WOULD NOT HAVE USED THE INSHORE ROUTE.

Inquiry:

It has been given in evidence that several masters, including Captain Knight, when proceeding from Whitsunday Passage north, were in the habit of using the inshore route, passing between Armit and Gumbrell Islands. The Board, however, are of opinion, taking into consideration the prevailing weather conditions at the time, that Captain Knight as a careful and experienced master would not use the passage on that occasion.

What an extraordinary deduction! More than one witness claimed that Captain Knight used this route in good and bad weather - only having used the outside route on two or three occasions. The Court was clearly giving Captain Knight the benefit of the doubt despite his track record. But in so doing the Court acknowledged that the conditions when Yongala was in the Whitsundays Passage (before and after 6.30 pm, 23 March) were severe enough to warrant using the outside passage. If the conditions were so severe as to force Captain Knight to make it the 'fourth' time in his coastal career to use the outside passage it stands to reason that seeking shelter and anchorage must have been the next logical step as the steamer progressed further and further into the brunt of the cyclone. This would hardly be the description of a careful and experienced master.

But if it were not a cyclone and a system coming from the south it makes sense that Captain Knight thought the odds were in his favour and his fast steamer capable of outrunning the approaching storm. In some respects it would seem more logical to avoid the worst of the storm in this manner rather than anchoring and running the risk of anchors dragging and losing cargo on deck + damage.

I DON'T THINK IT WAS A CLASSICAL CYCLONE!

Kalgoorlie Miner, Tuesday 28 March, 1911.

THE MISSING YONGALA

DIRTY WEATHER REPORTED.

GRAVE FEARS ENTERTAINED.

Townsville - March 27.

Captain Shaland of the steamer

Aramac, reported that shortly 

after leaving Flat-Top on Friday night,

the weather conditions were so thick 

that he anchored for two hours. He 

saw no traces of the Yongala but is 

now fearful of any serious calamity. 

He may have passed within 200 yards 

of the Yongala and not seen her. The 

chief officer of the Cooma entertains 

fears for the safety of the Yongala.

Captain Dawson of the Tainguan,

reports that he anchored at 10 a.m.

on Thursday south of Repulse Island, 

and remained there for 12 hours. It 

was the worst night the captain had 

spent on the Australian coast. He kept 

a lookout on the run to Townsville, but 

saw nothing of the Yongala.

It is interesting that Captain Dawson anchored for 12 hours taking the timeline to 10 pm, 23 March. This was shortly before the worst of the cyclone struck the Grantala's anchorage, Bowling Green Bay. It's as though Captain Dawson waited for the worst of the cyclone and then proceeded towards Townsville and the heart of the cyclone??

On closer inspection of the images below Repulse Island is about 100 n miles south of the Yongala wreck position. The fact that Captain Dawson waited until 10 pm for the worst of the storm to clear suggests that the system came from the south, heading in a relatively northward direction, passing over his vessel towards the north, allowing him to proceed in a northward direction behind the front. 

This suggests a frontal system; late summer phenomenon starting in southeast Queensland (associated with thunderstorms) forced by the Great Divide into a north moving south-east change along the Queensland coast.

Captain Sim reported the wind initially originating from the south east, shifting to southwest and then finally from the northwest, which could also be the description of a severe frontal system passing through.

This might explain why Captain Knight continued on his voyage with the southeaster behind him. He could theoretically have outrun the storm, but from Captain Sim's description, it was not to be. But at least he was not as unhinged as previously suggested by steaming into the heart of a cyclone.

If it was genuinely a cyclone with a diameter of 30 n miles why was it's influence severest for Captain Dawson some 100 n miles south of Cape Bowling Green when cyclones generally come from the northeast ???

Given these factors it is hard to believe there was a cyclone at all, but rather a severe frontal system moving up the Queensland coast. 

A frontal system moving up the coast in a northward direction would also more completely explain the distribution of wreckage discovered.

Why then was it referred to as a cyclone? Perhaps this was done to justify the loss of a presumably seaworthy vessel - perils of the sea.

There is the possibility that there were both, frontal system and cyclone.

NONE OF THE LIGHTHOUSES HAD MORSE LAMPS.

The Advertiser (Adelaide) Thursday 30 March, 1911.

Queensland coast. Except at Cape 

Moreton, not a lighthouse is equipped with 

a Morse lamp. 

An extraordinary state of affairs. There were no stations for receiving Marconi signals which would not have helped Yongala even if she carried a wireless installation. Apart from flags and the light itself there was no way of communicating with steamers along the Queensland coast relevant to the final route of Yongala. In other words when Yongala passed Dent Island, 6.30 pm, 23 March, it was dark and there was no means of communication. 

