NONE OF THE LIGHTHOUSES HAD MORSE LAMPS.

The Advertiser (Adelaide) Thursday 30 March, 1911.

Queensland coast. Except at Cape 

Moreton, not a lighthouse is equipped with 

a Morse lamp. 

An extraordinary state of affairs. There were no stations for receiving Marconi signals which would not have helped Yongala even if she carried a wireless installation. Apart from flags and the light itself there was no way of communicating with steamers along the Queensland coast relevant to the final route of Yongala. In other words when Yongala passed Dent Island, 6.30 pm, 23 March, it was dark and there was no means of communication. 

Caught out with a false time!!! 

6.35 p.m. was a fabrication.

THE CYCLONE.

Inquiry:

The Meteorological Bureau telegraphed Flat-top on the 23rd that cyclonic conditions prevailed between Mackay and Townsville. This was signalled to the s.s. " Cooma " from Flat-top; but, unfortunately, the "Yongala" had left some hours previously.

"The Cooma was a little late arriving there, 

and at dusk they were informed on board 

by signal that a cyclone was reported 

north-east of Bowen. Captain Smith decided 

to go into Mackay Harbor. Later on driving rain 

fell heavily, and although one attempt was

made to get out, the vessel could not do

so, owing to the weather closing in again."

However, and this is a big however:

The Argus, Melbourne, 24 March, 1911.

THE WEATHER

OFFICIAL FORECAST

Forecast by the Commonwealth Meteorologist

Mr. H. A. Hunt, Thursday 9 pm. (23 March)

"Fine throughout, some cloud in southern districts

and one or two misty showers along the coast. 

Variable winds tending east and northeast."

Queensland: cloudy with further rains along

seaboard: unsettled along Peninsular, with 

probability of stormy weather with heavy falls.

Fine inland, with moderate temperatures;

southeasterly winds.

There is a disconnect between that which was reported at the Inquiry and the official forecast printed in the press. In the latter, there was NO reference to a cyclone. Perhaps the signal the captain of the Cooma received was a local report from Cape Bowling Green Light? It seems disingenuous for the Bureau to be claiming 'a job well done'. Also, these warnings only served a purpose if they could be timeously issued to masters. Both Yongala and Grantala had sailed.

The s.s. " Taiyuan " anchored at Repulse Island on the morning of the 23rd, and had the wind from S.E. (strong gale with occasional terrific squalls). At Dent Island it also blew from S.E., force 7 to 9, with no indication of a cyclone, when the " Yongala" passed at 6.30 p.m.

It is no surprise that Yongala could maintain 17 knots with such a tail wind.

At Cape Bowling Green, however, the wind commenced at S.S.E., veering to S., S.W., W., and thence to N.W. The "Grantala," bound South, anchored about 7 miles W.N.W. from the Cape, experienced the same weather conditions; barometer 29.50, which would place her on the northern margin of the right-hand semicircle of the storm proving unerringly that in conformity with the laws relating to hurricanes in the Southern Hemisphere it came from the N.E., and in its progressive motion to the S.W. (inland) large trees were uprooted, clearing a well-defined space through the forest at the back of Cape Upstart. 

It would have been helpful to establish what the original barometer readings were prior to 29.50 and then calculate whether the drop was significant enough to alert Captain Knight.

From the scant data available, it may be assumed that the diameter of the storm did not exceed 30 miles; and as the course of the " Yongala " would be nearly at right angles with the path of the storm, it is just possible that she reached its southern margin, about midnight, between Cape Upstart and Cape Bowling Green.

I believe that much of the Yongala disaster hinged on the absence of a cyclone warning and the actions taken by Captain Knight. It is claimed that Captain Knight departed Flat-top anchorage 1.40 pm, 23 March, before cyclone warnings were issued, but given the above there does not appear to have been an official cyclone warning at all.

The SS Taiyuan anchored at Repulse Island during the morning of 23 March due to a 'strong gale with occasional terrific squalls'. See image below, Repulse Islands are roughly 37 n miles from Mackay. Surely Captain Knight was aware of the conditions into which he steamed unless he assumed that the gale coming from the southeast represented a front moving up the coast, and one he could outrun going north, if he 'put his foot down'.

