Wednesday, 12 October 2016

CATEGORICALLY NOT THE INSIDE PASSAGE!

Cairns Post, Wednesday 14 June, 1911.

Yongala Disaster. 
Marine Board Inquiry Closed. 
Finding to be Announced Shortly. 
(By Telegraph;) 

BRISBANE, Tuesday.-The Marine
Board Inquiry into the loss of the
Yongala was continued this morning.
The investigation would have closed
yesterday but for the desire of some
engineers of the Board to hear further 
evidence concerning the use by 
captains of coastal steamers of the
inside passage between Armit and 
Gumbrell Islands, which was one
mile wide.
Several witnesses stated this passage 
was regularly used by them at all times 
and in practically all weathers.
Captain Binstead, Torres Straits
pilot, said he formerly used the pas-
sage between Armit and Gumbrell
Islands till the outside passage was
surveyed, and shown to be safe
He now always used the outside course,
because it was more direct. He had 
seen other pilots go through the 
outside of Eschelly Island. In his 
opinion the Yongala struck Nares'
Rock or an outlying obstruction,
alter going outside the channel and
not allowing sufficiently for the set.

This is very important. It explains why the inside passage was used by many masters in all weathers. The risk was offset by the chances of striking an obstacle. But Captain Binstead made it perfectly clear that by 23 March, 1911, the outside passage had been charted and there was no longer an excuse (including saving time) for using the inside passage in poor weather and visibility conditions. 

The inside passage was risky
in night time, and he could not 
imagine anyone using it, because
no time was gained by it. On the 
night of  March 23 he was sure no 
one would  have ever attempted 
the passage

He was quite confident Captain Knight 
would not have used the passage that night.

I believe this is case-closed on the subject of using the inside passage - it WAS NOT SAFE - even at night without inclement conditions.

However, despite it all, we know that Yongala made it to within 11 n miles of Cape Bowling Green reducing this controversial subject to a moot point. 
Captain Hurford, Commander of the
Bomballa, said he had been a
master on the Northern coast 18 or
20 years. He passed all sides of the 
islands in fine weather, night and day. 
He was quite sure Captain Knight must 
have gone outside on the night of the 
disaster. He was as confident about it 
as if he was on the bridge with Captain 
Knight. He did not think any weather 
would overwhelm the Yongala. She 
probably struck an uncharted danger on
the outside course. He had passed
the Yongala on the outside course
in dirty weather twice in the last
two and a half years. If Captain
Knight had tried the inside passage
he could only have got through by
chance. The coast generally was 
fairly well lit, though there were weak 
points. On a night such as March 23 
no additional light would have been of 
use because it could not have been seen. 
Asked by Captain Mackay as to
the advisability of anchoring when
indications pointed to a cyclone; 
Captain Hurford said the Howard
Smith Company gave no instructions
in the matter, but after himself running 
through a cyclone the season before 
last he told his colleagues in the service 
that in future he intended to get to an 
anchorage if he had the slightest doubt 
about the weather. That one experience
was enough for him. 

Again a revealing comment suggesting that the owners of the coastal steamers did not advise their masters against chancing their luck in cyclonic conditions. This might be one crucial reason why the issue was not pursued at the Inquiry. If this had been probed, ultimately the Adelaide Steamship Company might have been held responsible for the loss of the Yongala.

After a bad experience Captain Hurford had come to one conclusion - seek shelter and anchor. This is what Captain Knight should have done if he had not been under the impression he was outrunning a frontal system. 
Captain Smith, commander of the
Cooma, said he used the passage
between Armit and Gumbrell Islands 
in very fine weather, but not frequently
in the past year. He completely dropped 
it. Ordinary sailor's prudence would have 
taken Captain Knight outside on the night 
of the disaster. The Cooma followed up
the Yongala on that trip, but was 24 hours 
behind. He received a warning of the 
cyclone at Flat Top and waited. He thought 
the Yongala went broadside onto the danger 
and had her side torn out. He could not think 
she went on the main reef, because she 
would have been found. She was not likely to
have been overwhelmed by the storm. 

This is probably the most accurate assessment of what happened to the Yongala. There is another possibility and it relates to the case of 'The Hawk' see:

http://waratahrevisited.blogspot.co.za/2013/09/anecdote-saturday_14.html

We know that during the height of the storm the gale prevailed from the south, behind Yongala steaming relatively northward. In such circumstances Yongala might have been overtaken by heavy seas breaking over her stern which ultimately caused a breach in the aft main hatch and intense, fatal flooding with release of cargo from the main holds aft. 
Captain Sharland, master of the
Warrego; said he was familiar with 
the Northern coast. His use of the
inside passage depended on the
weather. He always used it if it was 
fine. Captain Knight would certainly 
not have gone there on the night of 
March 23. He could say that positively, 
because they had been shipmates for 
four years, travelling up and down the 
coast together. He thought the Yongala
hit something. An able ship like the 
Yongala would not have been blown over 
by the cyclone. 
Mr. Bond, of the Meteorological
Office, was examined as to the direction 
from which the cyclone came, in view of 
Captain McKenzie's statement that he was 
informed the storm came from the S.W., 
against  the Iaw of cyclones on the 
Queensland coast. He said the accepted
theory was that these storms came from N.E., 
and there was nothing to support the S.W. 
statement in regard to the storm on March 23.
There were no records of storms of
this type coming from any other
direction than N.E. The warning of
the storm of March 23 was sent from
Brisbane at the earliest possible moment, 
but too late for Captain Knight.

A hybrid cyclone with a significant extension of gales predominating from the south (including southwest) could have created the confusion expressed by Captain Mackenzie. This interesting and complicated subject still requires more detailed resolution. It would be illuminating to hear from an expert on the subject of cyclones etc... Queensland coast. Captain Mackenzie was not a fool. Someone needed to pay attention to the quandary.
This concluded the evidence. 
Mr. O'Shea addressed the Board,
and urged that no findings should be
based on conjecture, and that the
Board should confine its conclusions
to matters upon which there was
positive evidence. The Adelaide
Company could not be injured by
conjecture, but it might have an 
effect upon the unthinking public.
He thought the Board must certainly
arrive at the conclusion that every-
thing human effort could do was
done to save the ship, and the souls
on board her. There had been only
one opinion expressed before the
Board as to the seamanship and 
extreme cautiousness of Captain
Knight. 
Captain Mackay replied that the
Board realised it had a difficult task
before it. The Board had acted
solely in the interests of the 
company in inviting anyone who 
desired to give evidence to appear
before the Board; in view of the 
rumours circulated, and it must be 
satisfactory to the Company that 
not one single one responded to 
the invitation. The Board's findings 
would be announced in open court 
with the least possible delay. 

Main goal for Inquiry = do not injure the Adelaide Steamship Company !!

Unthinking public = insulting  = whitewash !!

Captain Knight was not a man of 'extreme cautiousness' but in the same breath I do not believe he was unhinged, steaming directly into a cyclone intentionally !!

I ABSOLUTELY agree that everything was done on Yongala during the height of the crisis to save the ship and souls. But sometimes mother nature has the final say on the matter.

It is fascinating that exactly the same scenario played out at the Inquiry into the loss of the Koombana:

"in view of the rumours circulated,
and it must be satisfactory to the
Company that not one single one
responded to the invitation."

"Those busybodies who said things 
to the contrary had been given an 
ample opportunity to appear before 
the Court and give evidence, but not 
one of their number had come forward."    after being invited to do so. 




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