SMASHED HER DECKS LIKE AN EGGSHELL.

The Argus, Melbourne, Friday 31 March, 1911.

A CYCLONE THEORY.

Captain Thompson, A.U.S.N.'s Wyreema:

"How do you account for the cargo from the lower

hold drifting ashore, if the vessel's bottom was not

ripped open?"

Captain Thompson replied that only those who had

encountered cyclones knew their terrific force. 'If the

seas broke on the Yongala, as they probably did, they

would smash her decks like an eggshell. That would

account for the cargo from the lower hold being afloat.

No vessel, however well found, could pass through the

centre of a cyclone. Being in a cyclone is like being inside

a drum. There is a terrific surging noise round you, as if

all the fields in Hades were yelling. It is like hell let loose.

The sea breaks in every direction at once, a heavy sea 

and wind are coming over on one side, and the next 

minute the sea and wind are coming from the other. 

If there is searoom you might get out of it, but if there

is no room you can only anchor and trust to Providence.

Where the Yongala was there was no searoom, only 

about 15 or 30 miles between the coast and the reefs.

As for the force of the wind, when I was with Professor

Agassie surveying the reefs, we came across the bones

of a whale 30 ft. long 18 ft. above the high water mark.

The rush of water from a cyclone must have pushed it

up there.' 

Yongala's wreck site is 11.5 n miles from Cape Bowling Green and 23 n miles from the Barrier Reef. Captain Thompson certainly knew what he was talking about! Such force could certainly have stoved in Yongala's after hatch, allowing an inundation of tons of water and liberation of cargo from the holds.

INITIAL REACTION AND COMPARISON WITH SS WARATAH.

The Argus, Melbourne, Friday 31 March, 1911.

CAPSIZE IMPROBABLE.

BRISBANE, Thursday - In view of the

widespread statements that the Yongala

"turned turtle," Mr. Wareham flatly 

contradicted the possibility, and pointed 

out that the steamer had been running 

on the coast in the interstate trade for 

eight years - five years running between 

Sydney and Fremantle. Consequently she 

crossed the Australian Bight every four weeks, 

often with less than 100 tons of cargo and not 

more than 200 or 300 tons of coal. She never 

gave owners, master, crew, or passengers any

cause for uneasiness on account of her 

behaviour. It was unreasonable to suppose

that the Yongala, which left Brisbane with

2,000 tons weight in her bottom and only 5

tons of cargo on deck, could turn turtle.

This initial reaction from a representative of the owners is interesting. The scene was set for the Inquiry to come; under no circumstances was Yongala to be presented as a tender steamer which could have turned turtle in a cyclone. But the rumours were there as soon as one week after the disaster. Yongala did indeed have a good track record, particularly across the Bight. 

However, Mr. Wareham failed to mention that she carried 164 tons of pig iron ballast to compensate for minimal cargo and coal during these runs. The distance between Fremantle and Adelaide is 1720 n miles. Yongala consumed, on average, 60 tons of coal per day. Cruising at a modest 12 knots she would have taken 6 days = 360 tons of coal. Mr. Wareham already as early as 31 March, was prone to exaggeration in favour of dispelling the rumours and exaggerating Yongala's capabilities. 

He protested too much! 

It is known from the Inquiry that Yongala departed Brisbane with 11 tons on deck. Again, Mr. Wareham attempted to underplay the top heavy component by reducing this figure to 5 tons. It is interesting to note that Yongala had a jerky recovery when steaming in ballast with the 164 tons of pig iron (forward). The pig iron lowered the centre of gravity, raising GM, and with it the righting force recovering from a list. It appears that a concentrated focus of specific gravity lowest down in the ship had a remarkable effect on the righting powers of the steamer.

This reminds me of the Waratah. Captain Ilbery, finally on the last voyage, had sorted out Waratah's inherently tender condition by adding 1,500 tons of lead concentrates in a lower hold at 11 cubic feet to the ton, 8 ft. high. This produced a stable steamer with a GM of 1.9 ft.. However, the increased righting force, as in the case of Yongala, produced a jerky recovery which had passengers falling on the promenade deck during the voyage from Adelaide to Durban.  