A tropical cyclone off the east coast of Australia is characterised by a low pressure centre creating gales and flooding rain. Such a cyclone would approach from the northeast which might suggest why the Taiyuan anchored and at Flat-top (Mackay) there were no signs of the approaching cyclone until much later.

We know that the worst of the cyclone was experienced between 11 pm, 23 March and 3 am 24 March (Captain Sim, Grantala). 30 n miles diameter of the cyclone also suggests that it was limited in its path of destruction and could not have extended from Cape Bowling Green to Mackay.

However, there are certain tell-tale signs as to the approach of a cyclone. 12 hours before a cyclone strikes rain squalls are more frequent, winds do not lessen, the cloud ceiling lowers and the barometer is falling at 1 millibar per hour. 

As Yongala progressed into the cyclone zone, Captain Knight passing Dent Island would have been aware of the barometer dropping and a southeasterly gale strong enough to prevent standing unsupported on deck. But there again he could still have been under the impression the system was coming from behind.

Once into the system he would have been past the point of return and been little choice but to plow through.

According to:

http://www.aicomos.com/wp-content/uploads/vidukayongala.pdf

cyclones in the Townsville region are generally from northwest to southeast. 

WHISTLE AND EXPLOSION.

The Argus (Melbourne) Thursday 30 March, 1911.

The story told by a settler at Ayr of

having heard a whistle and an
explosion is discredited by Mr. 
Wareham, the Brisbane manager 
of the Adelaide Steamship Company, 
he states that the Grantala was also 
in the vicinity at the time, and that 
those on board would have been 
sure to have known of it.


Knowing the position of the Yongala wreck this is a both fascinating and tragic account. The 'whistle' and 'explosion' suggest that crew on the Yongala sent up at least one distress signal. Distress socket signals were associated with an explosive sound as the white roman-candle type stars were released into the sky above the foundering vessel. Grantala was tucked away in Bowling Green Bay and there were no other vessels in the vicinity to respond to the plea for help.

It does seem strange that those on Grantala did not hear anything, being closer to the wreck site, unless a lifeboat got away from Yongala and drifted further down the coast before succumbing to the elements.

an artist's impression of distress signals - Titanic.

Map Showing the Coast Upon Which Wreckage is Being Found. 

Help

HOW MUCH DECK CARGO WAS THERE IN REALITY?

Inquiry:

The vessel left Brisbane on the 21st March with a total dead weight of 1,885 tons, fully manned, equipped, in excellent trim, draft aft 22 feet 6 inches, forward 17 feet 9 inches, leaving a clear side of 10 feet 6 inches, with a general cargo and passengers for Northern ports, and reached Mackay on the 23rd March. The weight of cargo in the vessel was 667 tons, almost entirely in the lower hold, and was properly stowed. There were 43 tons in the between decks, 40 of which were for Mackay; and 11 tons on deck, 10 of which were also for Mackay.

Dead weight accounted for just over 50% of potential, fully loaded operational dead weight. Cargo represented about 36% of usual cargo component on this route (1800 tons max. capacity). The difference between the draught aft and forward was 4.75 ft. No wonder Yongala was described as 'lively' without pig iron ballast to increase the draught forward, and settle the bow. 

According to this extract from the Inquiry Yongala departed Mackay with 617 tons of cargo stowed in the lower hold and only 1 ton on deck.

THE YONGALA'S CARGO.

The Yongala was well down towards her

load line, having altogether 1800 tons of

weight below her decks, and drawing 22ft.

6in. of water aft, and 17ft. 9in. forward.

Thus there was no suspicion of her being

top-heavy, more especially as her decks

were comparatively clear of cargo, having

upon them nothing more than five tons

of oils and a racehorse named Moonshine.

She carried 703 tons of cargo, exclusive

of what was landed at Mackay, her water

tanks hold another 406 tons, and her

permanent coal bunkers were completely

filled at Brisbane with 650 tons, and 

another 100 tons being filled into the 

reserve bunkers at the bottom of the 

main hold.

Mr. Wareham, in supplying these details,

....

