captain Mackay: How much do you
think came out?
Mr. Wareham: Less than 10 tons
altogether.
Captain Mackay: You recognise that
there must have been an immense
fracture to allow of such cargo escaping?
Mr. Wareham thought it probable
that a long narrow hole was torn in
the ship, and she foundered very
quickly.
Mr. Wareham was not going to be drawn into discussions about the after hatch being blown off in a hurricane allowing the cargo to escape as the ship foundered vs. the size of the rent which would have to have been created by striking an obstacle to cause this cargo to be released.
Captain Mackay said the Meteorological
Bureau's information confirmed the
opinion of the board as to how the
disaster occurred. Captain Knight
evidently having a south-east gale
behind him, decided to go ahead. Every
thing was in his favour. Then this
terrific rotary storm came across his
path, and what happened after that
was a matter of conjecture.
Beautifully and succinctly put. I believe this was precisely the truth of the matter.
Mr. Wareham stated that neither the
Yongala nor the Grantala carried
a raft in addition to the boats. His
assumption was that the cargo which
had not been found had drifted through
the Flinders Passage.
Perhaps the import of this fact was that a raft would be quicker and easier to launch, hence no survivors.
Mr. Wareham (re-called) said the
ship cost £102,000, and was insured
for £65,000, the company taking the
balance of the risk.
Although this seemed like the ship was under-insured, it must be factored in that Yongala was more than 7 years old and depreciation counted against her value.
Five bags and one basket of mails
had been recovered. No bran or chaff,
except that which was required for the
horse and bull was on deck. Some of
the chaff picked up was shipped at
Brisbane. There were six tons from
Melbourne, eight tons from Sydney,
and three tons from Brisbane. About
25 tons of bran and pollard was also
shipped at Brisbane, and the bulk of it
was stowed in Nos. 2 and 3 lower holds.
Again, sensible stowage, either side of midships, dominated by boilers and engine machinery.
Captain Rothwell, a pilot and master
mariner, said he had been sent to
examine the reefs near Townsville, on
the steamer Porpoise. He examined
Boulder, Broadhurst and Wheeler
reefs, but none of them presented any
thing extraordinary. A steamer striking
any of the reefs would remain there.
He also examined Keeper Reef,
which was remarkable for its pinnacles
which went down to a distance of 12
fathoms, and were covered by about
two fathoms of water. It would be fatal
to a steamer to strike on of those
pinnacles. From his experience as a
master mariner of rotary storms, he
did not think it was likely that the
steamer ran on to a reef. She was
more likely to have run ashore near
Cape Bowling Green; either that, or
she went down in the storm. The
big storms went inland and uprooted
every tree within a certain radius. He
thought the steamer encountered the
full force of the storm about midnight,
and foundered owing to a list caused
by the shifting of the cargo.
Was the man psychic. He certainly had the firmest grip on the reality of the disaster.
The only thing he found during his search
was a steamer's hatch. It was a solid
hatch. The hatch measured 5 ft 10 in
in length, and 2 ft 6 in in width.
The water was fairly clear where the
search was made, but they could not
see any distance down with the naked
eye.
Captain Mackay: What chance
would there be of finding the ship if
a further search were made?
Captain Rothwell: I don't think
there would be much chance, as I had
a spar trailing at a depth of 16 fathoms,
and if there had been anything in the
shape of a ship on the bottom the spar
would have caught something.
Continuing, he said he thought the
cargo would have shifted when the
ship heeled over to a certain angle.
If something like that had not happened
he thought she could have pulled
through. He did not think the ship
succumbed owing to instability.
Cargo shifting was something which could happen if a top heavy / tender steamer heeled over to a significant degree. It was like admitting the original problem.
He did not think it should be very difficult
to run over the track taken by the
Yongala and locate the spot within a
few miles where she would have been
at midnight on that date. She should
have been 10 or 12 miles north of
Cape Upstart.
The distance is actually 26 miles, but the man's deduction is impressive to say the least!!
Midnight was correct.
 |
| Cape Upstart, 26 miles from site of disaster - courtesy Google Earth |
He had no reason to suggest that
there was anything wrong in the
stowage of the cargo or with the
equipment. He had never heard
that any of the officers were lacking
in ability. The reason why he did not
think the ship struck a rock was that
so small a quantity of cargo escaped.
Rationale rules.
Mr. O'Shea: Do you suggest that any
human effort could have saved her?
The only thing would have been to
have anchored in Whitsunday Passage.
And this was excused because there was general acknowledgment that Captain Knight probably thought he was outrunning a frontal system coming up the coast.
