'IT IS WORSE THAN HELL'.

The Evening Telegraph, 7 April, 1911.

Captain MacKenzie brought out the 

chart, sketched the passage Captain 

Knight is bound to have taken and if 

this is correct, then it is impossible 

that the ill-fated vessel was ever within 

miles of Nares Rock.

Captain Knight and Captain Mc-Kenzie 

have often discussed the navigation of 

this difficult Northern run; have compared 

charts; and both Captains run on the same 

course.

It seems that there

ARE TWO COURSES

once north of the passage. One leads

away, outskirting the coastal reefs

and islands, and runs within a few

miles of Nares Rock. The second

comes in and bears towards Gloucester 

Island.

"We were both decided that the

Nares Rock course is unsafe unless

we pass the rock in daytime," said

Captain McKenzie.

courtesy Google Earth

"It is easy to trace the whole catastrophe," 

he added. "I know Captain Knight and 

his methods so well." 

Captain McKenzie thinks that the

vessel would have caught 

THE FULL FORCE

of the storm after passing north of

Upstart, at that time the vessel

would be on its ordinary inside 

course.

courtesy Google Earth
Interestingly, the inside course would have brought Yongala to about 7 miles out from Cape Bowling Green, which was where the original oil patch was observed - wrecks are known to move over decades, but 4 miles is ridiculous. It makes more sense that Captain Knight gave himself more sea room given the extreme conditions and ended up at a position 11 miles out from Cape Bowling Green irrespective of whether he initially used the inside or outside courses.

"It is sad to think",said Captain

McKenzie, "that at that precise moment

the Grantala was anchored in safety not 

25 miles away from its sister ship, which 

was being driven to its doom.

Grantala was anchored 17.7 miles away.

Captain McKenzie considers that

the storm would "put the vessel

broadside on to its full force, and

with a dreadful list it would be driven 

before its fury. There would be few 

on deck at the time. The captain, 

of course, would be on the bridge, 

and probably , two of the mates, the 

wheel hand, and the lookout. The 

weather would render the fo'c'sle head 

untenable.

When the full terrific blast struck

the ship she would list immediately.

Acknowledging the top heavy steamer's limitations.

Captain Knight might have given orders

but it would have been impossible to have 

heard them two feet away, and even if heard, 

it would have been impossible to have carried

them out. All that the hands on deck could have 

done would be to have clung to a stanchion 

and wait for the frightful blow to moderate.

The rain would come down almost horizontally 

with such awful force that if one turned one's face 

to it, it would have been cut. The spray would be 

whipped from the crests of the seas , and would 

hit the vessel like shrapnel.

And indeed impossible to launch lifeboats in such conditions.

"They say," said Captain' McKenzie

"that a cyclone at sea is like hell. I say, if it is 

possible, it is worse than hell. It is simply 

indescribable."

The captain considered that under

these awesome and dreadful conditions 

the vessel was driven out broadside on.

And eventually the end came.

As it was, with that tremendous list,

and the terrible storm, it was impossible 

to do anything. Those on deck could only 

cling breathlessly to stanchions or whatever 

hold was available, while down below it 

would be sheer impossibility to put a 

shovelful of coal into the fires.

The Australasian, Melbourne, 8 April, 1911.

"To be in a cyclone," Captain Thompson 

continued, "is like being in the inside

of a drum. There is a terrific surging noise

round you, as if all the fields in Hades were

yelling. It is like hell let loose. The sea

breaks in every direction at once, a heavy

sea and wind are coming over on one side,

and the next minute the sea and wind are

coming from the other. If there is sea

room you might get out of it, but if there

is no room you can only anchor and trust

to Providence. Where the Yongala was

there was no sea-room - only about 15 or

20 miles between the coast and the reefs.


The Register, Adelaide, 9 June, 1911.

 'But Capt, Knight, never varied his track. 

Night or day, thick or clear, she steered 

13 miles off Cape Upstart, and

6 1/2 miles off Cape Bowling Green.

Contradicting Captain Mackenzie, Alexander McGregor Leslie, Superintendent of Wharfs and master mariner, who had been Yongala's second officer for 2 years and 3 months, made the convincing statement that Captain Knight never varied his course no matter the weather, day or night. 

13 miles off Cape Upstart was the outside track, not inside. This was close to Nares Rock and considered dangerous at night. 

6 1/2 miles off Cape Bowling Green was 5 miles closer to shore than where the wreck lies. This also makes sense in the context of allowing enough sea room to prevent running aground on the reefs off the Cape during a fierce storm.

Captain Knight was a risk-taker, by all account. 



courtesy Trove.

siz surveying the reefs