The above figures give us a total of 1859 tons dead weight, 26 tons short of the Inquiry figure of 1885 tons - this probably being accounted for by fresh water, baggage, mails, crew and passengers. It is very interesting to compare these initial figures issued by Mr. Wareham and those given at the Inquiry. 703 tons is 86 tons more, as is four tons more on deck!  One can imagine Mr. Wareham exaggerating to fend off accusations of 'top heaviness', but he did let slip deck cargo (kerosene) to the tune of 5 tons rather than 1 ton. Was this an error or were the final figures adjusted to minimise the implications of 'movable' weight on deck? It is also strange that he claimed Yongala was almost down to her load line with only between 36 and 39% of cargo capacity and absence of 164 tons of pig iron.  

I accept that newspaper reports could be inaccurate but at this early stage after the loss of the Yongala I have a distinct impression that the Brisbane manager tried to steer conjecture away from a top heavy steamer falling foul of a cyclone.

1911 - courtesy Bonzle Ships Photo Collection.

FUNNEL BUILT INTO THE SHIP.

Cairns Post, Wednesday 14 June, 1911.

Captain Sim, Commander of the

Grantala, said he had charge of the

Yongala four years ago, and would

describe her as a very good sea boat

indeed. He had no fault to find with

her at all. He had heard outside

rumours from people who had never

been in her that she was "cranky."

While he was with her she encountered 

several heavy gales across the Great 

Australian Bight. On the night of the 

loss of the Yongala he was coming 

south with the Grantala and finding 

the weather dirty put back to Cape 

Bowling Green, and anchored. 

The wind veered round from S.S.E. to 

N.W., which proved that he was on 

the right of the western margin of 

the right hand of the semicircle of 

a cyclone. He did not believe the 

Yongala went on the reefs. He had 

formed no idea as to how she met 

her fate (but she didn't go on the reefs). 
He did not think it likely that Captain 
Knight could have taken the inside 
course between Armit and Gumbrell  
Islands after passing Dent Island, 
because he could not have seen 
the islands. He thought it possible 
for the Yongala to  have run across 
the vortex of the cyclone, but she might 
have struck something before getting clear. 
The weather was very thick that night.

Looking at the image below it makes sense; it was evidently more hazardous tracking through the maze of islands to Gumbrell and Armit, than bypassing the Whitsundays. But the Cannon Valley residents saw Yongala heading towards Armit and Gumbrell - oh dear, this was not a cautious master.

Captain Knight had given witness

the course inside the islands, but he

did not know if it was true, as had

been stated by the second officer,

that Captain Knight. always used

that course in all weathers.

It is almost bizarre that the second officer claimed that Captain Knight used the inner, inside passage in 'all weathers'. What was there to be achieved from this apart from substantially increased risk of running aground? Yes, time could be saved but there was theoretically no rush to make Townsville by morning, next day, normal circumstances. This fact reflected poorly on Captain Knight, a distinct pattern of his actions emerging as master of Yongala.

A few more tons of cargo on one side 
than the other would give the Yongala 
a list. 

Why would Captain Sim have mentioned this? Was he in fact stating that Yongala had a prominently top heavy tendency, equilibrium easily upset by shifting centre of gravity marginally to one side or the other? It's almost as though he was trying to say something of importance about the stability of the Yongala but did not wish to put it in so many words. 

If the cargo was well stowed

it could not shift, neither could the

coal.

Again a round about way of stating that it was vitally important that cargo and coal were securely stowed in vessels such as Yongala and Grantala - no room for error.

Where he was on the night of the 
storm the wind was not travelling

more than 70 or 80 miles an hour. 

The storm was at its worst from 

11 o'clock at night until 3  o'clock 

next morning. There was nothing in 

the storm as he experienced it to make 

control of the vessel impossible.

So, in other words, it was a bad storm but not an exceptional one. However, HE did not choose to be out at sea during the onslaught! In a previous report Captain Sim narrowed the worst of the storm down to between 1 and 2 am, 24 March. 11 to 3 o'clock opens the range to include foundering by midnight, which is my conclusion (see later posts).  

He noticed nothing abnormal in the tides 

and currents. All the ships of the Company 

were well equipped. He did not think the

Yongala could have been overcome by

 the elements alone.

Although he was not willing to risk Grantala in the storm the point is well made that the conditions were not as extreme as implied (thus far) and Yongala in good trim with hatches securely fastened could have made it through unscathed. But she didn't.

