CATEGORICALLY NOT THE INSIDE PASSAGE!

Cairns Post, Wednesday 14 June, 1911.

Yongala Disaster. 

Marine Board Inquiry Closed. 

Finding to be Announced Shortly. 

(By Telegraph;) 

BRISBANE, Tuesday.-The Marine

Board Inquiry into the loss of the

Yongala was continued this morning.

The investigation would have closed

yesterday but for the desire of some

engineers of the Board to hear further 

evidence concerning the use by 

captains of coastal steamers of the

inside passage between Armit and 

Gumbrell Islands, which was one

mile wide.

Several witnesses stated this passage 

was regularly used by them at all times 

and in practically all weathers.

Captain Binstead, Torres Straits

pilot, said he formerly used the pas-

sage between Armit and Gumbrell

Islands till the outside passage was

surveyed, and shown to be safe. 

He now always used the outside course,

because it was more direct. He had 

seen other pilots go through the 

outside of Eschelly Island. In his 

opinion the Yongala struck Nares'

Rock or an outlying obstruction,

alter going outside the channel and

not allowing sufficiently for the set.

This is very important. It explains why the inside passage was used by many masters in all weathers. The risk was offset by the chances of striking an obstacle. But Captain Binstead made it perfectly clear that by 23 March, 1911, the outside passage had been charted and there was no longer an excuse (including saving time) for using the inside passage in poor weather and visibility conditions. 

The inside passage was risky

in night time, and he could not 

imagine anyone using it, because

no time was gained by it. On the 

night of  March 23 he was sure no 

one would  have ever attempted 

the passage. 

He was quite confident Captain Knight 

would not have used the passage that night.

I believe this is case-closed on the subject of using the inside passage - it WAS NOT SAFE - even at night without inclement conditions.

However, despite it all, we know that Yongala made it to within 11 n miles of Cape Bowling Green reducing this controversial subject to a moot point. 

Captain Hurford, Commander of the

Bomballa, said he had been a

master on the Northern coast 18 or

20 years. He passed all sides of the 

islands in fine weather, night and day. 

He was quite sure Captain Knight must 

have gone outside on the night of the 

disaster. He was as confident about it 

as if he was on the bridge with Captain 

Knight. He did not think any weather 

would overwhelm the Yongala. She 

probably struck an uncharted danger on

the outside course. He had passed

the Yongala on the outside course

in dirty weather twice in the last

two and a half years. If Captain

Knight had tried the inside passage

he could only have got through by

chance. The coast generally was 

fairly well lit, though there were weak 

points. On a night such as March 23 

no additional light would have been of 

use because it could not have been seen. 

Asked by Captain Mackay as to

the advisability of anchoring when

indications pointed to a cyclone; 

Captain Hurford said the Howard

Smith Company gave no instructions

in the matter, but after himself running 

through a cyclone the season before 

last he told his colleagues in the service 

that in future he intended to get to an 

anchorage if he had the slightest doubt 

about the weather. That one experience

was enough for him. 

Again a revealing comment suggesting that the owners of the coastal steamers did not advise their masters against chancing their luck in cyclonic conditions. This might be one crucial reason why the issue was not pursued at the Inquiry. If this had been probed, ultimately the Adelaide Steamship Company might have been held responsible for the loss of the Yongala.

After a bad experience Captain Hurford had come to one conclusion - seek shelter and anchor. This is what Captain Knight should have done if he had not been under the impression he was outrunning a frontal system. 

Captain Smith, commander of the

Cooma, said he used the passage

between Armit and Gumbrell Islands 

in very fine weather, but not frequently

in the past year. He completely dropped 

it. Ordinary sailor's prudence would have 

taken Captain Knight outside on the night 

of the disaster. The Cooma followed up

the Yongala on that trip, but was 24 hours 

behind. He received a warning of the 

cyclone at Flat Top and waited. He thought 

the Yongala went broadside onto the danger 

and had her side torn out. He could not think 

she went on the main reef, because she 

would have been found. She was not likely to

have been overwhelmed by the storm. 

