SCIENCE vs CYCLONES.

The mercury, Hobart, Saturday 16 May, 1931.

SCIENCE v. CYCLONES

Hurricanes No Longer

Dreaded

Experience of S.S. Macumba

Given sea room, the modern steamer is

not imperilled by the fiercest hurricane

which can strike the Queensland coast,

but a recent experience of the A.U.S.N.

Co.'s s.s. Macumba proves that science

has provided a comparatively easy means

of avoiding or nullifying even the most

intractable cyclone. Illustrating the

fact, Captain H. P. Upward takes readers

back to January 29 of this year.

Three factors figure in the Macumba's

feat of actually tracking a cyclone down

the Queensland coast - knowledge of the

law of storms, wireless, and the broad-

casting of advance reports from Willis

Island, 207 miles north-east from Townsville.

Captain Knight did not have the advantage of wireless and a timeous cyclone warning.

Captain Upward says that most of the

hurricanes which affect the Queensland

coast occur in January, February, and

March. They generally come from the

east, and approach the coast between

Townsville and Cooktown. Mostly they

recurve south-easterly, pass southwards,

frequently as far as Brisbane, then move

off E.S.E., increase in area, and disperse.

This would certainly explain why the SS Geelong was subjected to three days of stormy conditions, following roughly the path from Townsville down the coast to Carlisle Island.

Others recurve some distance from the

coast, near the Barrier Reef, passing

southward and eastward, without causing 

much damage. These fierce storms are one 

of Nature's rough blessings.

They bring heavy rain and prevent

droughts, more especially those which

cross Cape York and get away inland.

In order to make clear the Macumba's

successful strategy, it may be explained

that the tropical cyclone consists of an

atmospheric whirl, rotating clock-wise

in the Southern Hemisphere, with spirally

inflowing winds attaining destructive

velocities, ranging from 60 miles an hour 

to, in extreme cases, 120 miles, (Captain Sim 

reported that the winds were between 70 and 

80 miles per hour) while moving along this line 

or progression at a velocity of five to 30 miles

an hour. They were once supposed to be

perfectly round, but are now known to

resemble the shape of the earth - even

elliptical.

The 'cyclone' coming from the northeast, from the direction of Willis Island, would have taken approximately 1 to 6 hours to moved across the stretch of sea between the Barrier Reef and Cape Bowling Green - Cape Upstart. Captain Sim, anchored in Bowling Green Bay, reported that the worst of the gale was between 11 pm, 23 March and 3 am, 24 March - 4 hours. 

DESTRUCTIVE SECTION.

The destructive section of a cyclone

is frequently less than 100 miles wide.

If a ship is in the centre of the storm,

facing with it, there will be a semi-circle 

to right and left, of which the left semi-circle 

is the most dangerous. 

Knowledge of this simple fact enables a 

captain who is being overtaken by a cyclone 

to take his vessel into the right or less dangerous 

semi-circle. 

The Yongala wreck site is within the steamer track between the Whitsundays and Townsville. This suggests that Captain Knight was aware of the dangers associated with altering course closer to the mainland in order to seek shelter. He was also caught between a rock and a hard place, because altering course to approximate the right semi-circle (left-hand), would have taken Yongala too close to the Barrier Reef. He had no choice but to continue within the track on course for Townsville.

According to Captain Upward, a skipper has 

three ways of knowing that a cyclone is

coming his way: the barometer, a wireless 

warning, and the ship's cat. The last of the trio 

is said to be remarkably quick in its reactions 

to impending weather changes.

While the A.U.S.N. steamer was approaching 
Mackay on her last voyage north, very suspicious 
weather began, heavy rain squalls from the east, 
with a slightly falling barometer. On February 1, 
when the Macumba reached Townsville, there were 
strong indications of a cyclone to the north, on the
York Peninsula. The warning signal was hoisted at 
the harbour office, and a message was received that 
a hurricane had crossed the Peninsula from the
west, gone out to sea between Cooktown and Cardwell, 
and ran slowly moving eastward toward Willis Island.

The s.s. Morinda, bound for Townsville, was sheltering 

under Gloucester Head from heavy easterly gales. Wireless 

had enabled her to locate the centre of the cyclone,

and the rate of progression, and, wisely to take precautions.

Willis Island wireless gave technical particulars on February 2, 

which showed that the Morinda and Macumba were on the 

right semi-circle of the line of progression, and that the former's 

best plan was to run north, while the Macumba steamer cautiously 

southward in the wake of the disturbance.

How very interesting. The Morinda could represent the Yongala, running north, and the Macumba, representing the Grantala, proceeding cautiously southward and then taking shelter at Cape Bowling Green. This rationale would certainly explain Captain Knight's decision to 'run north'.