Henry Adamson, superintendent

engineer of the Adelaide Company

said the Yongala was built by an

excellent firm to good specifications.

She had excellent machinery and all

her engine shafting was from 20 to

25 per cent above requirements so

they could not break. He never had

the slightest fear of her under any

conditions. Her funnel was peculiar

having been built into the ship,

it would have stood alone even if

the guides had been blown away.

This is most intriguing. If you examine the image of Yongala below there is no doubt that the prominent funnel presented a further component of top heaviness and susceptibility to wind force. In a gale the funnel would assist in forcing the Yongala into a list to leeward. It might have been better if the funnel could have broken off in such circumstances rather than helping to drag the steamer over.  

By Mr. O'Shea "The loss of the

funnel would not necessarily mean

disaster to the Yongala."

He admitted that the funnel could have been 'broken off', which ironically (I believe) could have helped circumstances. Strange thing to suggest on the part of a witness - drawing unnecessary attention to the funnel of the Yongala. How the things said trigger red flags... 

He came up first to Sydney, and to 

Brisbane in the Yongala on her last 

trip. He estimated at the time of the 

disaster, that Yongala had free board 

of eleven feet to the weather deck. 

Witness was in England throughout 

the building of the Yongala. He saw

the specifications carried out. The

builders were responsible for the

design of the vessel which was 

registered in the highest class of 

Lloyd's and remained at that class

up to the time of her loss.

A freeboard of 11 ft. in a steamer of this size was substantial and further points to a low draught. It is fascinating that a similar approach was taken at the Waratah Inquiry. Although representatives of the owners wanted to assure the Court that Yongala (as with Waratah) was in the highest class of Lloyd's, responsibility for the design lay squarely in the court of the builders. Talk about hedging one's bets and in the case of both steamers the owners were very particular about specification requirements - which is shared responsibility.

PIG IRON BALLAST.

Inquiry:

'In regard to pig-iron ballast being placed in the vessel whilst in the West Australian trade, and subsequently removed when the ship was transferred to the Queensland trade, it was explained by the general manager that this ballast, amounting to 164 tons, became unnecessary, owing to cargo being obtainable both up and down the Queensland coast. A letter from Captain Knight to the company at the time confirmed this view; and stated that the ship rolled less, and was more comfortable in a seaway.'

Cairns Post, Wednesday 14 June, 1911.

The Yongala Inquiry.

Marine Board inquiry resumed.

Further Evidence.

(By Telegraph.) :

BRISBANE,- Monday.The Queensland 

Marine-Board this morning continued 

its inquiry into the loss of the Yongala, 

which was commenced last week.

Captain Mackay said he thought the Board 

were perfectly satisfied as to the stability of 

the ship. Edward Northcote, general 

manager of the Adelaide Co. and master

mariner, said when the pig-iron was placed 

in No. 2 hold of the Yongala for the West 

Australian run he was not concerned about 

her stability which has been established by 

experience in several voyages, it was put in 

to make the vessel more comfortable, and
to increase her draught when returning 

from the west without cargo, it was found 

it increased her draught six inches forward

and one inch aft, and she was less lively in

a sea way. The iron was removed when the 

ship was placed on the East coast, because

sufficient cargo was obtainable. Masters of 

the Company's boats, had instructions on

no account to race.

It is interesting to note that the 164 tons of pig iron increased draught by 6 inches forward and yet, discharging 50 tons at Mackay, reduced draught by 3 inches. Something was seriously off with these figures.

The impression one is left with is that Yongala required additional ballasting, forward, illustrated by the final voyage figures of 17 ft. 9 in. forward, 22 ft. 6 in aft (as dodgy as they indeed are), a differential of 4.75 ft.. But comfort won of safety and one wonders what roll this played in the disaster. Certainly handling would have been compromised to some extent in a gale.

Interesting that the masters were instructed not to race - implying a cautious code of conduct within the company. What does this say about:

http://yongalarevisited.blogspot.co.za/2016/08/exciting-ocean-race.html

Captain Knight was one of the most experienced 

men in the service, and enjoyed the Company's 

perfect confidence. He was a particularly 

cautious man. The Yongala had less superstructure 

than most modern ships. In the absence or facts 

he hesitated to express  an opinion which would 

be academic as to what happened to the Yongala.