This is probably the most accurate assessment of what happened to the Yongala. There is another possibility and it relates to the case of 'The Hawk' see:

http://waratahrevisited.blogspot.co.za/2013/09/anecdote-saturday_14.html

We know that during the height of the storm the gale prevailed from the south, behind Yongala steaming relatively northward. In such circumstances Yongala might have been overtaken by heavy seas breaking over her stern which ultimately caused a breach in the aft main hatch and intense, fatal flooding with release of cargo from the main holds aft. 

Captain Sharland, master of the

Warrego; said he was familiar with 

the Northern coast. His use of the

inside passage depended on the

weather. He always used it if it was 

fine. Captain Knight would certainly 

not have gone there on the night of 

March 23. He could say that positively, 

because they had been shipmates for 

four years, travelling up and down the 

coast together. He thought the Yongala

hit something. An able ship like the 

Yongala would not have been blown over 

by the cyclone. 

Mr. Bond, of the Meteorological

Office, was examined as to the direction 

from which the cyclone came, in view of 

Captain McKenzie's statement that he was 

informed the storm came from the S.W., 

against  the Iaw of cyclones on the 

Queensland coast. He said the accepted

theory was that these storms came from N.E., 

and there was nothing to support the S.W. 

statement in regard to the storm on March 23.

There were no records of storms of

this type coming from any other

direction than N.E. The warning of

the storm of March 23 was sent from

Brisbane at the earliest possible moment, 

but too late for Captain Knight.

A hybrid cyclone with a significant extension of gales predominating from the south (including southwest) could have created the confusion expressed by Captain Mackenzie. This interesting and complicated subject still requires more detailed resolution. It would be illuminating to hear from an expert on the subject of cyclones etc... Queensland coast. Captain Mackenzie was not a fool. Someone needed to pay attention to the quandary.

This concluded the evidence. 

Mr. O'Shea addressed the Board,

and urged that no findings should be

based on conjecture, and that the

Board should confine its conclusions

to matters upon which there was

positive evidence. The Adelaide

Company could not be injured by

conjecture, but it might have an 

effect upon the unthinking public.
He thought the Board must certainly

arrive at the conclusion that every-

thing human effort could do was

done to save the ship, and the souls

on board her. There had been only

one opinion expressed before the

Board as to the seamanship and 

extreme cautiousness of Captain

Knight. 

Captain Mackay replied that the

Board realised it had a difficult task

before it. The Board had acted

solely in the interests of the 

company in inviting anyone who 

desired to give evidence to appear

before the Board; in view of the 

rumours circulated, and it must be 

satisfactory to the Company that 

not one single one responded to 

the invitation. The Board's findings 

would be announced in open court 

with the least possible delay. 

Main goal for Inquiry = do not injure the Adelaide Steamship Company !!

Unthinking public = insulting  = whitewash !!

Captain Knight was not a man of 'extreme cautiousness' but in the same breath I do not believe he was unhinged, steaming directly into a cyclone intentionally !!

I ABSOLUTELY agree that everything was done on Yongala during the height of the crisis to save the ship and souls. But sometimes mother nature has the final say on the matter.

It is fascinating that exactly the same scenario played out at the Inquiry into the loss of the Koombana:

"in view of the rumours circulated,
and it must be satisfactory to the
Company that not one single one
responded to the invitation."

"Those busybodies who said things 

to the contrary had been given an 

ample opportunity to appear before 

the Court and give evidence, but not 

one of their number had come forward."    after being invited to do so. 

MOONSHINE.

The Queenslander, 15 April, 1911.

TOWNSVILLE, April 11.

Inspector Malone to-day received a report 

from Constable Portley, at Mundingburra, 

in respect to the carcass of a horse found 

on the beach at the mouth of Gordon's Creek, 

three miles down the coast from Ross River. 

The bones are there, minus the head and hoofs. 