Mr. O'Shea: Don't you think that the
fact that the inner music-room doors
and not the outer doors were found
points to a different conclusion than
the one you have come to?
Striking an obstacle vs. overwhelmed by a cyclone.
Witness: The inner doors would be
very frail, and if a sea got inside it
would break them.
Makes sense entirely. As Yongala rolled over the water pressure building up in the inner compartments would have popped out doors which were 'very frail', rather than the sturdier ones on the outside.
Mr. O'Shea: Assuming that the mail
room was part of the ship, and was
secured by a Yale lock how do you
account for the mails being found?
Witness: It may have been that at
Mackay, the mails were not put in the
mail-room.
Mr. O'Shea: Well, if she foundered,
do you think the mail-room would
burst open?
Witness: No.
Mr. O'Shea: If she struck a rock, do
you think the mail-room would be
opened?
Witness: I do not think so.
Mr. Wareham: I have been informed
that the mails at Mackay were placed
on board at the last moment, and in
all probability were never placed in
the mail-room.
Such an impressive witness not yielding to the theory of striking an obstacle.
Alexander M. Leslie, superintendent
of wharves and stores for Dalgety and
Co., said he held a master's certificate,
and a commission in the R.N.R. He
sailed for over two years in the
Yongala as second officer. She had
a reputation as a tender, but safe ship.
It only took a few tons of cargo on
either side to give her a list.
He might as well have stopped at this point. Case proven, Yongala was an inherently tender (top heavy) ship. A few tons on either side to give her a list was convincing.
He had heard that she was a ship that
rolled heavily, but not dangerously. He
had been in her through some of the
heaviest gales of wind that ever blew in
the Australian Bight. The ship always
righted herself steadily.
The Age, 24 April, 1907.
YONGALA IN HEAVY SEAS.
The steamer Yongata had a rough passage
from Melbourne. Off Cape Northumberland
she shipped tremendous seas, and the fore
and aft deck cargo was adrift The engineer
reduced speed lo "slow," and the ship headed
sea until the cargo was lashed.
Captain Knight always considered the ship
steadier after the pig iron ballast had
been taken out. Witness could not say
that he had ever sailed on a better
sea boat. Even when she had a trim
of 19 ft aft and from 10 ft to 11 ft forward
she behaved well.
She must have been difficult to handle with a forward draught like that.
Note that the lowest draught average here is 14.5 ft. which gives a differential of 9.5 ft. compared to Mr. Wareham's estimate of 7 ft. when Yongala was in ballast (empty). Who was telling the truth?
If one uses the differential of 9.5 ft. equivalent to 2,091 tons we get:
- 607 tons equivalent to 2.755 ft. which added to 14.5 ft. = 17.255 ft..
Mr. Wareham came to the conclusion that Yongala was drawing 19 ft. 7 1/2 in. at the time of the disaster, but the truth hinted at above by Mr. O'Shea, is that the draught was actually in the region of 17 ft. some 2 ft. 7 in. lighter.
In fact the average figure of 17 ft. was the very draught quoted to justify the 164 tons of stablising pig iron required by the steamer, and which was notably absent on this disastrous occasion!
Note that the lowest draught average here is 14.5 ft. which gives a differential of 9.5 ft. compared to Mr. Wareham's estimate of 7 ft. when Yongala was in ballast (empty). Who was telling the truth?
If one uses the differential of 9.5 ft. equivalent to 2,091 tons we get:
- 607 tons equivalent to 2.755 ft. which added to 14.5 ft. = 17.255 ft..
Mr. Wareham came to the conclusion that Yongala was drawing 19 ft. 7 1/2 in. at the time of the disaster, but the truth hinted at above by Mr. O'Shea, is that the draught was actually in the region of 17 ft. some 2 ft. 7 in. lighter.
In fact the average figure of 17 ft. was the very draught quoted to justify the 164 tons of stablising pig iron required by the steamer, and which was notably absent on this disastrous occasion!
Captain Mackay: You don't mean to
say that is good trim for a ship?
Witness: No, but we could not help
it; we had not the cargo.
Point confirmed! This proved that without cargo in forward holds Yongala was too light in the bow and needed the pig iron.
Captain Mackay: I can quite understand
a ship rolling under such conditions.
He could not think for one moment that
she did other than strike an obstruction.
He could not conceive that such a ship
was blown over.
Captain Mackay was blatantly biased in favour of the stability of the Yongala. This was not his role as 'prosecutor'.
Captain Mackay: I want you to
discriminate between the heaviest
gale that ever blew and a Hurricane.
Witness: My opinion is that she
struck some obscure obstacles.
Avoiding the import of the question and reverting back to the 'striking an obstacle' theory.
