DISASTER PREMONITION.

The Brisbane Courier, Thursday 6 April, 1911.

A REMARKABLE PREMONITION.

THE WARNING THAT CAME TOO

LATE.

The father of Master E. Rall, who left

the Yongala at Flat-top when returning

to Cairns from a holiday trip in Brisbane,

is in receipt of a letter from a friend in

Mackay, in which it is stated : " It was

only when the tender was about to leave

the Yongala, on her return to the town

that Teddy made up his mind to break

the journey in order to pay it a surprise

visit before returniug home. He previously

thought about spending a week with us,

but says he changed his mind. He was

eager to get back to Cairns. He suddenly

began, however, to feel an undefinable

uneasiness. He is not a good sailor, and

followed what he describes as an uncon-

trollable impulse, and came ashore. He

has been greatly shocked, and for a day

was quite ill when he heard from you

that the Yongala was probably wrecked.

I may mention that a little later the pas-

sengers could not have been transhipped.

The Yongala had not long left Flat-top

when an urgent advice was received from

the Weather Bureau, warning shipping

that a gale was approaching Bowen. That

is probably the storm which drove the

Yongala to her doom. If that warning

had come a little earlier Captain Knight

would have anchored in Whitsunday Pas-

sage, and so secured the safety of the ship,

passengers, and crew.

IT IS A CASE OF GOODBYE.

Queensland Times, Wednesday 13 December, 1911.

ENVELOPE IN A BOTTLE.

" It Is A Case Of Goodbye,"

Mackay, December 12.

The local agent at the Adelaide Steamship Company received a letter to-day containing an envelope, which was found in a bottle washed up a few miles south of Mackay. On the envelope the following words were written :--"S.S. Yongala. Terrible storm, 8.30 p.m. It is a case of good-bye. J. West, cook." The agent wired to Brisbane, and received a reply that the Yongala's records show that T. West. aged 58, was a cook on the Yongala.

Most bottle messages were hoaxes. This one is probably no exception. It would not have been difficult to establish who was on board Yongala during her final voyage. Passenger and crew lists were constantly appearing in the Press. It might also explain why 'T' was replaced with 'J'. 

But IF it were true, tragic in its brevity, where would that have placed Yongala at 8.30 pm? According to my calculations Yongala would have been in the proximity of Hobourne Island and Nares Rock - see image below.

Contrary to veracity must surely be the time, 8.30 pm. For Yongala to have arrived at her final position by 11.45 pm, 23 March, implies that she continued to steam at a steady 16 knots for 3 1/4 hours after this note was written. This is certainly not a description of dire straights.

If Yongala ran into imminent danger in the close vicinity of Holbourne Island would it have been an option to beach her there??

Holbourne Island

CAPTAIN M'KENZIE - MOST UNUSUAL STORM.

The Brisbane Courier, Thursday 6 April, 1911.

CAPTAIN M'KENZIE'S.VIEWS

MOST UNUSUAL STORM.

THE TRACK OF THE CYCLONE.

CAIRNS, April 5.

Captain M'Kenzie, of the steamer 

Innamincka, after being apprised of the latest

news concerning the Yongala said in the

course of an interview: "The cyclone

which probably struck the Yongala was a

most unusual one. When that occurs no

commander, no matter what his experience

has been, can say his judgment is correct.

This cyclone was the reverse of what

we have had for years. It worked from

the S.E. to south, then from south-west

to west. As a rule they work from the

south-east round eastwards. You cannot

realise what it is. Such a cyclone has

been known before, but it has never come

within my experience. The last few

months have been very trying ones on

the Queensland coast, and the Yongala,

Cooma, and Innamincka have been in the

track of every disturbance during that time."

Captain M'Kenzie further stated that

between Cape Upstart and Cape Bowling

Green there was now visible in the bush

the track of the awful southwest tornado,

which it is believed drove the Yongala

into Broadhurst Reef. For a width of

15 miles a track has been cut in the forest,

the whole of the trees, including many 

immense ones, being torn out by the 

roots and levelled. Captain M'Kenzie's 

observations regarding this evidence of 

the cyclone s track corroborate the 

statements regarding the direction of 

the blow, which contrary to the recognised 

order of cyclonic blows, blew from the 

south west, thus practically reversing the 

order of nature. This is his reason for stating 

any captain would have been taken by surprise 

by such an untoward event, and instead of 

running out of the storm, would be running right

into it.

There is absolutely no doubt that the so-called cyclone was anything but 'standard issue' and should not be referred to as such in historical records. There are none so poignant words as 'instead of running out of the storm, would be running right into it'.

The only system I can think of, with very limited experience in these matters, is a hybrid cyclone which would, as Captain Mackenzie described, have been predominated by a swathe of gale force winds from the southeast and southwest extending down the coast from the vortex. 

As an alternative one could consider a 'south-east change' which would have presented as a northward propagating south-east change. But would this have created a 'tornado-effect' cutting trees down in a 15 mile track as described? I doubt it.

No, I think I will stick with a hybrid cyclone.

But perhaps what is more important than semantics is that Captain Knight's judgment was not in question. His reputation, redeemed.