The colour of the hide was bay. The strong 

odour rising shows that the body had not long 

been dead. The remains are under water at high

tide. The horse could not have got there

from land, owing to the boggy state of

the country, and must have been washed

up by the sea. An aboriginal lad living

near there, who is very intelligent, and

can read and write, says that he first

saw the carcass on April 2. It was then

very much swollen, and the hind legs

were missing. It is thought that this

may be the remains of Moonshine, the

racehorse which was on the Yongala. The

aboriginal says that the same day — April

2 — he saw a lot of Swede turnips on the

beach.

Yongala departed Flat Top, Mackay, 1.40 p.m., Thursday, 23 March. She was in relatively light / tender condition (top heavy). Cargo weight accounted for 29% of maximum load and 164 tons of stabilising pig iron ballast had been removed because it caused a jerky recovery uncomfortable for passengers.

Captain Knight elected to depart for Townsville despite strengthening wind from the southeast and a falling barometer. I believe the decision was based on an assumption that the weather system was coming up the coast, rather than one into which they would be steaming. 

There was no cyclone warning.

Heading north to Townsville and believing they could outrun the weather, Yongala made an average of 16 knots assisted by a 2 knot current. Yongala passed Dent Island, inside passage, Whitsundays, at about 5 p.m. (erroneously reported as 6 p.m.) and was subsequently seen by residents of Cannon Valley Beach an hour later, coinciding with dusk at 6 p.m.. This was the riskier but quicker, inside passage passing between Armit and Gumbrell Islands. 

Having cleared the Whitsundays without mishap, Yongala headed northwest in open water parallel with the coast and the outer Barrier Reef. She cleared Nares Rock without difficulty and arrived at a position 11.5 miles out from Cape Bowling Green Light, 17.7 miles from where Grantala lay anchored to the west due to deteriorating weather conditions.

We know from the chronometer time, 11.45 p.m. (conclusive in my opinion) and a wreck site within the large steamer track, that the disaster must have been sudden and catastrophic. Also, the time and site matches a plausible 15 - 16 knots (favourable, 2 knot current).

My belief is that the intense cyclonic system 30 miles in diameter was actually a hybrid cyclone (see image below) predominated by a gale from the south - the masters who experienced the storm reported gale force wind directions in keeping with this.

By the time Yongala was almost upon the eye of the cyclone, the gale would have shifted rapidly and violently from south to north, bringing the wind force to bear on the top heavy steamer's starboard bow and beam. 

Heading northwest, Captain Knight would have been confronted by an unfolding catastrophe and certain knowledge of Yongala's inability to recover quickly enough in such conditions. I believe he attempted to bring the steamer's bow into the gale. 

What followed must have been extreme and sudden, Yongala capsizing within minutes. The rudder is still in the half to starboard position and the wreck lies facing north. If there had been enough time for recovery, I believe the rudder would have been corrected to maintain the heading.

An explosion was heard by residents south of the disaster site, suggesting that the furnaces burning under full steam reacted to the cold sea water rushing in. 

The main hatch was compromised as the steamer foundered and lighter cargo in hold 3 liberated into the tumultuous sea. 

Passengers would no doubt have been confined to cabins due to conditions, essentially trapped as the disaster unfolded. 

I choose to believe that Yongala foundered so quickly there was little time for protracted suffering and Yongala's 122 souls now rest in peace, cosetted by some of the Coral Sea's most illustrious and doting residents.  

courtesy Google Earth

courtesy Google Earth

Max Gleeson presents an engaging theory based on dive observations that lifeboats on the starboard side of Yongala were swung out in preparation for evacuation of the ship rather than a sudden, extreme event.

A great deal of wreckage was subsequently discovered after the disaster spanning large swathes of the coast from Cape Bowling Green to Palm Island in the north. No lifeboat(s) or section thereof from the starboard side were discovered. Only a section of lifeboat 1 from the port side was found, suggesting that no one escaped Yongala.

A possible reason for starboard davits being in the 'swung out' position could be forces linked with Yongala coming to rest on her starboard side. 

The following extract gives us an idea of the forces unleashed by the cyclone:

Cairns Post, 17 October, 1911. 

