CATEGORICALLY NOT THE INSIDE PASSAGE!

Cairns Post, Wednesday 14 June, 1911.

Yongala Disaster. 

Marine Board Inquiry Closed. 

Finding to be Announced Shortly. 

(By Telegraph;) 

BRISBANE, Tuesday.-The Marine

Board Inquiry into the loss of the

Yongala was continued this morning.

The investigation would have closed

yesterday but for the desire of some

engineers of the Board to hear further 

evidence concerning the use by 

captains of coastal steamers of the

inside passage between Armit and 

Gumbrell Islands, which was one

mile wide.

Several witnesses stated this passage 

was regularly used by them at all times 

and in practically all weathers.

Captain Binstead, Torres Straits

pilot, said he formerly used the pas-

sage between Armit and Gumbrell

Islands till the outside passage was

surveyed, and shown to be safe. 

He now always used the outside course,

because it was more direct. He had 

seen other pilots go through the 

outside of Eschelly Island. In his 

opinion the Yongala struck Nares'

Rock or an outlying obstruction,

alter going outside the channel and

not allowing sufficiently for the set.

This is very important. It explains why the inside passage was used by many masters in all weathers. The risk was offset by the chances of striking an obstacle. But Captain Binstead made it perfectly clear that by 23 March, 1911, the outside passage had been charted and there was no longer an excuse (including saving time) for using the inside passage in poor weather and visibility conditions. 

The inside passage was risky

in night time, and he could not 

imagine anyone using it, because

no time was gained by it. On the 

night of  March 23 he was sure no 

one would  have ever attempted 

the passage. 

He was quite confident Captain Knight 

would not have used the passage that night.

I believe this is case-closed on the subject of using the inside passage - it WAS NOT SAFE - even at night without inclement conditions.

However, despite it all, we know that Yongala made it to within 11 n miles of Cape Bowling Green reducing this controversial subject to a moot point. 

Captain Hurford, Commander of the

Bomballa, said he had been a

master on the Northern coast 18 or

20 years. He passed all sides of the 

islands in fine weather, night and day. 

He was quite sure Captain Knight must 

have gone outside on the night of the 

disaster. He was as confident about it 

as if he was on the bridge with Captain 

Knight. He did not think any weather 

would overwhelm the Yongala. She 

probably struck an uncharted danger on

the outside course. He had passed

the Yongala on the outside course

in dirty weather twice in the last

two and a half years. If Captain

Knight had tried the inside passage

he could only have got through by

chance. The coast generally was 

fairly well lit, though there were weak 

points. On a night such as March 23 

no additional light would have been of 

use because it could not have been seen. 

Asked by Captain Mackay as to

the advisability of anchoring when

indications pointed to a cyclone; 

Captain Hurford said the Howard

Smith Company gave no instructions

in the matter, but after himself running 

through a cyclone the season before 

last he told his colleagues in the service 

that in future he intended to get to an 

anchorage if he had the slightest doubt 

about the weather. That one experience

was enough for him. 

Again a revealing comment suggesting that the owners of the coastal steamers did not advise their masters against chancing their luck in cyclonic conditions. This might be one crucial reason why the issue was not pursued at the Inquiry. If this had been probed, ultimately the Adelaide Steamship Company might have been held responsible for the loss of the Yongala.

After a bad experience Captain Hurford had come to one conclusion - seek shelter and anchor. This is what Captain Knight should have done if he had not been under the impression he was outrunning a frontal system. 

Captain Smith, commander of the

Cooma, said he used the passage

between Armit and Gumbrell Islands 

in very fine weather, but not frequently

in the past year. He completely dropped 

it. Ordinary sailor's prudence would have 

taken Captain Knight outside on the night 

of the disaster. The Cooma followed up

the Yongala on that trip, but was 24 hours 

behind. He received a warning of the 

cyclone at Flat Top and waited. He thought 

the Yongala went broadside onto the danger 

and had her side torn out. He could not think 

she went on the main reef, because she 

would have been found. She was not likely to

have been overwhelmed by the storm. 

This is probably the most accurate assessment of what happened to the Yongala. There is another possibility and it relates to the case of 'The Hawk' see:

http://waratahrevisited.blogspot.co.za/2013/09/anecdote-saturday_14.html

We know that during the height of the storm the gale prevailed from the south, behind Yongala steaming relatively northward. In such circumstances Yongala might have been overtaken by heavy seas breaking over her stern which ultimately caused a breach in the aft main hatch and intense, fatal flooding with release of cargo from the main holds aft. 

Captain Sharland, master of the

Warrego; said he was familiar with 

the Northern coast. His use of the

inside passage depended on the

weather. He always used it if it was 

fine. Captain Knight would certainly 

not have gone there on the night of 

March 23. He could say that positively, 

because they had been shipmates for 

four years, travelling up and down the 

coast together. He thought the Yongala

hit something. An able ship like the 

Yongala would not have been blown over 

by the cyclone. 

Mr. Bond, of the Meteorological

Office, was examined as to the direction 

from which the cyclone came, in view of 

Captain McKenzie's statement that he was 

informed the storm came from the S.W., 

against  the Iaw of cyclones on the 

Queensland coast. He said the accepted

theory was that these storms came from N.E., 

and there was nothing to support the S.W. 

statement in regard to the storm on March 23.

There were no records of storms of

this type coming from any other

direction than N.E. The warning of

the storm of March 23 was sent from

Brisbane at the earliest possible moment, 

but too late for Captain Knight.

A hybrid cyclone with a significant extension of gales predominating from the south (including southwest) could have created the confusion expressed by Captain Mackenzie. This interesting and complicated subject still requires more detailed resolution. It would be illuminating to hear from an expert on the subject of cyclones etc... Queensland coast. Captain Mackenzie was not a fool. Someone needed to pay attention to the quandary.

This concluded the evidence. 

Mr. O'Shea addressed the Board,

and urged that no findings should be

based on conjecture, and that the

Board should confine its conclusions

to matters upon which there was

positive evidence. The Adelaide

Company could not be injured by

conjecture, but it might have an 

effect upon the unthinking public.
He thought the Board must certainly

arrive at the conclusion that every-

thing human effort could do was

done to save the ship, and the souls

on board her. There had been only

one opinion expressed before the

Board as to the seamanship and 

extreme cautiousness of Captain

Knight. 

Captain Mackay replied that the

Board realised it had a difficult task

before it. The Board had acted

solely in the interests of the 

company in inviting anyone who 

desired to give evidence to appear

before the Board; in view of the 

rumours circulated, and it must be 

satisfactory to the Company that 

not one single one responded to 

the invitation. The Board's findings 

would be announced in open court 

with the least possible delay. 

Main goal for Inquiry = do not injure the Adelaide Steamship Company !!

Unthinking public = insulting  = whitewash !!

Captain Knight was not a man of 'extreme cautiousness' but in the same breath I do not believe he was unhinged, steaming directly into a cyclone intentionally !!

I ABSOLUTELY agree that everything was done on Yongala during the height of the crisis to save the ship and souls. But sometimes mother nature has the final say on the matter.

It is fascinating that exactly the same scenario played out at the Inquiry into the loss of the Koombana:

"in view of the rumours circulated,
and it must be satisfactory to the
Company that not one single one
responded to the invitation."

"Those busybodies who said things 

to the contrary had been given an 

ample opportunity to appear before 

the Court and give evidence, but not 

one of their number had come forward."    after being invited to do so.