Caught out with a false time!!! 

6.35 p.m. was a fabrication.

THE CYCLONE.

Inquiry:

The Meteorological Bureau telegraphed Flat-top on the 23rd that cyclonic conditions prevailed between Mackay and Townsville. This was signalled to the s.s. " Cooma " from Flat-top; but, unfortunately, the "Yongala" had left some hours previously.

"The Cooma was a little late arriving there, 

and at dusk they were informed on board 

by signal that a cyclone was reported 

north-east of Bowen. Captain Smith decided 

to go into Mackay Harbor. Later on driving rain 

fell heavily, and although one attempt was

made to get out, the vessel could not do

so, owing to the weather closing in again."

However, and this is a big however:

The Argus, Melbourne, 24 March, 1911.

THE WEATHER

OFFICIAL FORECAST

Forecast by the Commonwealth Meteorologist

Mr. H. A. Hunt, Thursday 9 pm. (23 March)

"Fine throughout, some cloud in southern districts

and one or two misty showers along the coast. 

Variable winds tending east and northeast."

Queensland: cloudy with further rains along

seaboard: unsettled along Peninsular, with 

probability of stormy weather with heavy falls.

Fine inland, with moderate temperatures;

southeasterly winds.

There is a disconnect between that which was reported at the Inquiry and the official forecast printed in the press. In the latter, there was NO reference to a cyclone. Perhaps the signal the captain of the Cooma received was a local report from Cape Bowling Green Light? It seems disingenuous for the Bureau to be claiming 'a job well done'. Also, these warnings only served a purpose if they could be timeously issued to masters. Both Yongala and Grantala had sailed.

The s.s. " Taiyuan " anchored at Repulse Island on the morning of the 23rd, and had the wind from S.E. (strong gale with occasional terrific squalls). At Dent Island it also blew from S.E., force 7 to 9, with no indication of a cyclone, when the " Yongala" passed at 6.30 p.m.

It is no surprise that Yongala could maintain 17 knots with such a tail wind.

At Cape Bowling Green, however, the wind commenced at S.S.E., veering to S., S.W., W., and thence to N.W. The "Grantala," bound South, anchored about 7 miles W.N.W. from the Cape, experienced the same weather conditions; barometer 29.50, which would place her on the northern margin of the right-hand semicircle of the storm proving unerringly that in conformity with the laws relating to hurricanes in the Southern Hemisphere it came from the N.E., and in its progressive motion to the S.W. (inland) large trees were uprooted, clearing a well-defined space through the forest at the back of Cape Upstart. 

It would have been helpful to establish what the original barometer readings were prior to 29.50 and then calculate whether the drop was significant enough to alert Captain Knight.

From the scant data available, it may be assumed that the diameter of the storm did not exceed 30 miles; and as the course of the " Yongala " would be nearly at right angles with the path of the storm, it is just possible that she reached its southern margin, about midnight, between Cape Upstart and Cape Bowling Green.

I believe that much of the Yongala disaster hinged on the absence of a cyclone warning and the actions taken by Captain Knight. It is claimed that Captain Knight departed Flat-top anchorage 1.40 pm, 23 March, before cyclone warnings were issued, but given the above there does not appear to have been an official cyclone warning at all.

The SS Taiyuan anchored at Repulse Island during the morning of 23 March due to a 'strong gale with occasional terrific squalls'. See image below, Repulse Islands are roughly 37 n miles from Mackay. Surely Captain Knight was aware of the conditions into which he steamed unless he assumed that the gale coming from the southeast represented a front moving up the coast, and one he could outrun going north, if he 'put his foot down'.

A tropical cyclone off the east coast of Australia is characterised by a low pressure centre creating gales and flooding rain. Such a cyclone would approach from the northeast which might suggest why the Taiyuan anchored and at Flat-top (Mackay) there were no signs of the approaching cyclone until much later.

We know that the worst of the cyclone was experienced between 11 pm, 23 March and 3 am 24 March (Captain Sim, Grantala). 30 n miles diameter of the cyclone also suggests that it was limited in its path of destruction and could not have extended from Cape Bowling Green to Mackay.

However, there are certain tell-tale signs as to the approach of a cyclone. 12 hours before a cyclone strikes rain squalls are more frequent, winds do not lessen, the cloud ceiling lowers and the barometer is falling at 1 millibar per hour. 

As Yongala progressed into the cyclone zone, Captain Knight passing Dent Island would have been aware of the barometer dropping and a southeasterly gale strong enough to prevent standing unsupported on deck. But there again he could still have been under the impression the system was coming from behind.

Once into the system he would have been past the point of return and been little choice but to plow through.