'The arrival time of a south-east change in southeast Queensland is often critical to the development of thunderstorms, with greater heat and instability making the latter part of the afternoon most favourable for thunderstorm development. The over-land section of a south-east change will often merge with the inland trough. The near-coastal section is modified and turned north by the prominent coast of southeast Australia and by the Great Dividing Range, reaching the Queensland coast as a northward propagating south-east (sometimes southerly) change.'

http://www.mla.com.au/globalassets/mla-corporate/blocks/research-and-development/qld-climate-drivers.pdf

DEEP WATER.

The Northwestern Advocate, Friday 31 March, 1911.

FATE OF THE YONGALA.

EVIDENCE OF DISASTER.

WRECKAGE AT WHEELER REEF.

The discovery confirms a theory 

advanced by Capt. Davis, assistant 

harbor master at Melboune, and formerly

engaged in the Queensland coast trade,

referring to the Yongala's route, Capt.

Davis said: — 'In rough weather it is

customary to run well out from Cape

Upstart, past the outside, or east side,

of Holborn Island, then to make up

past Cape Bowling Green through

clear deep water. This course takes

a vessel parallel within 20 miles of the

Barrier Reef, but that is advisable, as

the dangers of Holborn Island and The

Nares rock are avoided. My opinion

is that Captain Knight intended in the

first instance to take the inner, or

fine weather course — perhaps the 

hurricane did not break on him until he

was on it off Cape Upstart. Then, realising 

that The Nares and Holborn Island would 

be in dangerous proximity in such weather, 

he had decided to edge away to the 

eastward on to the outer track. He had 

either edged away insufficiently, or left 

this manoeuvre until the last minute, 

striking one of the very dangers he wished 

to avoid, and tearing the vessel's bottom

out. There would be no hope in the event 

of such a disaster of saving life.

The cyclonic storms are of such fury

that a boat would be smashed to atoms

before she could be lowered into the

water. The Yongala would sink quickly

in deep water.

 This is a very interesting scenario presented by an experienced mariner of the time. It would certainly explain why Yongala was 11 n miles off Cape Bowling Green in deep water when she foundered. I agree that the full impact of the cyclone struck off Cape Upstart - a shocking development in the extension of the gale from the south. It must have been an appalling moment for all concerned when conditions, SUDDENLY, outstretched the capabilities of Yongala. 

THE NIGHT PROMISING TO BE A STORMY ONE.

Again carrying the extract over from yesterday:

'residents at Canon Valley Beach saw her

pass there just as darkness was setting in

and the night promising to be a very stormy

one'.

I am constantly drawn to this simple, revealing report: 

- It was not just one resident but a 'number' of residents who saw Yongala passing en-route to Armit and Gumbrell Islands. This is proof enough for me the report was legitimate. Why would the 'residents' say otherwise?? A community of liars??  I very much doubt that!!

- Visibility, despite encroaching darkness, was good enough to identify Yongala.

- Captain Knight, based on the above statement, was not taking an unreasonable risk going through the inside passage.

- The storm had not yet struck = 'promise', but there were enough indications to suggest that the 'night was going to be a stormy one'. This in itself was adequate justification, bearing in mind wind predominating from the south, to continue at a cracking pace for Townsville.

The more I think about this and search for answers the more sympathy I have for Captain Knight whom I assumed, based on superficial information, to have been reckless. By this account Captain Kmight's decision to continue on without seeking anchorage was JUSTIFIED.

INSIDE PASSAGE AND TIME OF FOUNDERING CONFIRMED.

Taken from previous post:

'residents at Canon Valley Beach saw her

pass there just as darkness was setting in

and the night promising to be a very stormy

one'.

This is a revealing report. Most of the literature claims that Yongala was last sighted off Dent Island by the keeper and after that no further evidence pointing to Captain Knight electing to use the inside or outside passage. If this report is accurate it confirms without a fraction of a doubt that Captain Knight used the inside passage. The route directly out to sea (outside passage) as depicted on the image below would have taken Yongala away from any vantage point of vision within Canon Valley.

Sunset 23 March, Queensland, is 5:56 pm. Yongala was alleged to have passed Dent Island at 6:30 pm. Yongala would then have steamed another 13 n miles in roughly an hour to be sighted off Canon Valley = 7:30 pm, well after dark!  What can we make of this? Either the report was false or there is more to this than meets the eye...

We know that Dent Island is roughly 53 n miles from Mackay. If Yongala departed Flat-Top at 1:40 pm and made her average speed of 14 knots she should have been sighted off Dent Island at 5:30 pm NOT 6:30 pm. This would then correlate with the sighting from Canon Valley at roughly 6:30 pm which would more accurately account for the statement 'as darkness was setting in'.