During his time he never heard of passengers
leaving the ship at Adelaide to join another ship.
So there had been concerns.....
He had seen the ship roll very heavily,
but had never known her to shift her
cargo or coal.
Again the rolling pattern of a top heavy vessel would be described as 'roll very heavily'. In doing so the angle of heel could have been large enough to cause even well stowed cargo to shift (the SS Vestris disaster is a good example of this).
The ship made good courses, and
Captain Knight was a man who never
varied the track. The ship kept about
13 miles off Cape Upstart, and six and
a half off Cape Bowling Green. The
same track was taken day or night.
It was pointless insisting that Captain Knight took the outside passage, Whitsundays, given the repeated confirmations by various witnesses that he did not vary his course, day or night and in all weathers.
Yongala went down a further 5 miles out off Cape Bowling Green which could have been due to a certain amount of drift off course, or given the extremely adverse conditions, a conscious decision to put more sea between himself and the coast.
 |
| courtesy Google Earth |
Captain Mackay: There has been
something said about the presence of
a light at Cape Gloucester preventing
the disaster; did you ever fail to see
Cape Gloucester looming up, bold and
high?
Witness: No, we never failed to see
it; we passed within three-quarters of
a mile of it.
There are certainly conditions at sea when visibility is markedly reduced. These were vacuous statements.
Witness had never heard of Mr. Wareham
giving instructions to Captain Knight as to
time.
This statement suggests that time pressure might have been an issue, but in the context of Flat Top to Townsville overnight, there was no practical pressure to press on.
The mails were placed in No. 3 hold.
The mail room carried bonded cargo.
The hatch he had seen within the
precincts of the Port Office was not
from the Yongala.
This explanation confirms why mails were found, having been released from hold 3.
How would this man have known that the hatch was not from Yongala? The hatch was an important link to the ship having been battered by the cyclone rather than striking an obstacle. One suspects that there would have been denials of its origins. A hatch which had been some time in the water (another vessel) would have been covered with barnacles. No reports of this were made.
Mr. O'Shea: He said there was no
danger in the rolling of the Yongala.
The fact that she had 1800 tons on
board would make her less tender. She
was a seaworthy ship if she had 20
tons on the upper and 'tween decks,
and 1800 tons below decks. He could
not give any evidence on the question
of the point where she disappeared.
A sound argument.
Captain Fredk.. Graham Shaw,
assistant shipping inspector for Brisbane,
said he inspected the Yongala when
she was in Brisbane on her last
voyage. She was a well-equipped
vessel, and complied with the regulations
in every respect. She had remarkably
little deck cargo — less, perhaps, than
he had seen before on a ship. It was
not within his province to look to the
stowing of cargo.
Captain Forrester, shipping inspector
for the port of Brisbane, said he
had visited the Yongala a great
number of times. He had never heard the
question of her instability raised by
her passengers or anyone else. He did
not think there was anything in the
ship which was different to other ships.
When she passed out to sea on her first
voyage she could not have been in a
better trim. He had never heard
anything said either in her praise or
to her detriment. The ship was like
other ships. If a ship was not a first
class ship he should certainly say
something about it.
Captain Sim, commander of the
Grantala, described the Yongala as a
very good sea-boat. He had charge of
her four years ago. He had heard
rumours from people who had never
been in her that she was 'cranky.' While
he was in command she encountered
several heavy gales across the Bight.
On the night of the loss of the Yongala
he was coming south in the Grantala.
Finding the weather dirty, he put back
to Cape Bowling Green and anchored.
There is no denying that the severity of conditions forced Captain Sim to seek shelter. The implication is glaring that Captain Knight should have done the same, unless he was caught in the cyclone in no-man's land, too late for such choices.
The wind veered round from the
SSE to NW, which showed that he
was on the western margin of the
right-hand semi-circle of a cyclone.
Correct.
He did not think the Yongala went on
the reefs, but would not venture an
opinion as to how she was lost. He
did not think it likely that Captain
Knight could have taken the inside
course between Armit and Gumbrell
islands after passing Dent Island,
because he could not have seen the
islands.
This was a lone voice protesting Captain Knight's route through the dangerous inshore passage. Everyone knew otherwise, but the Adelaide Steamship Company's senior employee stuck to the same hymn sheet.
It was possible that the ship
may have run across the vortex of a
cyclone, and she might have struck
something before getting clear. The
weather was very thick that night. He
did not know if it was true that Captain
Knight used the inside course in
all weathers. At the point where he
(witness) anchored that night, the wind
was not travelling more than 70 or 80
miles an hour. It was at its worst
between 11 o'clock that night and 3
o'clock next morning. There was
nothing in it, as far as he could see, to
make the control of a vessel impossible,
and noticed nothing abnormal in
the tides and currents. He did not
think the ship could have been over
come by the elements alone. The
vessel was very easy to manage.