Yongala, I believe that the absence of the pig iron had a significant impact on tenderness and being 34% full in terms of cargo dead weight, and a prominent funnel, made Yongala tender and vulnerable to turning turtle in a gale. 

The West Australian, 13 April, 1912.

STABILITY OF SHIPS AND

LAWS OF STORMS. 

- To the Editor.

"Sir, now I that the missing Koombana

may certainly be listed as lost, like the

Waratah and Yongala, the travelling public

might very well be interested in studying

for themselves the simple proposition of 

stability in ships. This proposition lies buried

in scientific jargon as far as the man in the

Street is concerned, and can easily be 

demonstrated in ordinary language. 

It is a long time since Archimedes proved. 

that a floating body is exactly the same 

weight as the water it displaces. A steamer, 

with whatever cargo or ballast she may 

have in her, is exactly the same weight as 

the water she displaces. The water she 

displaces is what would fill the cavity her 

weight and shape impose below the water 

line or surface of the water. Exactly in the 

centre of this cavity, in which the floating 

ship fits lies the vessel's centre of buoyancy, 

and through this centre there acts an upward 

pressure from the sea in its endeavour to 

become level against the weight of the ship. 

When a steamer is floating upright, this 

centre of buoyancy lies midships in a 

vertical line or plane, dividing the vessel 

in two. If one thinks of  a partition being 

built from stem to stern amidships from 

the keel upward, then in this partition lies 

the centre of buoyancy when the steamer 

stands upright, and it lies nearly half-way 

between the keel. and the water line. 

The water line is a imaginary line or plane 

joining, from side to side through the vessel 

the  surfaces of the surrounding sea. Not any

of the painted lines on the hull often alluded

to as the "water line." When a steamer

heels over; that is lists or rolls from side to

side part of her hull comes out above the

level of the sea on one side and another part

sinks further in on the other side. When

this happens the centre of buoyancy changes

position in the hull while always retaining

its position about the centre of whatever

portion of the hull is immersed. Thus, as

she rolls to starboard, it leaves the assumed

partition amidships, moving to starboard,

returning to partition, and then towards

port as she rolls from starboard, through

upright, and then to port.

As before explained, there is always an

upward pressure from the ocean in a 

straight line perpendicular to its level

surface through this moving centre of 

buoyancy and that line always passes 

through a given point in the midships 

partition above it. This point is termed 

the "meta centre" by experts and it will 

readily be imagined that the centre of 

buoyancy swings from side to side like 

a pendulum suspended from it, when

the vessel is rolling at sea.

There is now the centre of gravity, which

everyone nowadays understands is simply

the centre of weight to be considered as it

must readily be realised that a vessel's

centre of gravity depends upon the amount 

of cargo or ballast she may be carrying and

how such is stowed or disposed in her holds.

But once the cargo or ballast is placed, stowed,

or, disposed in the vessel, the centre of 

gravity remains constant, and does not

shift (unless the cargo shifts), like the centre

of buoyancy. If the vessel be stowed properly 

it will be found somewhere in the assumed 

midships partition and at a point below meta 

centre point. The pressure from the weight of 

the ship is always in the direction of an assumed 

plumb line hanging from the centre of gravity point, 

and as the vessel rolls at sea this plumb line or 

direction of pressure swings from side to side

in harmony with the line of buoyancy, exactly 

coinciding when the vessel is upright, and parallel, 

with an increasing distance between them as the 

vessel rolls to one side. 

The degree of stability- that is safety from capsizing 

- depends on the distance of the meta centre above 

the centre of gravity. This distance is termed the meta 

centric height. (GM). The force downward from the

centre of gravity is exactly equal to the force 

upward exerted by the ocean endeavouring to 

get level; and these two forces tend to right the ship 

when the undulations of the sea swing her away

from the upright. The greater the metacentric 

height which is the same as saying the greater 

the safety from capsizing, the more uncomfortable 

the vessel to travel on. The more leverage the forces 
of buoyancy and gravity have the more quickly 
they can right the vessel swaying on the undulating 
surface. Too great safety from capsizing brings about 
other dangers. Sailing vessels with heavy dead-weight 
cargoes have been known to lose their masts and 
strain their hulls to such an extent, in so rolling, their

masts out, that they have sprung a leak and

foundered. 