Captain McKenzie further stated that 

between Cape Upstart and Cape Bowling 

Green there is now visible in the bush the 

track of the awful south-west tornado, which

it is believed drove the Yongala out onto

Broadhurst Reef. For a width of fifteen miles

the whole of the trees, including many immense

ones, being torn out by the roots and levelled.

It is clear from this description that Yongala was subjected to an intense, narrow, system of formidable force, causing her to capsize rapidly. One could argue that such a force would have destroyed even the most 'stable' of vessels.


The Week, Brisbane, 31 March, 1911.

A veteran master mariner firmly adheres

to the belief that the vessel turned turtle

in the cyclone, and explains the fact that

the cargo mentioned had come ashore by

pointing out that it was quite likely that the 

cargo of the overturned vessel falling upon 

the hatches, would burst them open, the 

lighter portion finding its way to the surface.


courtesy Trove

For all readers with an in interest in this subject Max Gleeson's online video, 'Mystery of a Generation' is compelling and beautifully compiled.

CAPTAINS DIBBLE AND MACKENZIE.

Cairns Post, Wednesday 14 June 1911.

George Dibble, master mariner,

said he was familiar with the coast,

and had worked out a theory as to

what might have happened to the

Yongala. He thought Capt. Knight

followed the usual inside course 

between Armit and Gumbrell Islands,

because all the masters he knew took

that course in all weathers. After passing 

Cape Gloucester six or seven miles he 

probably found the weather so bad that 

he anchored in ten to twelve fathoms of 

water. After lying some time his anchors 

would have dragged till the cables parted

and she went on to Nares Rock and sank 

in a few minutes. If she was found she 

would be within a five miles radius of 

Nares Rock. 

Captain Mackay: Surely the £1000

reward offered for the location of

her should be sufficient inducement

for you to try to find her.

Captain Dibble: I have been in

the hospital for two months. I

have laid my theory and chart

before the Treasury.

Captain Mackay: should strongly

recommend you to try to find her.

Don't you intend to do anything ? 

Capt. Dibble : Not more than I 

have done. It's only my opinion.

By Mr. O'Shea : He did not think

for a moment that Captain Knight 

was guilty of negligence. He would

have done his best under the

circumstances by anchoring.

Reinforcement by experienced mariners that Captain Knight should have sought anchorage. They were not to know that he did not and neither did Yongala strike Nares Rock. But there was unambiguous confirmation that Captain Knight was likely to have used the inshore route.

Captain MacKenzie, commander of

the Wollowra, said he was in charge

of the Yongala for six months. She

was the finest sea boat he was ever

in Captain Knight was an officer of 

wide experience, and very capable. 

In 20 years on the coast he (witness) 

had never gone outside Armit and 

Gumbrell Islands more than three 

times, and he was confident Captain 

Knight took a course between the 

islands because it was agreed it was 

the safest. 

It does not necessarily follow that because most masters used the inside passage in all weathers that it was the safer option. Captain Mackenzie was defending collective actions. The Marine Board on the other hand made this point quite clear:

It has been given in evidence that several masters, including Captain Knight, when proceeding from Whitsunday Passage north, were in the habit of using the inshore route, passing between Armit and Gumbrell Islands. The Board, however, are of opinion, taking into consideration the prevailing weather conditions at the time, that Captain Knight as a careful and experienced master would not use the passage on that occasion.

There must have been risk associated with negotiating the narrow passage between the islands in weather conditions when visibility was poor!

His information, was that the storm in 

which the Yongala was lost came from 

S.W. and not N.E. He was told the wind 

was S. and S.W. all that night. He did 

not think any ill befell the Yongala in 

passing the islands, and believed she 

got past Upstart safely. He thought she 

was blown away to leeward among the

reefs.

Captain Mackay : What ? With

the wind blowing from N.E. ?

Captain MacKenzie : But I don't

agree with you as to the direction

of the storm. In further evidence

he said the passage between the 

islands was hours off the vortex of 

the storm, and if anything happened

there Captain Knight could have got

round Cape Gloucester, and lowered

his boats. He reckoned the Yongala

struck somewhere about Flinders

Passage. This cyclone was peculiar,

but there were records of cyclones

working the wrong way, namely from

the southwest.