According to:

http://www.aicomos.com/wp-content/uploads/vidukayongala.pdf

cyclones in the Townsville region are generally from northwest to southeast. 

WHISTLE AND EXPLOSION.

The Argus (Melbourne) Thursday 30 March, 1911.

The story told by a settler at Ayr of

having heard a whistle and an
explosion is discredited by Mr. 
Wareham, the Brisbane manager 
of the Adelaide Steamship Company, 
he states that the Grantala was also 
in the vicinity at the time, and that 
those on board would have been 
sure to have known of it.


Knowing the position of the Yongala wreck this is a both fascinating and tragic account. The 'whistle' and 'explosion' suggest that crew on the Yongala sent up at least one distress signal. Distress socket signals were associated with an explosive sound as the white roman-candle type stars were released into the sky above the foundering vessel. Grantala was tucked away in Bowling Green Bay and there were no other vessels in the vicinity to respond to the plea for help.

It does seem strange that those on Grantala did not hear anything, being closer to the wreck site, unless a lifeboat got away from Yongala and drifted further down the coast before succumbing to the elements.

an artist's impression of distress signals - Titanic.

Map Showing the Coast Upon Which Wreckage is Being Found. 

Help

HOW MUCH DECK CARGO WAS THERE IN REALITY?

Inquiry:

The vessel left Brisbane on the 21st March with a total dead weight of 1,885 tons, fully manned, equipped, in excellent trim, draft aft 22 feet 6 inches, forward 17 feet 9 inches, leaving a clear side of 10 feet 6 inches, with a general cargo and passengers for Northern ports, and reached Mackay on the 23rd March. The weight of cargo in the vessel was 667 tons, almost entirely in the lower hold, and was properly stowed. There were 43 tons in the between decks, 40 of which were for Mackay; and 11 tons on deck, 10 of which were also for Mackay.

Dead weight accounted for just over 50% of potential, fully loaded operational dead weight. Cargo represented about 36% of usual cargo component on this route (1800 tons max. capacity). The difference between the draught aft and forward was 4.75 ft. No wonder Yongala was described as 'lively' without pig iron ballast to increase the draught forward, and settle the bow. 

According to this extract from the Inquiry Yongala departed Mackay with 617 tons of cargo stowed in the lower hold and only 1 ton on deck.

THE YONGALA'S CARGO.

The Yongala was well down towards her

load line, having altogether 1800 tons of

weight below her decks, and drawing 22ft.

6in. of water aft, and 17ft. 9in. forward.

Thus there was no suspicion of her being

top-heavy, more especially as her decks

were comparatively clear of cargo, having

upon them nothing more than five tons

of oils and a racehorse named Moonshine.

She carried 703 tons of cargo, exclusive

of what was landed at Mackay, her water

tanks hold another 406 tons, and her

permanent coal bunkers were completely

filled at Brisbane with 650 tons, and 

another 100 tons being filled into the 

reserve bunkers at the bottom of the 

main hold.

Mr. Wareham, in supplying these details,

....

The above figures give us a total of 1859 tons dead weight, 26 tons short of the Inquiry figure of 1885 tons - this probably being accounted for by fresh water, baggage, mails, crew and passengers. It is very interesting to compare these initial figures issued by Mr. Wareham and those given at the Inquiry. 703 tons is 86 tons more, as is four tons more on deck!  One can imagine Mr. Wareham exaggerating to fend off accusations of 'top heaviness', but he did let slip deck cargo (kerosene) to the tune of 5 tons rather than 1 ton. Was this an error or were the final figures adjusted to minimise the implications of 'movable' weight on deck? It is also strange that he claimed Yongala was almost down to her load line with only between 36 and 39% of cargo capacity and absence of 164 tons of pig iron.  

I accept that newspaper reports could be inaccurate but at this early stage after the loss of the Yongala I have a distinct impression that the Brisbane manager tried to steer conjecture away from a top heavy steamer falling foul of a cyclone.

1911 - courtesy Bonzle Ships Photo Collection.

FUNNEL BUILT INTO THE SHIP.

Cairns Post, Wednesday 14 June, 1911.

Captain Sim, Commander of the

Grantala, said he had charge of the

Yongala four years ago, and would

describe her as a very good sea boat

indeed. He had no fault to find with

her at all. He had heard outside

rumours from people who had never

been in her that she was "cranky."

While he was with her she encountered 

several heavy gales across the Great 

Australian Bight. On the night of the 

loss of the Yongala he was coming 

south with the Grantala and finding 

the weather dirty put back to Cape 

Bowling Green, and anchored. 