Again pushing the striking an obstacle theory. It was all out defending Yongala's seaworthiness.
Wm. Kenneth Saunders, chief officer,
and Frederick Kirket Brown, chief
engineer of the Grantala, both gave
evidence to the effect that the Yongala
was an excellent sea boat and well
equipped.
Henry Adamson, superintendent
engineer to the Adelaide Steamship
Company, said the Yongala was built by
a good firm and to good specifications.
She had excellent machinery, and all
her engine shafting was from 20 to 25
per cent, above requirements, so that it
was not likely to break. He never had
the slightest fear of her under any
conditions.
Her funnel was peculiar as it had been
built into the ship, and if would have stood
even if the guides were blown away.
In my opinion, this was Yongala's weak link. Such an enormous funnel in hurricane-force conditions could have assisted in dragging the steamer over.
The ship had been carefully tested
for stability, and had never broken
down. He did not think the disaster
could have happened through any
mishap to the machinery, which was
the strongest he had seen on the
coast. He did not think that everything
would go if the funnel went
over the side. The ship would still
have a good length of funnel left. He
would not venture an opinion as to
what happened to the ship. He
supervised the building of the Grantala
and Yongala. The specifications were
very rigid, and both ships were looked
upon by the company as the best ships
of their dimensions that could be built.
He travelled from Sydney in her on
her last voyage, and she was then a
well equipped ship. Taking into
consideration the amount of coal
consumed and the cargo discharged at
Mackay he estimated the freeboard of
the vessel at the time of the disaster
at 11ft. The builders were responsible
for the design of the vessel. Their
reputation was at stake. In his opinion
the Yongala was a well designed, safe
vessel. She was classed as A1 at
Lloyd's, and up to the time of her loss
was still in that class.
There's no denying Yongala's attributes. But stability was a function of ballasting and with 29% cargo on board, she was vulnerable in a cyclone.
Captain Mackay said the board were
perfectly satisfied as to the stability
of the ship.
Captain Edward Northcote, general
manager for the Adelaide Steamship
Company, made a short explanation as
to the pig iron put into the ship when
in the Western Australian trade. In
the Western Australian trade she had
no back cargo on the run from
Fremantle, and owing to the consumption
of coal and fresh water it was an
advantage to have some weight. By
placing it in No. 2 lower hold the vessel
was in better trim. He found that
it made the vessel deeper by 6in forward
and 1in aft. She was less lively
in a seaway. When the ship was
drafted into the Queensland trade the
average draught of the ship was some
3ft greater, and represented over 900
tons more weight. In the absence of
any facts he would not like to venture
an opinion as to what happened to the
ship.
There is no denying that this was the Adelaide Steamship Company's achilles heel in the Inquiry. Yongala required additional ballasting when in light trim. It was a weak link.
He did not think such a hurricane
would overwhelm the ship. he had
come through two hurricanes lately,
one in a ship that he would not class
with the Yongala.
This statement is reminiscent of the ageing Bullarra surviving the Balla Balla Blow and Koombana not. It was all a question of top hamper and the modern luxury vessels boasted plenty of that compared with the more humble steamers of the time.
Captain Geo. Dibble, a master mariner,
presented his theory to the board.
He thought the Yongala would anchor
in about 12 fathoms of water after she
had passed Gloucester Head. The wind,
blowing from the south-south-west,
would have driven her so hard that
the cables parted and she drifted, or
was driven on to Nares Rock. His
idea was that the Yongala would be
found within a radius of five miles from
Nares Rock.
It would be quite safe for Captain Knight
to go by the inner route, even on a bad
night.
A valiant attempt to defend the actions of Captain Knight.
Captain Mackenzie, commander of
the Wollowra, said he had command
of the Yongala for six months, and
she was the finest sea boat he was
ever in. In 23 years 'experience on
the coast he had only been outside
Armit and Gumbrell islands on three
occasions. He was confident Captain
Knight took that course, as it was the
safest.
Such protests demonstrated a closing of ranks within the shipping circle.
He thought the vessel got as far as
Cape Upstart. He thought the
ship was blown away to leeward
among the reefs. The storm probably
went inland and blew out to sea again.
The cyclones of which they had records
all occurred within 10 days.
'Within 10 days' of what??
Captain Mackay: The board have no
doubt that the ship was one of the
staunchest and best found on the
coast, but they want some professional
opinion as to how she met her fate.
Captain Mackay certainly made his position clear, well within the pro Adelaide Steamship Company 'circle'.