There was confusion as to the nature of the storm system. In my previous post I even went so far as questioning whether it was a genuine cyclone or not. Both Captain Mackenzie and Captain Sim (who was present in Bowling Green Bay) claimed that the wind predominated from the south. This would be in keeping with the distribution of the wreckage discovered. The Marine Inquiry was very clear on this point - it was a cyclone originating from the northeast, moving southwest inland and uprooting large trees in the vicinity of Cape Upstart.

If one examines the image below Cape Upstart is 30 n miles southeast of Cape Bowling Green. Cyclones in the southern hemisphere rotate clockwise. If the brunt of the cyclone impacted Cape Upstart and it was genuinely 30 n miles in diameter, this suggests that the winds reported by Captain Mackenzie and Captain Sim would initially have come from the southeast, shifting to the southwest (and finally northwest as the system passed). It also suggests that Captain Sim and the final position of the Yongala were on the upper, left hand fringe (right-hand side) of the cyclone moving from northeast to southwest. It also suggests that Captain Knight had steamed, safely, through the worst of the system before arriving at Yongala's final position. In fact the cyclone may very well have been a cyclone hybrid as depicted in the graphic below with a predominating gale from the south.

Even experienced mariners of the time got confused about the direction of wind originating from a cyclone and Captain Mackenzie's assertion that the cyclone moved from southwest to northeast is not possible. The only way his statement could have been true is if the system was actually a severe frontal system moving up from the south and then veering off to the northeast as it reached Cape Bowling Green.

If the hybrid cyclone theory holds how then does this explain the conditions experienced by Captain Dawson some 100 n miles south of the event at Repulse Island? 

http://www.bom.gov.au/cyclone/about/eastern.shtml

'Even cyclones that are located off the north or central Queensland coast can affect areas well to the south. Heavy rain can occur well to the south of the cyclone and the strong easterly winds between the cyclone and a high to the south may cause large waves over the east coast.' 

Although the facts as they stand point clearly to a cyclonic event, the alternative frontal system theory would at least offer Captain Knight some dignity in that he was justified in attempting to outrun the system - and got within 50 n miles of his destination at Townsville. Why would Captain Knight have attempted to outrun a storm system rather than seeking safe anchorage? I have a theory on this and will return to this fascinating subject in my next post.

Captain Mackay; since the offering of

the reward all reefs from Flinders Passage 

to Bowen have been thoroughly searched 

by ships and that does away with your theory.

Captain MacKenzie : She would slide back 

into deep water. She certainly would not 

have capsized. I believe she was blown to 

the N.E. onto the reefs. He added that he .

had been in cyclones in which a ship

was helpless, because no one could

do anything more than hold on. A drop 

of rain or sea water would cut the flesh 

and one could not even speak.

Captain Johnson : What would you

make your starting point of search ?

Captain MacKenzie : Broadhurst Reef.

Captain Mackay : It was well

searched for a week.

Captain MacKenzie ; It would take

six months to properly search it.

He thought a captive balloon would

be of value for such a.search.

Captain Johnson: Do you think

that part of the coast is sufficiently

lighted?

Captain-MacKenzie : There should

be a light on Cape Gloucester or 

Middle Head.

Captain Mackay mentioned that a

great many recommendations had

been made for lights, but Cape

Gloucester had never been mentioned.

Capt. Johnston ; Would additional

lights have made any difference that

night ?

Captain MacKenzie : It all depends

what the night was. It might have

cleared for a moment just when the

light would have been of use.

Captain Mackay : Would wireless

have been any help that night?

Captain MacKenzie : No. I think

not.

In answer to further questions he

said Captain Knight probably kept

on thinking he was north of the

storm.

What a fascinating parting statement by Captain Mackenzie defending my theory that Captain Knight thought he was north of a frontal system and NOT steaming into the heart of a cyclone. There is so much more to this mystery than meets the eye.

courtesy: http://www.bom.gov.au/cyclone/about/eastern.shtml

WOULD NOT HAVE USED THE INSHORE ROUTE.