"We sailed at 4 p.m., keeping to a certain 

course," says Captain Upward, "and at 10 p.m.

passed the Morinda, bound north. The weather 

was clear, but a nasty easterly sea was making

both vessels roll heavily. At noon on February 3 

we were well down among the Whitsunday Islands, 

with the cyclone still showing signs of converging 

with our course. If the tendency continued, it was 

evident that we should have to ease up before reaching 

a position at which we would come together.

This part of the coast is the most picturesque 

in Australian waters, owing to its miles and miles 

of island chains, which practically form inland seas.

What a grand tourist resort it would make ! On this 

special occasion, however, I was glad to be getting 

through with moderately clear weather, and was

not thinking of tourist possibilities. On February 4 

a course was shaped inside the Percy Islands. 

The barometer began to fall rapidly, and the ship 

was swept by thick blinding rain squalls of hurricane 

force. Owing to the indraft of the islands, it was very 

difficult to get a true direction of the wind, but it was 

obvious that we were getting too close on the heels 

of the cyclone, especially as the flood tide - a king one 

at that - would cause the storm to incline in our 

direction. I decided to anchor and stand by till daylight! 

It was some satisfaction later to know that other ships, 

ahead and more to the eastward of our position reported

by wireless that they were having a bad time, one captain 

stating that he had passed through the centre of the cyclone.

The barometer fell rapidly and blinding squalls predominated with difficulty establishing the true direction of wind. Such confusing horror. It is interesting to note that despite adequate wireless communication and warning, ships found themselves in the brunt of the cyclone and at least one in the centre. 

  

I was glad that I had not proceeded

until the storm had passed. At 5 a.m.,

the barometer started to rise slowly and

the weather to improve all round. The

wind got more westing in it, and the

cyclone ahead of us gradually curved 

out to sea and was finally reported to

be 100 miles east of Capricorn, moving

E.S.E., expanding and losing force.

Having remained at anchor 14 hours,

the vessel proceeded, and, except for

the expected rough seas, reached port

without trouble. Following as we were,

on the heels of a cyclone, it is necessary

to keep as much westerly as possible in

your wind and to watch your barometer

closely.

Advice to watch the barometer was perhaps the most important take-home message. 

It is interesting to note, in connection

with the barometer, that from 4 to 10,

a.m. and pm; the barometer usually

rises, while from 10 to 4 a.m. and p.m. 

it falls. This is called the diurnal range,

and is most pronounced in the Tropics,

amounting to about one-tenth of an

inch. The movement becomes very

irregular when a storm is impending,

and that is the time to keep a sharp

lookout and heed any wireless warnings.

Sensible guideline (so similar to that relating to the Koombana disaster - see Koombana Revisited). 

Incidentally, according lo Captain Upward, 

the ship's cat becomes as jumpy as the 

aneroid barometer!

Did Yongala have a 'ship's cat' ??

Morning Bulletin, 2 July, 1947.

SEA STREWN WITH WRECKAGE

Captain Rhodes says that the

current belief that no trace of the

Yongala was ever found is wrong,

as the sea between Cape Bowling

Green and Palm Islands was littered 

with wreckage, much of it being 

kerosene in the square tins of the 

day. 

He said that the cyclone was small, 

but of great intensity, the barometric 

gradients being so steep that there 

was a difference of an inch in the 

readings at Cape Bowling Green 

and at Townsville pilot station. The

path cut by the storm through the 

timber at the head up Upstart Bay, 

in which great trees twisted and 

shattered, was most impressive.

What Butler saw suggested that

the tornado swept through the 

Inkerman area on a 30 mile front to

the sea, crossing the coast between

Cape Upstart and Cape Bowling

green. On the northern side of Cape

Upstart there had been a large

landslide and trees uprooted, but

cut off clean about eight feet from

the ground. 

SS GEELONG, CYCLONE.

The following extract gives us an impression of the force of cyclones along the stretch of coast where Yongala foundered. The account started on Wednesday, 15 February, 1888 and ended in tragedy, Friday, 17 February. The storm system dragged on for three days in a swathe from Townsville to Carlisle Island - roughly 165 n miles. The winds, much like in the case of the Yongala, predominated from the south, and a dropping barometer signaled progression and worse to come. The SS Geelong, built in 1856, was a combination passenger/cargo steamer of 431 tons. Once caught in these 'cyclones' options were limited and in this case Captain Junner beached his steamer as a last resort.

The Argus, Melbourne, Tuesday 21 February, 1888.