Don't you think there is some chance
that the ship touched on the reefs
when passing Armit Island, and, then
stranded?
Captain Mackenzie: I don't think
so; I don't believe she was injured
until she reached Cape Upstart. If
the ship struck a pinnacle near Armit
Island the captain could turn round
one of the islands and get his boats
out.
Perfectly reasonable.
I think she is up among the reefs
near Flinders Passage. All my
inquiries have led me to believe that the
cyclone came from the south-west. The
cyclone was something unusual, some
thing that had never been heard of in
Australia before. I have heard of
cyclones going the wrong way in the
Bay of Bengal.
I believe that the confusion resulted from the fact that it was a hybrid cyclone - see image
I did not think she capsized. She would
heel over, like all fine bottomed vessels,
to a certain extent, but she would not
capsize.
Again the protests continued.
He had been in cyclones, and he was sure
a man could not hold on to the wheel.
All the shelter would be swept away.
Under such circumstances a ship
would be out of control. A drop of
water driven by a cyclone would cut
a man's flesh.
A realistic comment.
He added that all the men trained
under the A.U.S.N. Company went
outside. Captain Knight would be
perfectly justified in taking the inner
passage on that night.
Contradictory statement. It was not 'perfectly justified'.
He (witness) would take that passage at
any time. He liked to get all the islands
on the sky line, and if he took the outer
passage he could not do so.
Interesting comment.
Mr. Johnston: If you went to search
for this vessel what would you make
your starting point?
Captain Mackenzie: Broadhurst Reef.
He thought the best way to find the
vessel would be to send up a captive
balloon. It would take six months to
make a survey of that coast. He
thought, and had thought for a long
time, that a light was needed on Cape
Gloucester or Middle Island.
Captain Mackay said he had got the
opinion of various master mariners as
to where additional lights should be
placed, but Cape Gloucester had never
been mentioned.
Captain Mackay, 20 May, 1911:
"He recommends further, the necessity for a light
on Gloucester Head, or in that locality, and that the
question of a light at Point Lookout remain in abeyance
until the visit of the Federal expert."
Captain Mackay was dishonest.
Mr. Johnston: Do you think, Captain
Mackenzie, that any additional lights
in that vicinity would have made any
difference on that night?
Captain Mackenzie: It would all depend
on what the night was like.
Captain Mackay: What difference do
you think wireless telegraphy would
make in a cyclone like that?
Captain Mackenzie: Not much .
Captain Binstead, Torres Strait
pilot, gave evidence regarding his
experience of Whitsunday Passage. He
used to take the inside course between
Armit and Gumbrell islands, but he
now went outside. He thought the
Yongala had .struck Nares Rock or
some projection near it. He did not
think Captain Knight would have
attempted the course between Armit
and Gumbrell islands on that night.
Empty words.
Captain Hurford, master of the
steamer Bombala, said he went between
Armit and Gumbrell islands at all
hours of the night and day in fine
weather. He thought the Yongala
struck some uncharted danger. He
considered Captain Knight took his
vessel outside Eschelby Island.
 |
| the implication is clear that outside Eschelby Island was not via Armit and Gumbrell - courtesy Google Earth. |
On such a night as that of March 23 it
would be impossible to see a light even
if one was there on Gloucester Head.
Captain Mackay: Have you ever received
instructions about anchoring in
hurricane weather?
Captain Hurford: No; I have never
received instructions; I should say a
master would decide to anchor in
hurricane weather.
Captain Sim (re-called) said that
No. 1 lifeboat on the Yongala, portion
of which had been picked up, would
be on the port side.
This is a fascinating revelation. Max Gleeson claims that only davits on Yongala's starboard side had been swung out. But this lifeboat was from the port side and the only one discovered after the disaster. It suggests, strongly, that the hurricane conditions did much damage to the vessel, liberating all or part of lifeboat number 1 from the davit. What became of the starboard side lifeboats is in the realm of speculation.
Captain Gerritt Smith, master of the
Cooma, said he did not often go be
tween Armit and Gumbrell islands. He
would only do so in very fine weather.
He did not think Captain Knight would
have done so on the night of March 23.
What were they trying to prove when the residents of Cannon Valley had seen Yongala passing along the inside passage on the night in question.
Captain Sharland, master of the
Warrego, said he had been a shipmate
of Captain Knight's for about four
years. He did not think the captain
would have gone through the inside
passage on that night. On the night
after the wreck took place he (witness)
anchored 18 miles this side of Dent
Island light in consequence of thick
weather. When he was there the
Grantala came along and he got
his bearings from her. There was very
little wind or sea. He did not think a
cyclone would be strong enough to
turn over such a big and welt-built
ship as the Yongala.