Again I think Captain Mackay protested too much in his description of Captain Knight and the significant top hamper carried by Yongala:

http://yongalarevisited.blogspot.co.za/2016/09/reprehensible-amount-of-over-confidence.html

Yes, there were other steamers with similar and higher superstructures, but in most cases these were stabilised by appropriate ballasting.

I guess the key factor was cargo carried. These steamers were designed to operate with large components of cargo in holds. Without this component stability was compromised even if all ballast tanks were full. 

Running such steamers with 34% of max. cargo in the case of Yongala and 14% in the case of Koombana a year later, plus storm conditions, was never going to end well.

A postcard circa 1910 showing ships tied up to the wharves along the Pioneer River and showing the old Sydney Street Bridge.
(Mackay Historical Society Archive No. 86-71a)

STABILITY - MARINE INQUIRY.

The " Yongala " was a steel screw steamer of 3,664 tons gross and 1,825 net; length, 350 feet; breadth, 45·2 feet; depth (of hold), 27·2 feet; built under special survey in 1903 by Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworth, and Co., Newcastle-on-Tyne, from specifications supplied by the Adelaide Steamship Company. Mr. Adamson, the company's superintendent engineer, supervised her building, and gave in evidence that the that the specifications provided that:

"After the vessel is completed, her centre of gravity is to be ascertained experimentally by inclining her, and curves of stability are to be calculated up to 90 degrees inclination at intervals of not more than 10 degrees and for five different conditions of loading, to be specified by the company". "Complete diagrams of results are to be prepared and supplied to the company". "The inclining experiments are to be performed at the expense of the builders", "and in the presence and to the satisfaction of inspectors appointed by the company to watch the experiments."

These tests were strictly carried out in his presence. Mr. Adamson also stated that the machinery, especially crank shaft and shafting, were 20 to 25 per cent. stronger than Lloyd's requirements.

If further confirmation of the ship's stability and seaworthiness be required, it is to be found in the satisfactory career of the vessel of over seven years' continuous running on the coast of Australia, four of which were in the West Australian trade, where the return journey was always made without cargo in all weathers, without accident.

It is important to note that Yongala's specifications were, as in the case of the Waratah, supplied by the owners. Armstrong Whitworth and Company had a fine reputation which was only as good as the specifications supplied. The Adelaide Steamship Company ordered steamers with prominent top hampers and relatively low draughts, a good example of which was the SS Koombana, built 1908 (see image below). I believe the reason for this was multi-fold. There was increasing competition-driven pressure to provide luxurious, elevated (access to sea breezes in warm weather) accommodation for first class passengers, combined with 2nd and 3rd class accommodation lower down in the ship. Add to this a financially viable capacity for cargo and mails, and it starts to become clear that this was the way of the future. An ambitious all in one package. To further complicate matters many of the lesser coastal ports at that time had limited draught access - some with prominent sand bars at their mouths. In fact the larger steamers had to time their arrivals at ports to coincide with spring tides, which in itself probably presented a further pressure to make good passages without delays.  

The Inquiry transcript is glaring in not what was included but what was not. In the case of the Waratah the Court examined the stability curve figures in various conditions of lading. It was not simply enough to state that there were five and the presence of Mr. Adamson ensured all was well. Yongala departed Mackay with only 34% of her usual cargo component and at least a ton of kerosene on deck. This condition demanded analysis of the respective stability factors both GM and righting angles. It's absence reduces the gravitas of the Inquiry. Note that the Inquiry did not even include the maximum draught figures for the Yongala. Again the words white wash come to mind.

Yes, a relevant point was made that Yongala had a good track record in various conditions of lading and all forms of weather at sea. But it took a cyclonic event to reveal this type of steamer's weakness. We must not forget that Grantala, identical to Yongala, was safely anchored in Bowling Green Bay during the same cyclonic storm, at the same time Yongala was 11 n miles out at sea in the worst of the conditions. It was a sensible decision on the part of Captain Sim who understood the limitations of his steamer and did not wish to put her to the final, fatal test.

It is disturbing that the wording and content of this Inquiry mirrored the same a year later at the Inquiry into the loss of the Koombana. Plagiarism masking bias and whitewash.

SS Yongala (I still believe that the size of her funnel could have been reduced to improve stability)

SS Koombana