Iron and such like heavy cargoes have often to 

be stowed in narrow trunkways or on platforms

especially built in the ship to keep her centre

of gravity higher when loaded. When we hear

people say that such and such a vessel is a 

grand seaboat, etc., etc., such a vessel may 

have been very unsafe on that particular voyage, 

her very unsafety contributing to the comfortable 

travelling. 

It may be taken for granted there is very little

difference in modern cargo vessels when

carrying complete cargoes that nearly fill

them. With like loading they may safely

be expected to behave much the same in

similar storms. The common design for such

vessels provides a breadth equal to about

twice the moulded depth below the main

deck,and as there are no passengers

carried there is very little superstructure

above the main deck. When we consider

passenger steamers, however, the tendency

to build additional decks and keep the 

passengers' accommodation all above the main

deck is most noticeable. Everyone prefers a

nice airy cabin to the stuffy ones which were

once the vogue, and all below the main deck.

Here it is an open question whether we are 

not sacrificing safety for comfort and carrying 

capacity. 

The fact that we have had the Waratah,

Yongala, and Koombana mysteries in these 

latitudes during the last three years is sufficient 

excuse for the public requiring some practical

and expert investigation made on their behalf. 

In the case of the Waratah it seems abundantly 

clear, from the evidence given at the Law Courts 

that this vessel was not considered to have 

sufficient ballasting powers when sailing without 

cargo, to counteract the weight of superstructure

supplying the passenger accommodation. She

was to some extent in the same predicament as 

our famous sailing clippers of last century, which 

needed nearly half a cargo of ballast to go seeking 

for cargoes from one port to another. 

When the Waratah was lost she had nearly a 

full cargo on board and whatever her degree 

of stability was when empty, had surely nothing 

to do with her degree of stability when loaded. 

Yet, as far as  the writer can learn, there was 

little or no evidence forthcoming as to the weight 

and disposal of the cargo she had when lost.

In the case of the Koombana there is

considerable food for reflection. She was

probably carrying less than 500 tons of

cargo and:appears to have been engulfed

in the centre of a "willy-willy." It the opinion 

of the writer that the Koombana in light trim 

was not fit to encounter a hurricane centre.

The writer has been caught near a cyclone 

centre off Mauritius in a sailing vessel, and 

remembering how that vessel, although in 

ideal load and trim was.smothered under 

almost bare poles with bulwarks under water 

and hatch comings awash, he cannot conceive 

it possible for a steamer like the Koombana 

in light trim, exposing such an area of 

superstructure to such a force of wind, to live 

through it.

The question is, 'Is it a legitimate risk to send

such a vessel in such a trim into hurricane

latitudes in hurricane seasons?" 

It must be remembered that the law of

storms is getting on towards being an exact

science, with barometers to provide indications

of approach; and with means to indicate the 

vessel's position from the centre and to show 

from collected data the most probable path of 

the centre, a good steamer with an experienced 

and expert master should easily avoid being 

caught. It is a matter of vigilance and judgment

just as is the case with a pedestrian avoiding

motor cars. These remarks are applicable.

to cyclones, typhoons, and other well

known and studied storms, but have we

done our duty with regard.to the Nor'-West

"willy-willy" ?? Is there a published hand

book with information; instructions; and

suggestions as is the case in other 

hurricane parts of the,world for the

safety of mariners. If not, is it not a work 

worth taking in hand at once?

'Yours; etc.,

LONGSHOREMAN.'

Fremantle, April.

SS Yongala

  

SS Waratah - Port Adelaide.

CYCLONE AT CAIRNS, 17 MARCH, 1911.

The Mercury, Hobart, Saturday 18 March, 1911.

CYCLONE AT CAIRNS.

MANY BUILDINGS DAMAGED.

BRISBANE, March 17.

A terrific cyclone struck Cains on

Thursday morning. The barometer

fell to 29.50 and the wind blew with

hurricane force, and was accompanied

by torrential rain.