The wind veered round from S.S.E. to 

N.W., which proved that he was on 

the right of the western margin of 

the right hand of the semicircle of 

a cyclone. He did not believe the 

Yongala went on the reefs. He had 

formed no idea as to how she met 

her fate (but she didn't go on the reefs). 
He did not think it likely that Captain 
Knight could have taken the inside 
course between Armit and Gumbrell  
Islands after passing Dent Island, 
because he could not have seen 
the islands. He thought it possible 
for the Yongala to  have run across 
the vortex of the cyclone, but she might 
have struck something before getting clear. 
The weather was very thick that night.

Looking at the image below it makes sense; it was evidently more hazardous tracking through the maze of islands to Gumbrell and Armit, than bypassing the Whitsundays. But the Cannon Valley residents saw Yongala heading towards Armit and Gumbrell - oh dear, this was not a cautious master.

Captain Knight had given witness

the course inside the islands, but he

did not know if it was true, as had

been stated by the second officer,

that Captain Knight. always used

that course in all weathers.

It is almost bizarre that the second officer claimed that Captain Knight used the inner, inside passage in 'all weathers'. What was there to be achieved from this apart from substantially increased risk of running aground? Yes, time could be saved but there was theoretically no rush to make Townsville by morning, next day, normal circumstances. This fact reflected poorly on Captain Knight, a distinct pattern of his actions emerging as master of Yongala.

A few more tons of cargo on one side 
than the other would give the Yongala 
a list. 

Why would Captain Sim have mentioned this? Was he in fact stating that Yongala had a prominently top heavy tendency, equilibrium easily upset by shifting centre of gravity marginally to one side or the other? It's almost as though he was trying to say something of importance about the stability of the Yongala but did not wish to put it in so many words. 

If the cargo was well stowed

it could not shift, neither could the

coal.

Again a round about way of stating that it was vitally important that cargo and coal were securely stowed in vessels such as Yongala and Grantala - no room for error.

Where he was on the night of the 
storm the wind was not travelling

more than 70 or 80 miles an hour. 

The storm was at its worst from 

11 o'clock at night until 3  o'clock 

next morning. There was nothing in 

the storm as he experienced it to make 

control of the vessel impossible.

So, in other words, it was a bad storm but not an exceptional one. However, HE did not choose to be out at sea during the onslaught! In a previous report Captain Sim narrowed the worst of the storm down to between 1 and 2 am, 24 March. 11 to 3 o'clock opens the range to include foundering by midnight, which is my conclusion (see later posts).  

He noticed nothing abnormal in the tides 

and currents. All the ships of the Company 

were well equipped. He did not think the

Yongala could have been overcome by

 the elements alone.

Although he was not willing to risk Grantala in the storm the point is well made that the conditions were not as extreme as implied (thus far) and Yongala in good trim with hatches securely fastened could have made it through unscathed. But she didn't.

Henry Adamson, superintendent

engineer of the Adelaide Company

said the Yongala was built by an

excellent firm to good specifications.

She had excellent machinery and all

her engine shafting was from 20 to

25 per cent above requirements so

they could not break. He never had

the slightest fear of her under any

conditions. Her funnel was peculiar

having been built into the ship,

it would have stood alone even if

the guides had been blown away.

This is most intriguing. If you examine the image of Yongala below there is no doubt that the prominent funnel presented a further component of top heaviness and susceptibility to wind force. In a gale the funnel would assist in forcing the Yongala into a list to leeward. It might have been better if the funnel could have broken off in such circumstances rather than helping to drag the steamer over.  

By Mr. O'Shea "The loss of the

funnel would not necessarily mean

disaster to the Yongala."

He admitted that the funnel could have been 'broken off', which ironically (I believe) could have helped circumstances. Strange thing to suggest on the part of a witness - drawing unnecessary attention to the funnel of the Yongala. How the things said trigger red flags... 

He came up first to Sydney, and to 

Brisbane in the Yongala on her last 

trip. He estimated at the time of the 

disaster, that Yongala had free board 

of eleven feet to the weather deck. 

Witness was in England throughout 

the building of the Yongala. He saw

the specifications carried out. The

builders were responsible for the

design of the vessel which was 

registered in the highest class of 

Lloyd's and remained at that class

up to the time of her loss.

A freeboard of 11 ft. in a steamer of this size was substantial and further points to a low draught. It is fascinating that a similar approach was taken at the Waratah Inquiry. Although representatives of the owners wanted to assure the Court that Yongala (as with Waratah) was in the highest class of Lloyd's, responsibility for the design lay squarely in the court of the builders. Talk about hedging one's bets and in the case of both steamers the owners were very particular about specification requirements - which is shared responsibility.