The cyclone, narrow in diameter (30 miles) had come and dissipated within 24 hours.
George E. Bond, of the Meteorological
Bureau, also gave evidence. Captain
Mackay informed him that Captain
Mackenzie had thought the cyclone
came from the south-west.
Mr. Bond said his opinion was that
there was nothing to support the
south-westerly theory. The charts
showed pretty clearly that the storm
came from the ocean to the north
east. No such storms had been known
to come from the other direction.
The storm was in existence on March 20
and a notification was sent on that day
to the coastal stations to the effect that
a depression existed to the north-east of
Cardwell, and probably moving toward the
seaboard.
The official weather forecast appeared in the press as follows:
The Argus, Melbourne, 24 March, 1911.
THE WEATHER
OFFICIAL FORECAST
Forecast by the Commonwealth Meteorologist
Mr. H. A. Hunt, Thursday 9 pm. (23 March)
"Fine throughout, some cloud in southern districts
and one or two misty showers along the coast.
Variable winds tending east and northeast."
Queensland: cloudy with further rains along
seaboard: unsettled along Peninsular, with
probability of stormy weather with heavy falls.
Fine inland, with moderate temperatures;
southeasterly winds.
On the 22nd there was little change in the
conditions, but on the afternoon of the
23rd a report from Bowen showed
unmistakable developments. On receipt
of the report a message warning ships
was sent from Brisbane. A telegram was
sent to Flat-top, but it arrived too late for
the Yongala.
It is rather extraordinary that the cyclone warning did not appear AT ALL in the weather forecast for Queensland, 23 March, 1911. Stormy weather and heavy falls, associated with southeasterly winds was exactly the assessment made by Captain Knight when he made his dash for Townsville.
But NO official cyclone warning.
Mr. O'Shea briefly addressed the
board, and expressed the hope that
whatever decision was arrived at
would not be based on conjecture, but
on whatever facts they had before them.
If this was not done the public might
form a conclusion adverse to the
company's interests.
And there you have it. The public, in my opinion, would have formed its own conclusion irrespective of protests issued at the Inquiry.
The Queensland Marine Board
delivered the following finding regarding
the loss of the steamer Yongala.
The board found that the steamer
Yongala, official No. 118,332, registered
in Adelaide, Captain Wm. Knight,
master, and owned by the Adelaide
Steamship Company, Ltd., was on a
voyage from Melbourne to Cairns, via
ports. In view of certain rumours
being circulated reflecting on the ship's
stability the board invited, through the
press, persons desirous of giving
evidence to attend the inquiry, which
notice, however, met with no response.
One does wonder about this....
The finding goes on to quote the
evidence of Mr. Adamson, the company's
superintendent engineer, and says the
board was satisfied that the vessel, in
construction, stability, and seaworthiness,
was equal to any of her class on the
Australian coast.
And they all needed pig iron ballast when in light condition???
The cost of the vessel was £102,000,
the underwriters' proportion of the
insurance was £ 65,000, and the balance
was carried by the owners.
The vessel left Brisbane on March 21,
with a total dead weight of 1885 tons,
fully manned and equipped, and in
excellent trim. The draught aft was
22 ft. 6in.(with 29% cargo?!), forward
17ft., 8in., leaving a clear side of 10ft.
6in.
With only 29% of cargo capacity on board it seems extraordinary that the aft draught figure was a mere 1.5 ft. from maximum. It simply does not make sense and throws these figures into the realm of skepticism.
Henry Adamson had already claimed a free side (free board) of 11 ft.. They were not even consistent with their figures.
She had a general cargo and
passengers for northern ports, and
reached Mackay on March 23. The
weight of cargo in the vessel was 667
tons, almost entirely in the lower hold
and properly stowed. - There were 53
tons in the 'tween' deck, ;40 tons of
which were for Mackay, and 11 tons on
deck, 10 of which were also for Mackay.
The number of passengers on board on
leaving Mackay were: — First saloon
passengers, 29; second saloon passengers,
19; crew, 72; total 120.
Reviewing the evidence from the
time the Yongala left the anchorage at
Mackay, at 1.40 p.m. on March 23, the
finding states:— 'It has been given in
evidence that several masters, including
Captain Knight, when proceeding
from Whitsunday Passage north, were
in the habit of using the in-shore route
passing between Armit and Gumbrell
islands, The board, however, is of opinion,
(and ignoring the Cannon Valley residents)
taking into consideration the prevailing
weather conditions at the time, that
Captain Knight, as a careful and experienced
master, would not use the passage on that
occasion.