The Geelong left Townsville on Wednesday

for Brisbane via Mackay, having on board

Mr John Bridge and about 12 steerage

passengers. Mr Bridge gives the following

account of the wreck of the Geelong - "I

left Townsville on Wednesday by the Geelong. 

The wind was then blowing rather heavily from 

the south with increasing force, and the progress 

of the vessel was consequently rather slow. The 

following day (Thursday) the weather was extremely 

rough. After passing through Whitsunday Passage

the storm was so violent that the Geelong made little 

progress. She was therefore brought to under the 

shelter of an island. The wind was then from the south, 

and  increasing every minute, but the water where the 

steamer was lying was comparatively calm. On Friday 

morning the storm was increasing, and it was impossible, 

by reason of the heavy driving rain and the sea breaking

over the vessel, to see the island, although we were quite 

close. The barometer was still falling between 3 and 4 

o'clock in the afternoon, showing that a worse storm had

yet to be experienced. The captain was in doubt as to the 

best course to pursue, as the storm was increasing and 

the anchors were dragging, the sea was breaking right

over the vessel, and night was coming on. He made 

various attempts to gain better shelter, but without avail. 

Finally he decided to beach the vessel in order to save

the lives of those on board, and at about 7 o'clock he ran 

her ashore on the island. The storm was so furious that I 

think, but for this action the steamer would certainly have

foundered. She went ashore pretty gently, there being about 

100 yards of water between the beach and the vessel when 

she struck. Captain Junner, without the slightest hesitation, 

jumped into the sea with a heaving line round his waist to 

which was attached a wire rope. This he made fast to the

shore, and by this means most of the crew and passengers 

were taken from the vessel. The captain went backwards

and forwards along the line, and never for one moment 

flagged in his exertions to save the lives of those under his 

charge. The engineer and a seaman tried to get ashore 

in a boat, but were immediately swamped  and drowned. 

The stewardess, in getting ashore, let go the rope, and 

was subsequently washed onto the beach in an insensible 

condition.

She revived after a few hours, and stated that

she was quite unconscious of what had taken

place after leaving the steamer's side. I did

not go ashore myself, but preferred to remain

on the vessel, as she seemed to be holding

together fairly well. l I stayed in my cabin

most of the time, until the storm increased

to such a height that I thought it advisable

to get on to the bridge, so as to be ready if 

the worst happened. I had the utmost difficulty 

in getting safely to the bridge, as the sea was 

washing right over the vessel, and I was knocked 

down several times, besides receiving severe 

blows from the wreckage which was being washed

about the deck. Soon after leaving my cabin, which 

was situated on the deck, it was washed away, and 

with it the whole of my baggage. I was left with the 

fur rug I had on me. I put a lifebelt round me, and 

remained on the bridge all night. As each person who 

went ashore by the line disappeared over the ship's side, 

it was quite impossible to see or know whether he had 

made the land in safety.  At about daylight the storm 

abated, and some of the passengers came back to 

look for their luggage. The You Yangs appeared at about 

9 am, on Saturday, and lay off the scene of the wreck

until 10 o'clock. The sea was then calm, and those who 

wished were taken on board the You Yangs. Captain Junner 

exhibited courage and presence of mind of the highest

order throughout the whole affair. He was about the only 

man on board who seemed to know what to do, and he 

behaved like a Briton.

His behaviour was quite on a par with his action in connection 

with the wreck of the Cahors when he was mate of the Burwah.

One of the officers and a few of the crew remained on the vessel 

instead of going ashore."

Fortunately the cargo of the Geelong this trip was small, 

consisting of nine and a half tons of sugar, one ton of tin ore, 

some bananas, and a few empty cases. The Geelong is lying 

on the rocks at the island with a boulder through her bottom, 

but it is considered possible that she may be got off at high tide. 

The captain of the You Yangs left provisions for those who remained 

in charge of the Geelong. 

Yesterday Mr Fairland telegraphed to Mackay for the agents to send 

the tender Iceberg to the scene of the wreck.

SS Geelong - courtesy wrecksite.eu

ROCK OFF HOOK ISLAND.

Cairns Post, Thursday 6 April, 1911.

Whitsunday Passage.