Inquiry:

It has been given in evidence that several masters, including Captain Knight, when proceeding from Whitsunday Passage north, were in the habit of using the inshore route, passing between Armit and Gumbrell Islands. The Board, however, are of opinion, taking into consideration the prevailing weather conditions at the time, that Captain Knight as a careful and experienced master would not use the passage on that occasion.

What an extraordinary deduction! More than one witness claimed that Captain Knight used this route in good and bad weather - only having used the outside route on two or three occasions. The Court was clearly giving Captain Knight the benefit of the doubt despite his track record. But in so doing the Court acknowledged that the conditions when Yongala was in the Whitsundays Passage (before and after 6.30 pm, 23 March) were severe enough to warrant using the outside passage. If the conditions were so severe as to force Captain Knight to make it the 'fourth' time in his coastal career to use the outside passage it stands to reason that seeking shelter and anchorage must have been the next logical step as the steamer progressed further and further into the brunt of the cyclone. This would hardly be the description of a careful and experienced master.

But if it were not a cyclone and a system coming from the south it makes sense that Captain Knight thought the odds were in his favour and his fast steamer capable of outrunning the approaching storm. In some respects it would seem more logical to avoid the worst of the storm in this manner rather than anchoring and running the risk of anchors dragging and losing cargo on deck + damage.

I DON'T THINK IT WAS A CLASSICAL CYCLONE!

Kalgoorlie Miner, Tuesday 28 March, 1911.

THE MISSING YONGALA

DIRTY WEATHER REPORTED.

GRAVE FEARS ENTERTAINED.

Townsville - March 27.

Captain Shaland of the steamer

Aramac, reported that shortly 

after leaving Flat-Top on Friday night,

the weather conditions were so thick 

that he anchored for two hours. He 

saw no traces of the Yongala but is 

now fearful of any serious calamity. 

He may have passed within 200 yards 

of the Yongala and not seen her. The 

chief officer of the Cooma entertains 

fears for the safety of the Yongala.

Captain Dawson of the Tainguan,

reports that he anchored at 10 a.m.

on Thursday south of Repulse Island, 

and remained there for 12 hours. It 

was the worst night the captain had 

spent on the Australian coast. He kept 

a lookout on the run to Townsville, but 

saw nothing of the Yongala.

It is interesting that Captain Dawson anchored for 12 hours taking the timeline to 10 pm, 23 March. This was shortly before the worst of the cyclone struck the Grantala's anchorage, Bowling Green Bay. It's as though Captain Dawson waited for the worst of the cyclone and then proceeded towards Townsville and the heart of the cyclone??

On closer inspection of the images below Repulse Island is about 100 n miles south of the Yongala wreck position. The fact that Captain Dawson waited until 10 pm for the worst of the storm to clear suggests that the system came from the south, heading in a relatively northward direction, passing over his vessel towards the north, allowing him to proceed in a northward direction behind the front. 

This suggests a frontal system; late summer phenomenon starting in southeast Queensland (associated with thunderstorms) forced by the Great Divide into a north moving south-east change along the Queensland coast.

Captain Sim reported the wind initially originating from the south east, shifting to southwest and then finally from the northwest, which could also be the description of a severe frontal system passing through.

This might explain why Captain Knight continued on his voyage with the southeaster behind him. He could theoretically have outrun the storm, but from Captain Sim's description, it was not to be. But at least he was not as unhinged as previously suggested by steaming into the heart of a cyclone.

If it was genuinely a cyclone with a diameter of 30 n miles why was it's influence severest for Captain Dawson some 100 n miles south of Cape Bowling Green when cyclones generally come from the northeast ???

Given these factors it is hard to believe there was a cyclone at all, but rather a severe frontal system moving up the Queensland coast. 

A frontal system moving up the coast in a northward direction would also more completely explain the distribution of wreckage discovered.

Why then was it referred to as a cyclone? Perhaps this was done to justify the loss of a presumably seaworthy vessel - perils of the sea.

There is the possibility that there were both, frontal system and cyclone.