Several theories were suggested by
witnesses — well-known shipmasters —
as to the cause of the disaster, notably
the vessel striking a reef, or owing to
being rendered helpless in the vortex
of the storm; but as they were merely
conjectures it is not possible to allow
them any consideration. While it
is both gratifying and reassuring that
the vessel's stability and seaworthiness
remain unassailable, and the
competency and carefulness of Captain
Knight unimpeachable, the board, with
no desire to indulge in idle speculation,
simply finds that after becoming lost
to view by the lightkeeper at Dent Island
the fate of the Yongala passes beyond
human ken into the realms of conjecture
to add one more to the long roll of
mysteries of the sea.
The conclusion to the Inquiry into the loss of the Koombana a year later:
"In conclusion, the Court simply finds, without
indulging in useless speculation, that the Stability
and Seaworthiness of the s.s. Koombana were
unassailable, and the competency and
carefulness of her master, Capt. Allen, beyond
question and that after being lost sight of at
sea on the 20th March, 1912, her fate passes
beyond human knowledge and remains' a mystery
of the sea."
If this does not tell you all you need to know about how these people operated, nothing will....
The board has to thank Mr. Northcote,
general manager of the Adelaide
S.S. Company, Mr. Wareham, local
inspector, and the officers for their
efforts in supplying every information
and details of every description were
readily furnished, and witnesses were
brought forward at some inconvenience
to the company's working arrangements.
The board also commends the company
for their prompt action in endeavouring
by every means at their disposal to
obtain information regarding the
whereabouts of the missing vessel.
courtesy Trove
courtesy Trove
SUMMARY:
Yongala departed Flat Top, Mackay, 1.40 p.m., Thursday, 23 March. She was in relatively light / tender condition (top heavy). Cargo weight accounted for 29% of maximum load and 164 tons of stabilising pig iron ballast had been removed because it caused a jerky recovery uncomfortable for passengers.
Captain Knight elected to depart for Townsville despite strengthening wind from the southeast and a falling barometer. I believe the decision was based on an assumption that the weather system was coming up the coast, rather than one into which they would be steaming.
Captain Knight elected to depart for Townsville despite strengthening wind from the southeast and a falling barometer. I believe the decision was based on an assumption that the weather system was coming up the coast, rather than one into which they would be steaming.
There was no cyclone warning.
Heading north to Townsville and believing they could outrun the weather, Yongala made an average of 16 knots assisted by a 2 knot current. Yongala passed Dent Island, inside passage, Whitsundays, at about 5 p.m. (erroneously reported as 6 p.m.) and was subsequently seen by residents of Cannon Valley Beach an hour later, coinciding with dusk at 6 p.m.. This was the riskier but quicker, inside passage passing between Armit and Gumbrell Islands.
Having cleared the Whitsundays without mishap, Yongala headed northwest in open water parallel with the coast and the outer Barrier Reef. She cleared Nares Rock without difficulty and arrived at a position 11.5 miles out from Cape Bowling Green Light, 17.7 miles from where Grantala lay anchored to the west due to deteriorating weather conditions.
We know from the chronometer time, 11.45 p.m. (conclusive in my opinion) and a wreck site within the large steamer track, that the disaster must have been sudden and catastrophic. Also, the time and site matches a plausible 15 - 16 knots (favourable, 2 knot current).
My belief is that the intense cyclonic system 30 miles in diameter was actually a hybrid cyclone (see image below) predominated by a gale from the south - the masters who experienced the storm reported gale force wind directions in keeping with this.
By the time Yongala was almost upon the eye of the cyclone, the gale would have shifted rapidly and violently from south to north, bringing the wind force to bear on the top heavy steamer's starboard bow and beam.
Heading northwest, Captain Knight would have been confronted by an unfolding catastrophe and certain knowledge of Yongala's inability to recover quickly enough in such conditions. I believe he attempted to bring the steamer's bow into the gale.
What followed must have been extreme and sudden, Yongala capsizing within minutes. The rudder is still in the half to starboard position and the wreck lies facing north. If there had been enough time for recovery, I believe the rudder would have been corrected to maintain the heading.
An explosion was heard by residents south of the disaster site, suggesting that the furnaces burning under full steam reacted to the cold sea water rushing in.
The main hatch was compromised as the steamer foundered and lighter cargo in hold 3 liberated into the tumultuous sea.
Passengers would no doubt have been confined to cabins due to conditions, essentially trapped as the disaster unfolded.
I choose to believe that Yongala foundered so quickly there was little time for protracted suffering and Yongala's 122 souls now rest in peace, cosetted by some of the Coral Sea's most illustrious and doting residents.