The following particulars of Whitsunday 

Passage and the Great Barrier Reef,

in the vicinity of the scene of the supposed 

wreck, extracted from the official sailing 

directions, throw graphic light upon the

perils of the trip in such violent

weather as was encountered by the

Yongala :-The northern termination

of the inner channel of Whitsunday

Passage is bounded to the eastward

by Shaw, Dent, Whitsunday, Cid.

and Hook Islands, and the islets 

between Hook Isle and the northern-

most of the Cumberland Islands end

is bounded to the westward by the

shoal lying off Cape Conway and

Round Head, Molle Isles, and the

islets which lie scattered to the

eastward of Cape Gloucester. The

least breadth of Whitsunday Passage

is two miles, between Dent Islands

and Pine Head, to the northward of

which it increases to four and seven

miles The existence of a rock not

charted, situated one mile from the 

south-west point of Hook Island has

been reported, and masters of vessels 

are warned not to approach its locality

nearer than two miles. On a dark night 

or in thick weather it is wiser to go north 

of all the islands lying to the eastward of 

Gloucester Head. Coasters and shipmasters

with local knowledge frequently use the 

channel between Armit and Gumbrell Islands, 

but there is very little difference in distance 

between any of the routes.

The 'rock' in question might have been one of the main reasons for risking the inside passage between Armit and Gumbrell. Note that the comment was to avoid the islands altogether and go what amounted to around the Whitsundays to the east.

Anchorages in this area are as

follows :- under the north head of

Dent island, well sheltered from the

S.E; Port Molle under the R. W. end

of Long Island ; between the mainland 

and White Rock, sheltered from all winds; 

Grimstone Bay - good anchorage with 

shelter from westerly and southerly winds.

This passage suggests that there were adequate options for anchorage within the Whitsundays. The implication being that to go into this maze of islands would be to seek shelter and not a 'short-cut'.

From Gloucester Head to Cape

Bowling Green the track is clear of

all dangers. The course given leads

a vessel 3 1/4 miles to the southward

of Nares Rock, and about 13 miles

off the highest point of Cape Upstart, 

a high abrupt mass of land composed 

of granite rocks and scantily wooded, 

rising 2420 ft. above sea level. When 

approaching Cape Bowling Green care 

should be taken that the vessel is going 

to pass far enough off (at least five miles)
(Yongala was 11 miles) to avoid the shoals 
off the point. The banks in this vicinity are 
constantly shifting, and the tidal streams set

strongly and irregularly over them.

It is clear from this article that it was viewed as risky to go through the Whitsundays at all during inclement weather. Yongala passed through while there was the 'threat of stormy conditions' but not overtly poor visibility.

There was no getting around the fact that caution favoured by-passing the Whitsundays which was certainly not the course of action taken by Captain Knight.

They were never to know then, 1911, that the master supreme brought his steamer to a point well within a safe steamer track course off Cape Bowling Green, where nature had the final say.

ACKHURST ISLAND.

The following extract continues to intrigue and confound me. It is taken from The Brisbane Courier, Saturday 20 May, 1911:

"I observe," continued Mr. Denham,

"that at a conference held recently at

Adelaide, some comment was made about 

providing communication between the light-

houses and Brisbane. At my request,

Capt. Mackay went into this matter, and

furnishes some interesting information.

He shows that the following lighthouses

are in direct telegraphic communication

with Brisbane, or they are able to

communicate by telephone, to telegraph 

stations giving connection with Brisbane:

Cape Moreton, Caloundra, Double Island

Point, Woody Island, Sandy Cape, Burnett 

Islands, Bustard Heads, Cape Capricorn, 

Flat-top, Cape Bowling Green, Cape

Cleveland, Archer Point, Grassy Island,

and Goode Island. 

It has proved difficult to establish the details of the Lighthouse (station) on Grassy Island referred to and in telegraphic / telephonic communication with the mainland - Brisbane. If one looks at present day images of Grassy Island it is deserted without any outward evidence of buildings or infra-structure. I have found Trove evidence that people lived on Grassy Island, 1911, but nothing about a lighthouse or keeper. I do not believe Captain Mackay would have listed Grassy Island unless it was relevant. I do not believe that he confused it with Grassy Hill Light. So where to from here?

Why would there have been any form of Light on Grassy Island? For the answer to this we need to go back in time before 1911. The following extract is taken from The Argus, Melbourne, Monday 5 November, 1866:

'Ackhurst Island is about a mile in length from north to south, and about the same width from east to west, is 545 ft. high, and is covered with grass and a few trees on its summit.'

So what's all this about Ackhurst Island? Grassy Island was originally called Ackhurst Island. Commander G.S. Nares (Nares Rock) of HMS Salamander (1866) named the island after his boatswain, John Ackhurst.

'The soundings around it are from five to three fathoms. Off its northwest point is a shoal of one and a half fathoms. There are also two smaller islands off the north point, one forty feet high and the other, ten feet. The forty foot high island has a reef off its south end, and the channel between it and Ackhurst Island is blocked by the shoal aforementioned. The ten feet high island has from six to ten fathoms all round, and the channel between it and the forty feet high is free from danger, with soundings from six to ten fathoms.'