If this is the case, then we must take the calculations further. Maintaining 14 knots Yongala should have reached her final position by 12:30 am, 24 March. Let's say for argument's sake Captain Knight pushed Yongala, attempting to outrun a storm he believed was coming up from the south, he could have maintained about 16 knots which would give us an arrival time at Yongala's final position +/- 11:45 pm, 23 March - the distance covered from Dent Island, via the north side of Holbourne Island, to Yongala's final position is about 100 n miles. (see:  http://yongalarevisited.blogspot.co.za/2016/10/deep-water.html)

If this final calculation is true there is a fascinating correlation. A chronometer was discovered at the Yongala wreck site which stopped working when Yongala foundered. After some interpretation (Queensland time vs. Greenwich Meantime) a conclusion was reached that Yongala foundered at 11.45 pm, 23 March according to the chronometer reading. This and the report above would substantiate three things:

- Yongala was sighted by the keeper off Dent Island at 5:30 pm, not 6:30 pm, 23 March.

- Captain Knight used the inside passage.

- Captain Knight, pushing the Yongala at an average of 16 knots, was trying to outrun a storm system he believed was coming up from the south rather than steaming as fast as he could into the centre of a cyclone!

See the following for more information on the chronometer:

www.academia.edu/3991909/Viduka_A._and_Muliava_V._2007_To_capture_time_a_conservation_approach

'CYCLONE' NOT SEVERE.

Bowen Independent, Thursday 5 March, 1931.

LOSS OF THE S. S.

“YONGALA”

IN 1911 CYCLONE.

DISAPPEARS WITH 217 PERSONS

ON BOARD.

By GEORGE TURNER.

On Thursday March, 1911, a

special forecast was posted at Bowen

Post Office at 5 p.m. notifying the public 

that a cyclone was imminent and

was travelling in the direction of Bowen. 

At. 7 p.m. the wind increased to gale force 

and continued throughout the night but 

abated towards morning and veered from 

S.E. to N. It was found that no very serious 

damage had occurred but several outhouses 

were unroofed or collapsed and all telegraph

lines were interrupted with, one exception 

and communication by wire or mail was seriously 

delayed. The rain fall for 24 hours was 400 locally 

and Proserpine reported 770 points. Floods

occurred on the railway and Bolmwaha train 

could not get beyond Salisbury and had to return 

to town. The citrus crop, which was then well foward, 

suffered serious damage, most of the fruit being 

shaken off and many trees uprooted from floods 

and wind. The A.U.S.N. Coy.’s office, then on the 

beach at the foot of Herbert Street, was badly

knocked about and all books and stationery 

injured from driving rain and spray. The steamer 

“Grantala” which left Townsville at 4 p.m. on 

Thursday ran into a cyclone and took shelter, 

under Cape Bowling Green and did not reach 

Bowen until 3 p.m. on Friday.

Passengers describing their experience,

stated that they had a very bad time

and considered themselves lucky that

the ship had come through the storm.

They had seen nothing of the Yongala,

the sister ship belonging to the same

service, which had left the anchorage

at Flat Top before the storm warning

reached her. She was making for

Townsville and Cairns and carried 136

passengers and 81 of a crew. On Saturday 

when it was ascertained the Yongala had 

not reached Townsville or been sighted on 

the way serious fears for her safety began 

to be expressed and steps were taken to 

ascertain her fate. Dent Island Lighthouse 

reported her as passing there at 6 p.m. on 

Thursday and residents at Cannon Valley

Beach saw her pass there just as darkness 

was setting in and the night promising to be 

a very stormy one. 

revisiting Captain Sim's (of Grantala) statement:

'Where he was on the night of

the storm the wind was not 

travelling more than 70 or 80 

miles an hour. The storm was 

at its worst from 11 o'oiock at 

night to 3 o'clock next morning. 

There was nothing in the storm 

as he experienced it to make 

control of the vessel impossible. 

He noticed nothing abnormal

in the tides and currents.'

Fix this text

Apart from the obvious inaccuracy regarding the number lost with Yongala the report is interesting and describes a cyclone which although destructive was not as severe as one might have thought. The following is an interesting addendum to the subject:

http://hardenup.org/umbraco/customContent/media/635_Townsville_Cyclone_Yongala_1911.pdf

Captain Sim, who was present at Bowling Green Bay confirmed that the gale was not excessive and the currents within normal parameters, which in itself, could have been reason enough for Captain Knight's decision to proceed northward.

I have expressed the opinion, backed up by the commentary of Captain Mackenzie, that Captain Knight thought he was ahead of a frontal system moving northward up the coast. Much was said about Captain Knight missing the vital cyclone warning after departing Flat-Top, which apparently was good enough reason, to steam headlong into a cyclone despite the obvious pattern of warning signs (barometer falling; changes in wind force and wave pattern) 12 hours prior to the event. 

The only explanation I can think of, taking into account severe limitations in my understanding of climatology off the Queensland coast, is that the cyclone was a 'hybrid cyclone' (see previous post and image below) which gave an impression (including barometric) of a system moving up the coast only to reveal a cruel twist in the form of a cyclone at the apex moving from northeast to southwest across the stretch of ocean off Cape Bowling Green. 

There simply has to be a logical explanation for Captain Knight's actions and Captain Mackenzie's revealing remarks. Captain Knight must have believed that he stood a fair chance of making Townsville. 

Anything else would be classified as suicide.