The balcony and roof of the Railway

Hotel were lifted over the buildings.

The Queen Hotel had a portion of

the roof stripped off.

One cottage was lifted bodily off the

blocks, and the cargo sheds at the

wharf suffered.

The Chillagoe Mining Company's

house was unroofed and one gust tore

the roof and the balcony off the Empire

Hotel, and stove in the side wall.

A whole row of shops in Spence

street were more or less damaged.

Damage of a less serious degree was

done to other properties.

Nelson, on the Mulgrave River also

experienced the full force of the cyclone

and a good deal of damage was done there.

This cyclone struck Cairns a week before Yongala steamed into one off Cape Bowling Green. It was clearly a season of multiple cyclones off the Queensland coast. My thoughts return to the fact that data was collected from a great number of the more than 800 stations along the Queensland coast, showing a pattern of barometer changes warning of an approaching cyclone, as early as 9 am, 23 March. Cyclones could move at variable speeds, some alleged to be as fast as 100 miles per hour. The cyclone associated with the Yongala came from the northeast and if this was indeed a season of multiple cyclones, surely the data would have been patched through to Mr Hunt at the Federal Meteorological Bureau for IMMEDIATE processing and a formal cyclone warning issued to Brisbane and further up the coast as soon as humanly possible to warn shipping? Yongala departed Flat-Top at 1.40 pm, 23 March, which had given the Meteorological Centre 41/2 hours to issue the warning. This system was useless in the event of cyclones moving at 100 miles per hour towards a vulnerable coast line. Not one word of this was discussed at the Marine Inquiry.

The image below illustrates a further complexity. More than one cyclone could occur at the same time. This pattern could potentially have caused great confusion in terms of barometer readings and the extrapolated pattern/s of storm systems and might account for the delays in data analysis at the Meteorological Bureau at Melbourne?? But there again there is no evidence that more than one cyclone was present off Queensland, 23 March, 1911. It does, combined with the account above, suggest that there might have been a somewhat blase attitude towards these 'frequently occurring' systems and in part could have been the reason for Grantala, Captain Sim, departing Townsville at 4 pm, 23 March, when the warning must have been issued by Melbourne by this time. Perhaps masters judged the severity of the conditions at sea, some like Captain Sim, deciding to put into the shelter of Bowling Green Bay, by 7.30 pm, 23 March. 

Cyclones Marcia and Lam, February, 2015.

The Argus, Melbourne, Friday 31 March, 1911.

CYCLONE AT CAIRNS.

Brisbane, Thursday.—A telegram from  

Cairns, timed 3 p.m. today stated that a        

cyclone storm was raging. The wind was

almost of hurricane force, accompanied by a

downpour of driving rain and a heavy sea

rolling in. There is every sign of the 

disturbance continuing.

Owing to the cyclone weather, the

steamer Mourilyan could not leave 

Cooktown last night for Townsville. 

Interuptions to the telegraph lines 

at Palmerville and Fairview have 

isolated Thursday Island.

Further proof that there were a series of 'cyclones' striking the Queensland coast during the period. This one a week after the Yongala disaster.

553 TONS IN THE 'TWEEN DECK.

The Register, Adelaide, Wednesday 21 June, 1911.

She carried general cargo and passengers 

for north ports, and reached Mackay on March 23.

The weight of the cargo in the vessel was

667 tons, almost entirely in the lower hold,

and properly stowed. There was 553 tons

in the 'tween deck, 40 tons of which were

for Mackay, and 11 tons on the deck, 10

of which was also for Mackay.

This is a contradictory report. Either lower hold or 'tween deck. Not both!

If most of the cargo, 553 tons (82%), was stowed in the 'tween deck which was certainly not the lowest point in the hold and being elevated would have had a negative impact on the centre of gravity - shifting it up in the vessel - reducing the GM, which in effect would have made the steamer even more tender (top heavy). 

I doubt whether this was true.

This cross-section illustration gives one an immediate idea of where the 'Between' or 'tween deck was relative to cargo storage in the lowest part of hold number 3.

Fix t