'Olden Island is 300 ft. high with grass and trees near its summit. A sandy spit runs off its south entrance. Off the southeast end of this island is a rocky island, about 20 ft. high, connected to Olden Island by a reef. Between Olden Island and the main (land) is good anchorage, and the channel is free from danger.'

'Cannor or Gumbrill Island is 390 ft. high; has a reef running around its east side; outside of which the soundings are deep, having from six to nine fathoms all around the island. The channel between it and Olden Island is about two miles wide, with soundings from nine and a half to thirteen fathoms in it.'

So what is to be made of all of this? The images below give important clues. Steamers using the narrow inside passage from Dent Island via Cannon Valley, Grassy Island and up between (2 miles wide) Gumbrell and Armit Islands were confronted with one dangerous point where bearings needed to be radically altered. This point, as can be seen from the images, is directly off the northern point of Grassy (Ackhurst) Island. If a steamer over-ran this point there was only a 1 n mile separation from the shoal north of Grassy Island. If there was going to be a Light, the northern side of Grassy Island would have been the most crucial position to warn steamers in darkness and conditions of poor visibility. 

Further to this, the dangerous inside passage was used by many coastal steamers and Grassy Island was the penultimate island before exiting the safety of the Whitsunday Islands. If there were storm warnings this would have been the point to let masters know to seek anchorage within the islands, hence telegraphic communication with the mainland. In conditions of good visibility I'm sure it was possible to hail passing steamers, but in conditions of significantly diminished visibility the keeper would have required a Morse Lamp to communicate the warning. Again, drawing from period newspaper articles, the emphatic point was made that only Cape Moreton had a Morse Lamp. If this issue had been raised at the Inquiry it would have cast a very bad light on Queensland State-controlled Lighthouses. Hence the Lighthouse Act of 1911 and federalization.

I believe that subsequent to the Yongala disaster and high profile coverage of the inside passage dangers, ship masters were obliged to use the outside passage (which had been fully charted by this stage) and the role of Lighthouse at Grassy Island became defunct. There was no further use for a keeper or residents on the island. All signs of infrastructure must have been demolished over time.

Unless it was a lightship??

See important comments below. There was never a light nor a lightship. Thanks to the renowned maritime historian, Captain Stanley Robinson for his vital input.

   

MR. DONALDSON'S FIANCE.

The Argus, Melbourne, Friday 31 March, 1911. 

ENGINEER'S SWEETHEART. 

SYDNEY - Thursday - A young woman

made anxious inquiries at the offices of

the Adelaide Steamship Company today

as to whether any news was at hand 

regarding the Yongala, or if any bodies

from the wreck had been washed ashore.

She explained that she was to have been

married to the second-engineer Mr. J. F.

Donaldson, on the return of the Yongala

from the northern trip.

Many such heart-wrenching stories brought home the human element of the disaster and the waste of life.

ONLY PRODUCE.

The Argus, Melbourne, Friday 31 March, 1911.

NO SEARCH FOR SALVAGE.

EXPENDITURE USELESS.

As the cargo of the Yongala mainly consisted of produce there 

is no possibility of any search being made for salvage.

It will be remembered that after the Pericles struck a sunken

rock, and foundered off Cape Leeuwin, hundreds of boxes

of butter were discovered in the vicinity of the wreck, several

vessels being engaged in the search. This course will not 

be followed in the case of the Yongala, even if the wreck 

is located.The principal items in the manifest were flour, bran, 

fruit, pollard and potatoes. These would be so damaged by their 

immersion the in salt water that arrangements for salving would 

mean expenditure without any return.

This seems feasible on the surface but rather hasty considering that Yongala had disappeared only a week prior. The owners gave an impression of being adamant about this matter despite the financial loss - at least 40 000 pounds carried by the company. One would imagine that any form of recovery would be better than nothing. It's as though they did not want Yongala found, removing the all-important lure of salvage reward. Why? One could argue that they did not want any form of evidence that Yongala might simply have been overwhelmed by the storm rather than striking an object. As we know from the wreck site, Yongala did not strike anything and foundered at the mercy of the elements. This points to the tenderness factor! A group of adventurers found what must have been the Yongala site in November of 1911, a well-defined patch of oil rising from the depths at a location off Cape Bowling Green and within the steamer track. If salvage had been on the table I believe that there would have been adequate motivation to find proof of the wreck and cause of the disaster - which is certainly NOT what the owners wanted. How the plot thickened...

There is a source which suggests that there was more than just produce on board.