Max Gleeson presents an engaging theory based on dive observations that lifeboats on the starboard side of Yongala were swung out in preparation for evacuation of the ship rather than a sudden, extreme event.
A great deal of wreckage was subsequently discovered after the disaster spanning large swathes of the coast from Cape Bowling Green to Palm Island in the north. No lifeboat(s) or section thereof from the starboard side were discovered. Only a section of lifeboat 1 from the port side was found, suggesting that no one escaped Yongala.
A possible reason for starboard davits being in the 'swung out' position could be forces linked with Yongala coming to rest on her starboard side.
Heading north to Townsville and believing they could outrun the weather, Yongala made an average of 16 knots assisted by a 2 knot current. Yongala passed Dent Island, inside passage, Whitsundays, at about 5 p.m. (erroneously reported as 6 p.m.) and was subsequently seen by residents of Cannon Valley Beach an hour later, coinciding with dusk at 6 p.m.. This was the riskier but quicker, inside passage passing between Armit and Gumbrell Islands.
Having cleared the Whitsundays without mishap, Yongala headed northwest in open water parallel with the coast and the outer Barrier Reef. She cleared Nares Rock without difficulty and arrived at a position 11.5 miles out from Cape Bowling Green Light, 17.7 miles from where Grantala lay anchored to the west due to deteriorating weather conditions.
We know from the chronometer time, 11.45 p.m. (conclusive in my opinion) and a wreck site within the large steamer track, that the disaster must have been sudden and catastrophic. Also, the time and site matches a plausible 15 - 16 knots (favourable, 2 knot current).
My belief is that the intense cyclonic system 30 miles in diameter was actually a hybrid cyclone (see image below) predominated by a gale from the south - the masters who experienced the storm reported gale force wind directions in keeping with this.
By the time Yongala was almost upon the eye of the cyclone, the gale would have shifted rapidly and violently from south to north, bringing the wind force to bear on the top heavy steamer's starboard bow and beam.
Heading northwest, Captain Knight would have been confronted by an unfolding catastrophe and certain knowledge of Yongala's inability to recover quickly enough in such conditions. I believe he attempted to bring the steamer's bow into the gale.
What followed must have been extreme and sudden, Yongala capsizing within minutes. The rudder is still in the half to starboard position and the wreck lies facing north. If there had been enough time for recovery, I believe the rudder would have been corrected to maintain the heading.
An explosion was heard by residents south of the disaster site, suggesting that the furnaces burning under full steam reacted to the cold sea water rushing in.
The main hatch was compromised as the steamer foundered and lighter cargo in hold 3 liberated into the tumultuous sea.
Passengers would no doubt have been confined to cabins due to conditions, essentially trapped as the disaster unfolded.
I choose to believe that Yongala foundered so quickly there was little time for protracted suffering and Yongala's 122 souls now rest in peace, cosetted by some of the Coral Sea's most illustrious and doting residents.
 |
| courtesy Google Earth |
 |
| courtesy Google Earth |
Max Gleeson presents an engaging theory based on dive observations that lifeboats on the starboard side of Yongala were swung out in preparation for evacuation of the ship rather than a sudden, extreme event.
A great deal of wreckage was subsequently discovered after the disaster spanning large swathes of the coast from Cape Bowling Green to Palm Island in the north. No lifeboat(s) or section thereof from the starboard side were discovered. Only a section of lifeboat 1 from the port side was found, suggesting that no one escaped Yongala.
A possible reason for starboard davits being in the 'swung out' position could be forces linked with Yongala coming to rest on her starboard side.
The following extract gives us an idea of the forces unleashed by the cyclone:
Cairns Post, 17 October, 1911.
Captain McKenzie further stated that
between Cape Upstart and Cape Bowling
Green there is now visible in the bush the
track of the awful south-west tornado, which
it is believed drove the Yongala out onto
Broadhurst Reef. For a width of fifteen miles
the whole of the trees, including many immense
ones, being torn out by the roots and levelled.
It is clear from this description that Yongala was subjected to an intense, narrow, system of formidable force, causing her to capsize rapidly. One could argue that such a force would have destroyed even the most 'stable' of vessels.
The Week, Brisbane, 31 March, 1911.
The Week, Brisbane, 31 March, 1911.
A veteran master mariner firmly adheres
to the belief that the vessel turned turtle
in the cyclone, and explains the fact that
the cargo mentioned had come ashore by
pointing out that it was quite likely that the
cargo of the overturned vessel falling upon
the hatches, would burst them open, the
lighter portion finding its way to the surface.
courtesy Trove
courtesy Trove
For all readers with an in interest in this subject Max Gleeson's online video, 'Mystery of a Generation' is compelling and beautifully compiled.
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